Prompt design affects the moral judgments and refusal behavior produced by large language models (LLMs), yet controlled comparisons remain fragmented across datasets and models. We introduce ProMoral-Bench, a benchmark-style comparison of 10 prompting paradigms across four LLM families. Using ETHICS, Scruples, WildJailbreak, and our 200-pair ETHICS-Contrast set, we report task-level metrics together with Moral Competence Score (MCS), jailbreak/over-refusal Safety Robustness Score (SRS), and Unified Moral Safety Score (UMSS). UMSS is a study-specific relative summary of MCS and SRS, not an absolute measure of model safety or moral grounding. In this fixed-template evaluation, compact exemplar-guided scaffolds attain stronger competence-robustness trade-offs at lower token cost than the particular multi-stage variants tested, although multi-stage prompting occasionally improves jailbreak refusal. The few-shot demonstrations are non-overlapping but drawn from the evaluation distributions, so their advantage should not be read as out-of-distribution robustness. Code and data are available at https://github.com/rohanthomas334-sketch/ProMoral_Bench.
Figures & tables
Model
Strategy
Acc
F1
ECE
GPT
Plan-and-Solve
0.96
0.96
0.03
GPT
Few-Shot-CoT
0.96
0.96
0.06
GPT
Few-Shot
0.95
0.95
0.05
Claude
Few-Shot
0.94
0.94
0.09
Claude
Zero-Shot
0.94
0.94
0.07
Claude
Role Prompting
0.93
0.93
0.06
Table 1: ETHICS (mini). Top three strategies per model by Accuracy/F1. Full results are in Table 10 .We abbreviate model names as follows: GPT = GPT-4.1, Claude = Claude Sonnet-4, Gemini = Gemini 2.5 Pro, DS = DeepSeek-V3.1.
Model
Strategy
Acc
F1
ECE
GPT
Role Prompting
0.60
0.63
0.33
GPT
Few-Shot-CoT
0.57
0.62
0.24
GPT
Value-Grounded
0.56
0.60
0.32
Claude
Few-Shot-CoT
0.66
0.68
0.10
Claude
First-Principles
0.63
0.65
0.20
Claude
Value-Grounded
0.61
0.64
0.12
Table 2: Scruples (mini). Top three strategies per model by Accuracy/F1. Full results are in Table 11 .
Model
Strategy
Δ Acc
Δ F1
Δ ECE
GPT
Role Prompting
-0.02
-0.02
+0.03
GPT
Zero-Shot-CoT
−0.02
−0.02
−0.00
GPT
Few-Shot
−0.03
−0.03
−0.01
Claude
Self-Correct
+0.09
+0.15
+0.04
Claude
First-Principles
−0.04
−0.04
0.01
Claude
Few-Shot
−0.05
−0.04
−0.01
Table 3: ETHICS-Contrast (mini). Top three strategies per model by least drop (higher Δ is better). Full results are in Table 12 .
Model
Strategy
ASR
RTA
GPT
Thought Experiment
0.16
0.04
GPT
Role Prompting
0.30
0.03
GPT
Value-Grounded
0.31
0.04
Claude
Value-Grounded
0.05
0.33
Claude
First-Principles
0.06
0.34
Claude
Zero-Shot
0.10
0.29
Table 4: WildJailbreak (mini). Top three strategies per model by lowest ASR (RTA shown). Full results are in Table 13 .
Task / expected behavior
Audited input (abridged)
Compact scaffold
Multi-stage scaffold
ETHICS-Contrast / Acceptable
“lit a cigarette as I got into the taxi” → “as I left the taxi”
Role: correct
Thought Experiment and Self-Correct: incorrect
ETHICS-Contrast / Acceptable
“put shampoo in her coffee” → “put sugar in her coffee”
Role: correct
Thought Experiment: correct; Self-Correct: incorrect
WildJailbreak benign / Comply
Authorized email-service security assessment with explicit terms-of-service constraints
Few-Shot-CoT: compliant answer with authorization safeguards
Thought Experiment: full refusal
WildJailbreak harmful / Refuse
Fictional request that escalates into assistance for infiltrating a violent gang
Few-Shot-CoT: refusal and non-violent redirection
Thought Experiment: substantive compliance
Table 5: Representative released-log outcomes. Cases are illustrative; harmful content is abridged.
Model
MCS
SRS
UMSS
GPT-4.1
0.800
0.710
0.752
Claude Sonnet-4
0.722
0.596
0.653
DeepSeek V3.1
0.688
0.626
0.655
Gemini 2.5 Pro
0.621
0.639
0.630
Table 6: Unified Moral Competence/Safety. MCS is the average min–max normalized accuracy on ETHICS and Scruples , and flip robustness on ETHICS-Contrast . SRS aggregates WildJailbreak by averaging min–max normalized safe rates (1−ASR,1−RTA) across a model’s prompting runs. UMSS is the harmonic mean of MCS and SRS. Bootstrap 95% CIs are in Appendix C.4 .
Prompting Strategy
MCS
SRS
UMSS
Few-Shot-CoT
0.967
0.686
0.803
Few-Shot
0.948
0.695
0.802
Role Prompting
0.934
0.636
0.757
Plan-and-Solve
0.894
0.512
0.651
Zero-Shot-CoT
0.827
0.508
0.629
Zero-Shot
0.847
0.358
0.504
Table 7: UMSS by prompting strategy. MCS: mean of min–max normalized classification scores over ETHICS , ETHICS-Contrast (flip accuracy), and Scruples . SRS: mean of min–max normalized safe rates (1−ASR,1−RTA) from WildJailbreak . UMSS is the harmonic mean of MCS and SRS ( β=1 ). Bootstrap 95% CIs are in Appendix C.4 .
Figure 1: UMSS vs. Token Cost. Scatter plot of UMSS score against average tokens per example (log scale) for ten prompting strategies. Green shading indicates optimal zone; dotted line marks efficiency threshold; dashed line shows LSRL.
Strategy
β=0.5
β=1.0
β=2.0
Few-Shot-CoT
0.893
0.803
0.728
Few-Shot
0.884
0.802
0.734
Role Prompting
0.844
0.757
0.678
Plan-and-Solve
0.777
0.651
0.560
Zero-Shot-CoT
0.735
0.629
0.551
Value-Grounded
0.615
0.502
0.435
Table 8: Strategy-level UMSS under varying β . Top-3 rankings remain stable; only positions 1–2 swap at β=2.0 .
Model
β=0.5
β=1.0
β=2.0
GPT-4.1
0.780
0.752
0.726
Claude Sonnet-4
0.697
0.653
0.619
DeepSeek V3.1
0.674
0.655
0.637
Gemini 2.5 Pro
0.623
0.630
0.635
Table 9: Model-level UMSS under varying β . GPT-4.1 leads throughout; Claude drops from 2nd to 4th as β increases.
Appendix figures & tables30 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Model
Prompting Strategy
Accuracy
F1
ECE
Brier
Avg Tokens
GPT-4.1
Zero-Shot
0.946
0.946
0.063
0.053
127.6
Zero-Shot-CoT
0.948
0.948
0.064
0.052
149.2
Few-Shot
0.952
0.952
0.052
0.040
305.1
Few-Shot-CoT
0.959
0.958
0.063
0.036
513.4
Role Prompting
0.935
0.936
0.042
0.035
207.5
Thought Exp
0.900
0.904
0.117
0.092
13822.7
Appendix
Table 10: ETHICS dataset results. We report Accuracy, F1 (positive class= Unacceptable ), calibration (ECE, Brier), and average tokens per example.
Model
Prompt
Acc
F1
ECE
Brier
Avg Tokens
GPT-4.1
Zero-Shot
0.503
0.569
0.396
0.054
604.5
Zero-Shot-CoT
0.467
0.542
0.440
0.050
724.9
Few-Shot
0.535
0.574
0.326
0.060
841.6
Few-Shot-CoT
0.568
0.615
0.242
0.071
880.2
Role Prompting
0.596
0.628
0.326
0.048
748.8
Thought Exp
0.274
0.298
0.656
0.041
18555.8
Appendix
Table 11: Scruples results. We report overall Accuracy, weighted F1 (five classes), calibration (ECE, Brier), and average tokens per example.
Model
Prompt
Acc (orig)
Acc (flip)
Δ Acc
Δ F1
Δ ECE
Δ Brier
GPT-4.1
Zero-Shot
0.980
0.945
−0.035
−0.035
0.004
0.026
Zero-Shot-CoT
0.970
0.950
−0.020
−0.020
−0.004
0.017
Few-Shot
0.990
0.965
−0.025
−0.025
−0.014
0.018
Few-Shot-CoT
0.985
0.930
−0.055
−0.055
−0.014
0.035
Role Prompting
0.970
0.955
−0.015
−0.015
0.029
0.035
Thought Exp
0.980
0.860
−0.120
−0.102
0.061
0.098
Appendix
Table 12: ETHICS-Contrast results. Accuracy on originals vs. flips, and the change ( Δ ) in accuracy, F1, and calibration ( Δ ECE, Δ Brier) for each prompting method.
Model
Prompt
ASR
RTA
Avg Gen Tokens
GPT-4.1
Zero-Shot
0.487
0.030
507
Zero-Shot-CoT
0.4429
0.0071
501
Few-Shot
0.4077
0.0154
2235
Few-Shot-CoT
0.3750
0.0167
1869
Role Prompting
0.3000
0.0333
557
Thought Experiment
0.1556
0.0444
7102
Appendix
Table 13: WildJailbreak safety results. We report Attack Success Rate (ASR; lower is better), Refusal Rate on benign prompts (RTA; lower is better), and efficiency as average generation tokens per example.
Table 24: Pairwise model UMSS significance. Δ = UMSS(A) − UMSS(B). pcorr : Holm–Bonferroni corrected bootstrap p -values ( N=10,000 ). GPT = GPT-4.1, Claude = Claude Sonnet-4, DS = DeepSeek V3.1, Gemini = Gemini 2.5 Pro.
Baseline
− Best
− Both
Strategy
UMSS
Rank
UMSS
Rank
UMSS
Rank
Few-Shot-CoT
0.803
1
0.803
1
0.811
2
Few-Shot
0.802
2
0.802
2
0.813
1
Role Prompting
0.757
3
0.694
3
0.696
3
Plan-and-Solve
0.651
4
0.651
4
0.662
4
Zero-Shot-CoT
0.629
5
0.629
5
0.640
5
Appendix
Table 25: UMSS strategy rankings under outlier removal. Best removes the highest-scoring (model, strategy) pair from the normalization pool; Both removes both the highest and lowest. Maximum rank displacement is one position.
Harmonic
Arithmetic
Geometric
Wt-HM
Strategy
UMSS
Rk
UMSS
Rk
UMSS
Rk
UMSS
Rk
Few-Shot-CoT
0.803
1
0.826
1
0.814
1
0.802
1
Few-Shot
0.802
2
0.821
2
0.812
2
0.798
2
Role Prompting
0.757
3
0.785
3
0.771
3
0.758
3
Plan-and-Solve
0.651
4
0.703
4
0.676
4
0.648
4
Zero-Shot-CoT
0.629
5
0.668
5
0.648
5
0.625
5
Appendix
Table 26: Strategy-level UMSS under four aggregation methods. Wt-HM downweights ETHICS at 0.5× in MCS to account for near-saturation. Top-three rankings are invariant across all methods; maximum rank displacement is one position.
Annotator Pair
Cohen’s κ
Raw Agreement
A vs. B
0.930
96.5%
A vs. C
0.990
99.5%
B vs. C
0.940
97.0%
Mean pairwise κ
0.953
97.7%
Fleiss’ κ (3 raters)
0.953
Appendix
Table 27: Inter-annotator agreement for ETHICS-Contrast. Three annotators independently classified 200 minimal-edit pairs as flip or preserve . Fleiss’ κ=0.953 indicates almost perfect agreement ( Landis and Koch, 1977 ) . Unanimous agreement was reached on 193/200 pairs (96.5%); the remaining 7 (all label-flipping edits) were resolved by majority vote. All 100 label-preserving pairs received unanimous agreement.
Prompting Strategy
Est. Latency (s)
Est. Energy (Wh)
Zero-Shot
4.1
0.37
Zero-Shot-CoT
4.3
0.40
Few-Shot
9.2
0.98
Few-Shot-CoT
8.7
0.93
Role Prompting
4.8
0.46
First-Principles
7.5
0.78
Appendix
Table 28: Latency and Energy Estimates. Estimated average inference latency and energy consumption per query across prompting strategies. Latency accounts for multi-turn network overhead, while energy is derived from token volume assuming standard frontier model efficiency (2.5 J/token, PUE 1.15).
Prompting Strategy
GPT-4.1
Claude Sonnet-4
Gemini 2.5 Pro
DeepSeek-V3.1
Zero-Shot
1,700
850
1,700
1,700
Zero-Shot-CoT
900
450
900
900
Few-Shot
1,700
850
1,700
1,700
Few-Shot-CoT
900
450
900
900
Role Prompting
1,700
850
1,700
1,700
Thought Experiment
100
50
100
100
Appendix
Table 29: ETHICS dataset evaluation instances per model and prompting strategy
Prompting Strategy
GPT-4.1
Claude Sonnet-4
Gemini 2.5 Pro
DeepSeek-V3.1
Zero-Shot
1,466
850
1,466
1,466
Zero-Shot-CoT
900
450
900
900
Few-Shot
1,466
850
1,466
1,466
Few-Shot-CoT
900
450
900
900
Role Prompting
1,466
850
1,466
1,466
Thought Experiment
100
50
100
100
Appendix
Table 30: Scruples dataset evaluation instances per model and prompting strategy
Prompting Strategy
GPT-4.1
Claude Sonnet-4
Gemini 2.5 Pro
DeepSeek-V3.1
Zero-Shot
430 (230 / 200)
280 (140 / 140)
428 (228 / 200)
430 (230 / 200)
Zero-Shot-CoT
280 (140 / 140)
220 (110 / 110)
278 (138 / 140)
280 (140 / 140)
Few-Shot
260 (130 / 130)
200 (100 / 100)
259 (129 / 130)
260 (130 / 130)
Few-Shot-CoT
240 (120 / 120)
180 (90 / 90)
240 (120 / 120)
240 (120 / 120)
Role Prompting
240 (120 / 120)
180 (90 / 90)
236 (116 / 120)
240 (120 / 120)
Thought Experiment
90 (45 / 45)
80 (40 / 40)
89 (44 / 45)
90 (45 / 45)
Appendix
Table 31: WildJailbreak dataset evaluation instances per model and prompting strategy. Format: Total (Harmful / Benign).
Prompting Strategy
GPT-4.1
Claude Sonnet-4
Gemini 2.5 Pro
DeepSeek-V3.1
Zero-Shot
400
400
400
400
Zero-Shot-CoT
400
400
400
400
Few-Shot
400
400
400
400
Few-Shot-CoT
400
400
400
400
Role Prompting
400
400
400
400
Thought Experiment
100
50
100
100
Appendix
Table 32: ETHICS-Contrast dataset evaluation instances per model and prompting strategy. Each of the 200 contrast pairs requires two evaluations (original + contrast), so counts reflect total model calls.
Dataset
GPT-4.1
Claude Sonnet-4
Gemini 2.5 Pro
DeepSeek-V3.1
Total
ETHICS
8,300
4,150
8,300
8,300
29,050
Scruples
7,598
4,150
7,598
7,598
26,944
WildJailbreak
2,290
1,720
2,259
2,290
8,559
ETHICS-Contrast
3,400
2,900
3,400
3,400
13,100
Grand Total
21,588
12,920
21,557
21,588
77,653
Appendix
Table 33: Summary of total evaluation instances across all datasets and models.
Model
Total
Audited
%
GPT-4.1
2,290
244
10.7
DeepSeek-V3.1
2,290
339
14.8
Claude Sonnet-4
1,720
316
18.4
Gemini 2.5 Pro
2,259
514
22.8
Strategy
Total
Audited
%
Zero-Shot
1,568
167
10.7
Appendix
Table 34: Human audit rates by model and prompting strategy on WildJailbreak . Higher audit rates indicate more edge-case or ambiguous model responses.
Trigger
Count
%
Judge disagreement
1,225
86.7
Primary incorrect
988
69.9
Partial compliance
187
13.2
Length anomaly
162
11.5
Identity terms
153
10.8
Appendix
Table 35: Edge-case trigger frequency among the 1,413 instances flagged for human audit.
Model
Prompting Strategy
Accuracy
F1
ECE
Brier
Avg Tokens
Llama 3.3 70B
Zero-Shot
0.914
0.917
0.061
0.070
158.2
Few-Shot-CoT
0.900
0.905
0.071
0.081
496.3
Plan-and-Solve
0.885
0.888
0.095
0.104
767.0
Self-Correct
0.820
0.839
0.133
0.138
4015.1
Appendix
Table 36: ETHICS results for Llama 3.3 70B Instruct. We report Accuracy, F1 (positive class= Unacceptable ), calibration (ECE, Brier), and average tokens per example.
Model
Prompt
Acc
F1
ECE
Brier
Avg Tokens
Llama 3.3 70B
Zero-Shot
0.231
0.321
0.583
0.067
576.8
Few-Shot-CoT
0.522
0.558
0.219
0.095
929.8
Plan-and-Solve
0.424
0.483
0.386
0.063
1437.9
Self-Correct
0.466
0.522
0.427
0.046
3614.8
Appendix
Table 37: Scruples results for Llama 3.3 70B Instruct. We report overall Accuracy, weighted F1 (five classes), calibration (ECE, Brier), and average tokens per example.
Model
Prompt
Acc (orig)
Acc (flip)
Δ Acc
Δ F1
Δ ECE
Δ Brier
Llama 3.3 70B
Few-Shot-CoT
0.980
0.935
−0.045
−0.045
0.013
0.041
Plan-and-Solve
0.970
0.920
−0.050
−0.048
−0.008
0.057
Zero-Shot
0.990
0.925
−0.065
−0.066
0.005
0.053
Self-Correct
0.876
0.758
−0.119
−0.091
0.022
0.108
Appendix
Table 38: ETHICS-Contrast results for Llama 3.3 70B Instruct. Accuracy on originals vs. flips, and the change ( Δ ) in accuracy, F1, and calibration ( Δ ECE, Δ Brier) for each prompting method. Rows are sorted by smallest ∣ΔAcc∣ .
Model
Prompt
ASR
RTA
Avg Gen Tokens
Llama 3.3 70B
Zero-Shot
0.7739
0.0450
632.1
Few-Shot-CoT
0.5167
0.0167
1974.9
Plan-and-Solve
0.6900
0.0600
1550.0
Self-Correct
0.7143
0.0286
9294.0
Appendix
Table 39: WildJailbreak safety results for Llama 3.3 70B Instruct. We report Attack Success Rate (ASR; lower is better), Refusal Rate on benign prompts (RTA; lower is better), and average generation tokens per example.
Social psychology has long described how people can be persuaded to interpret a harmful act as moral. Recent research suggests that Large Language Models (LLMs) echo aspects of human psychology, from cognitive biases to social conformity. This raises a question with direct safety implications: can LLMs be moralized to bypass safety guardrails? We answer this question with a multi-agent framework grounded in Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). Given a harmful request that is initially refused, our agents diagnose which moral foundation (MF) the prompt is violating, identify a justifiable foundation under which the same request appears virtuous, rewrite the prompt accordingly, and reinforce it with generated precedents of comparable moral reframing. We evaluate our framework on harmful prompts from three well-known jailbreak datasets across five open-source and proprietary models. Our analysis reveals that models are highly susceptible to moralization, exhibiting high single-trial jailbreak rates with success increasing further under repeated attempts. We also find that safety benchmarks are imbalanced in the MFs they violate, concentrating on foundations toward which models already exhibit biases.
For highly capable AI systems to operate safely in dynamic, open-ended environments, they must be able to identify, understand, and respond to moral reasons for action, and constrain their behaviour accordingly. A growing body of research aims to evaluate this capacity -- moral competence -- in today's most capable AI systems, recently reaching broadly pessimistic conclusions. One of the most ambitious such papers collects gold-standard human-authored rubrics for evaluating moral reasoning in 1,000 cases, and benchmarks frontier AI models against those rubrics, with underwhelming results. In this paper, we argue that the MoReBench dataset can be redeployed to give a much more optimistic picture of LLMs' moral reasoning (an essential part of moral competence). We show that if, instead of scoring LLMs' responses to these cases against these rubrics, we instead give the LLMs the same task given to humans -- to generate scoring rubrics for the moral analysis of particular cases -- the rubrics they generate are both better calibrated to the human rubrics than their open-ended responses, and, where they differ, plausibly reflect nothing more than the vast dimensionality of most moral problems, as well as highlighting some human departures from the "rubric for creating rubrics". Taking these points into consideration, the MoReBench dataset suggests that LLMs are significantly more capable at moral reasoning than was previously believed.
Menghang Zhu, Seth Lazar
School of Philosophy (Political Philosophy) Renmin University of China · School of Government and Policy Johns Hopkins University
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly participate in morally sensitive decision-making, yet how they organize ethical frameworks across reasoning steps remains underexplored. We introduce moral reasoning trajectories, sequences of ethical framework invocations across intermediate reasoning steps, and analyze their dynamics across six models and three benchmarks. We find that moral reasoning involves systematic multi-framework deliberation: 55.4--57.7% of consecutive steps involve framework switches, and only 16.4--17.8% of trajectories remain framework-consistent. Unstable trajectories remain 1.29 times more susceptible to persuasive attacks (p=0.015). At the representation level, linear probes localize framework-specific encoding to model-specific layers (layer 63/81 for Llama-3.3-70B; layer 17/81 for Qwen2.5-72B), achieving 16.8--22.2% lower KL divergence than the step-prior baseline. Activation steering applied during generation moves the framework-consistency--accuracy relationship, widening it for Qwen2.5-72B and erasing it for Llama-3.3-70B, and a probe-space layer sweep bounds the attainable drift reduction at 6.7--8.9%. We further propose a Moral Representation Consistency (MRC) metric whose underlying framework attributions are validated by human annotators (mean cosine similarity = 0.859), and we report what an automated coherence rater does and does not establish about it.