cs.MAFeb 16, 2026

Towards Selection as Power: Bounding Decision Authority in Autonomous Agents

Authors: Jose Manuel de la Chica Rodriguez, Juan Manuel Vera Díaz

Organizations: AI Lab, Grupo Santander, Madrid, Spain

Abstract

Autonomous agentic systems are increasingly deployed in regulated, high-stakes domains where decisions may be irreversible and institutionally constrained. Existing safety approaches emphasize alignment, interpretability, or action-level filtering. We argue that these mechanisms are necessary but insufficient because they do not directly govern selection power: the authority to determine which options are generated, surfaced, and framed for decision. We propose a governance architecture that separates cognition, selection, and action into distinct domains and models autonomy as a vector of sovereignty. Cognitive autonomy remains unconstrained, while selection and action autonomy are bounded through mechanically enforced primitives operating outside the agent's optimization space. The architecture integrates external candidate generation (CEFL), a governed reducer, commit-reveal entropy isolation, rationale validation, and fail-loud circuit breakers. We evaluate the system across multiple regulated financial scenarios under adversarial stress targeting variance manipulation, threshold gaming, framing skew, ordering effects, and entropy probing. Metrics quantify selection concentration, narrative diversity, governance activation cost, and failure visibility. Results show that mechanical selection governance is implementable, auditable, and prevents deterministic outcome capture while preserving reasoning capacity. Although probabilistic concentration remains, the architecture measurably bounds selection authority relative to conventional scalar pipelines. This work reframes governance as bounded causal power rather than internal intent alignment, offering a foundation for deploying autonomous agents where silent failure is unacceptable.

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