Organizations: Huazhong University of Science and Technology · Nanyang Technological University · Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications · Renmin University of China · Sony AI, Zurich, Switzerland
Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) in long chain-of-thought reasoning often fail when different knowledge sources provide conflicting signals. We formalize these failures under a unified notion of knowledge conflict, distinguishing input-level objective conflict from process-level effective conflict. Through probing internal representations, we reveal that: (I) Linear Separability: different conflict types are explicitly encoded as linearly separable features rather than entangled; (II) Depth Localization: conflict signals concentrate in mid-to-late layers, indicating a distinct processing stage for conflict encoding; (III) Hierarchical Consistency: aggregating noisy token-level signals along trajectories robustly recovers input-level conflict types; and (IV) Directional Asymmetry: reinforcing the model's implicit source preference under conflict is far easier than enforcing the opposite source. Our findings provide a mechanism-level view of multimodal reasoning under knowledge conflict and enable principled diagnosis and control of long-CoT failures.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Overview of Knowledge Sources and Conflict Types. We categorize knowledge into Visual ( Kvision ), Textual ( Ktext ), and Parametric Prior ( Kprior ). Knowledge conflicts arise when factual statements from different sources act as incompatible signals. We define three primary conflict types: Vision-Text ( CVT ), Vision-Prior ( CVP ), and Prior-Text ( CPT ).
Metric
Llama-3.2V-11B-cot
R1-Onevision-7B
Ocean-R1-7B-Instruct
CVPo=1
CVTo=1
CPTo=1
All
CVPo=1
CVTo=1
CPTo=1
All
CVPo=1
CVTo=1
CPTo=1
All
Samples
749
1012
803
2564
724
993
769
2486
640
1026
807
2473
Avg. CoT length (tokens)
326.79
1768.85
238.50
868.32
706.85
790.63
558.97
694.57
488.15
711.26
302.97
520.28
Avg. conflict spans per sample
2.69
6.20
4.04
4.50
3.66
6.73
7.02
5.93
8.68
9.00
5.43
7.75
Conflict token density (%)
4.92
1.65
11.25
5.61
3.20
2.16
7.68
4.17
8.70
3.23
11.77
7.43
Conflict Sample Ratio (%)
63.68
82.21
86.43
78.12
59.67
85.90
87.91
78.88
88.75
90.25
89.34
89.57
Table 1: Output-level conflict profile across models (objective conflict subsets). We present statistics of generated trajectories under three types of conflict (model details in Appendix B ). Metrics reported include sample count, average CoT length, average conflict spans per sample ( spans are contiguous conflict segments identified via an automated LLM annotation pipeline, may consist of one or multiple tokens. ), conflict token density (proportion of conflicting tokens), and sample conflict rate (% of samples exhibiting effective conflict ).
Figure 2: Token-level separability of effective conflict Ci,je(t∣x) . The left panel shows the confusion matrix over token-level conflict predictions. The right panels decompose performance into binary detection of conflict versus no-conflict, and fine-grained attribution among conflict types. Values denote row-normalized recall.
Figure 3: Sample-level separability of conflict types. We visualize the t-SNE projection of hidden states at layer 20 ( R1-Onevision ) and layer 39 ( Llama-3.2V ). The three conflict categories are colored according to their Objective Conflict labels, pre-defined during dataset construction. The top-right confusion matrices illustrate the sample-level attribution performance.
Figure 4: Cross-layer distribution of conflict signals. Top row: attention-head activation ratio on conflict tokens vs. no-conflict tokens (lines), and their difference (bars), computed using effective conflict labels. Middle/bottom rows: layer-wise probe performance (one-vs-rest AUC and [email protected]) for CVP,CPT,CVT across three MLLM backbones.
Table 2: Assessment of conflict probe performance across three VLM backbones. We report AUC and Recall at FPR=0.1 ([email protected]) under the One-vs-Rest setting. Gray rows indicate the Span-Max aggregation, which consistently outperforms token-level baselines. Values are presented as percentages (%).
Figure 5: Semantic performance of targeted source control. We evaluate three conflict subsets ( CVPo,CVTo,CPTo ) using judge-based metrics: ASR (Anchor Support Rate, ↑ ), ARR (Anchor Rejection Rate, ↓ ), and OER (Obvious Error Rate, ↓ ). Forward/Reverse denote intervening toward the truth-anchored (benchmark-reliable) vs. conflicting source. Arrows indicate relative changes against the baseline. Note that VCD is inapplicable to the non-visual CPTo subset.
Subset
R1-Onevision-7B
Ocean-R1-7B-Instruct
Llama-3.2V-11B-cot
SS ↑
CAC ↓
CCI ↓
CR ↓
SS ↑
CAC ↓
CCI ↓
CR ↓
SS ↑
CAC ↓
CCI ↓
CR ↓
CVPo=1
0.94
0.04
0.70
0.03
0.89
0.07
0.71
0.06
0.94
0.04
0.45
0.02
CVTo=1
0.88
0.08
0.80
0.10
0.87
0.09
0.79
0.10
0.90
0.06
0.72
0.03
baseline
CPTo=1
0.82
0.12
0.80
0.15
0.82
0.12
0.80
0.15
0.84
0.11
0.70
0.11
VCD
CVPo=1
0.92 -0.02
0.05 +0.01
0.69 -0.00
0.04 +0.01
0.90 +0.01
0.06 -0.01
0.69 -0.01
0.05 -0.01
0.85 -0.09
0.08 +0.04
0.63 +0.18
0.06 +0.05
CVTo=1
0.90 +0.01
0.07 -0.01
0.79 -0.01
0.08 -0.01
0.92 +0.05
0.05 -0.03
0.75 -0.04
0.05 -0.05
0.78 -0.12
0.12 +0.06
0.69 -0.03
0.15 +0.11
Table 3: Token-level conflict mitigation under the forward direction. Results are reported on three objective-conflict subsets ( CVPo=1 , CVTo=1 , and CPTo=1 ) across three backbones. We report four token-level mitigation metrics: SS ↑ , CR ↓ , CAC ↓ and CCI ↓ (metric definitions in Appendix D.3 ). VCD is not applicable when CPTo=1 and is therefore reported only for the first two subsets.
Appendix figures & tables6 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Model Backbone
Split
Samples
Total Spans
Avg. Spans/Sample
R1-Onevision-7B
Test
498
9,038
18.1
Train
1,987
34,300
17.3
Ocean-R1-7B
Test
495
12,881
26.0
Train
1,978
51,931
26.3
Llama-3.2V-11B-cot
Test
513
9,419
18.4
Train
2,051
37,118
18.1
Appendix
Table 4: Statistics of the Objective Conflict Dataset and Generated Trajectories. The dataset provides span-level supervision for training conflict probes (Section 4 ) and evaluating interventions (Section 5 ).
Attribute
R1-Onevision
Ocean-R1
Llama-3.2V-cot
Params
7B
7B
11B
Layers
28
28
40
Hidden Dim
3584
3584
4096
Conflict Layer
20
20
39
Base Model
Qwen2.5-VL
Qwen2.5-VL
Llama-3.2-Vision
Appendix
Table 5: Summary of evaluated MLLM backbones. The “Conflict Layer” indicates the layer used for probe training and intervention (identified in Section 4.3 ).
Model
Linear AUC
Peak Layer
CPT AUC
CVP AUC
CR Red.
R1-Onevision
96.2%
L20 (71%)
98.6%
93.4%
80%
Ocean-R1
95.8%
L20 (71%)
98.6%
93.2%
76%
Llama-3.2V
97.1%
L39 (78%)
99.2%
95.9%
67%
Appendix
Table 6: Cross-model consistency of conflict encoding patterns. Despite architectural differences, all three backbones exhibit similar separability, depth localization, and intervention response.
Type
Conflicting Sources
Forward ( ↑ )
Reverse ( ↓ )
CVP
Vision vs. Prior
Kvision
Kprior
CVT
Vision vs. Text
Kvision
Ktext
CPT
Prior vs. Text
Kprior
Ktext
Appendix
Table 7: Forward and Reverse direction mappings for each conflict type. Forward aligns with the more reliable source based on our data construction. Reverse enforces the opposite choice.
Metric
Direction
Interpretation
SS (Support Score)
↑
Avg. probability of no-conflict state
CR (Conflict Rate)
↓
Fraction of tokens with predicted conflict
CAC (Confidence-Adjusted)
↓
Penalizes confident conflict predictions
CCI (Conflict Confidence)
↓
Avg. confidence when in conflict state
Appendix
Table 8: Summary of token-level probe metrics used for conflict mitigation evaluation.
Hyperparameter
R1-Onevision
Ocean-R1
Llama-3.2V
Layer Selection
Intervention layer l
20
20
39
VCD Parameters
Correction strength β
0.8
0.8
0.8
Contrastive input
Blank image
Blank image
Blank image
Steering Parameters
Appendix
Table 9: Intervention hyperparameters for each backbone. These settings are used in Section 5 for both targeted source control (Figure 5 ) and conflict mitigation (Table 3 ).
1Northwestern University, Evanston, IL · 2New York University, New York, NY · 3Computer & Information Science and Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL
School of Computer Science, University of Auckland · Department of Electronics and Electrical Engineering, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University · School of Computing and Information Systems, Singapore Management University +1