Linguistics and Human Brain: A Perspective of Computational Neuroscience

Nastase et al. (2026) argue that large language models (LLMs) may illuminate language processing because both rely on distributed, context-sensitive representations shaped by statistical learning. Their rejection of simple cortical "boxology" is persuasive, and they articulate a strong case for the value of LLM-brain alignment research. The key question is what kind of inference LLM-brain alignment licenses. My claim here will be narrow: representational alignment can in principle constrain mechanistic hypotheses, but it does not by itself identify a mechanism. Nastase et al. acknowledge that an encoding model can capture features represented in neural activity without establishing a shared architecture or algorithm. Yet the authors sometime move from alignment to "shared computational principles" and ultimately to LLMs as mechanistic models of natural language. Indeed, their methodological caveat that alignment does not establish a shared architecture or algorithm sits uneasily with their conclusion that LLMs might instantiate the same computational principles as biological brains and provide a "fully mechanistic model" of language. I discuss what I consider to be problems of logical, causal, and computational underdetermination in Nastase et al.'s (2026) proposal.

Brain-language model alignment is often interpreted as evidence that transformer models implement computations similar to those of the human brain. This assumes that neural predictivity reflects internal computational properties of large language models (LLMs), such as hierarchical contextual processing, predictive coding, or representational compression. An alternative possibility is that brain scores primarily reflect stable lexical-semantic correspondences shared by language models and the brain. Here we tested these interpretations using whole-brain encoding models across Mandarin, English, and French. Across all three languages, transformer representations significantly predicted activity in a distributed network spanning classical language regions, transmodal cortical systems, and subcortical structures. These spatial patterns showed substantial cross-linguistic overlap and remained remarkably stable across layers, providing little evidence that model depth systematically maps onto cortical processing hierarchies. Likewise, contextual transformer embeddings did not consistently outperform static lexical embeddings, despite providing some unique predictive variance. Finally, neither surprisal nor intrinsic dimensionality reproduced the layer-wise profile of brain scores, arguing against prediction and information compression as primary explanations for brain-LLM alignment. Together, these findings suggest that brain-LLM alignment is more robust across languages, transformer depth, and model architectures than previously appreciated, but less informative about shared computational mechanisms. Our results are more consistent with neural predictivity reflecting stable representational structure preserved across model transformations than with a one-to-one correspondence between their underlying computations.

Brain-language model comparisons often interpret neural prediction scores as evidence that model representations capture brain-relevant language computation. We asked whether language models align with brains, and whether prediction scores are enough to support that claim, using L-PACT, a source-audited framework that evaluates predictive, relational, mechanism-stripping, and reliability-bounded evidence. Across primary naturalistic language neural datasets and derived language-model representations, L-PACT compared real model features with nuisance baselines and severe controls, tested whether model-to-brain profiles reproduced brain-to-brain patterns, recomputed held-out scores after mechanism stripping, and normalized evidence against brain-brain ceilings. The locked analysis set contains 414 predictive-control rows, 2304 relational profile rows, 4320 mechanism-stripping rows, 420 brain-brain ceiling rows, and 146 integrated decision rows. Assay-sensitivity checks showed that brain-brain reliability, brain-as-model run-to-run relational profiles, independent low-level neural and WAV-derived acoustic-envelope gates, and a deterministic implanted-signal simulation can produce positive evidence when expected. Nevertheless, no real model row passed the predictive, relational, mechanism-stripping, or operational Turing-bounded reliability gates; all 146 integrated rows were control-explained. Less stringent single-criterion rules would have counted raw positive predictive, relational, stripping-delta, and ceiling-normalized effects, but L-PACT downgraded them because controls explained the apparent evidence. In the analyzed derived artifact set, the tested language-model representations do not satisfy L-PACT alignment gates; apparent positives are converted into an auditable control-explained taxonomy rather than treated as structural alignment.