Common Belief Revisited

For each axiom of KM belief update we provide a corresponding axiom in a modal logic containing three modal operators: a unimodal belief operator $B$, a bimodal conditional operator $>$ and the unimodal necessity operator $\square$. We then compare the resulting logic to the similar logic obtained from converting the AGM axioms of belief revision into modal axioms and show that the latter contains the former. Denoting the latter by $\mathcal L_{AGM}$ and the former by $\mathcal L_{KM}$ we show that every axiom of $\mathcal L_{KM}$ is a theorem of $\mathcal L_{AGM}$. Thus AGM belief revision can be seen as a special case of KM belief update. For the strong version of KM belief update we show that the difference between $\mathcal L_{KM}$ and $\mathcal L_{AGM}$ can be narrowed down to a single axiom, which deals exclusively with unsurprising information, that is, with formulas that were not initially disbelieved.

Dynamic epistemic logic represents belief change via model transformations induced by epistemic events. Its standard formulation (Baltag, Moss, Solecki, 1998) provides a natural account of belief expansion through the elimination of possibilities, but it cannot model belief contraction about factual propositions. A classic response enriches Kripke models with plausibility orderings, representing contraction as an update that promotes certain possibilities over others. We show that this approach has expressive limitations. In particular, the approach cannot model belief that violates positive introspection and contraction dynamics in response to a hedged public announcement that phi might be false. Motivated by these considerations, we introduce a mechanism for belief contraction defined directly on standard Kripke models, without any constraints on the doxastic accessibility relation. We show that it satisfies some of the standard properties of belief contraction but not others, study the conditions under which contraction may be unsuccessful, and provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic via reduction axioms. We also define a more general dynamic logic that is an extension of standard DEL and accommodates belief contractions due to events such as private or semi-private announcements, and provide a complete and sound axiomatization of the general logic.

Belief revision is a process in which an agent begins to believe in something she previously did not. I begin the paper by presenting, based on (Gärdenfors, 1998; Hansson, 1999), postulates for belief revision that constitute the basis of the AGM theory. I will then briefly show the semantics of a modal logic introduced in (van Ditmarsch, 2005), which I call $P$'. This logic formalizes static epistemic states and has greater expressive power than AGM in doing so because it captures the quantitative notion of "degrees of conviction". The third step is to introduce revision operators on $P$ and, mostly following (van Ditmarsch, 2005), obtain the Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) I call $P*$'. It models processes of belief revision in several ways. Original results are presented in the following two sections. The first one of these sections revolves around a formalization of AGM postulates within $P*$ by proving some theorems related to the satisfaction of those postulates by revisions defined in $P*$. The last section features an analysis of $P*$'s revisions that go beyond the mere satisfaction of postulates. I compare their formal behavior with respect to some philosophical criteria. At last, I conclude that the functions presented in (van Ditmarsch, 2005) are not good formalizations of the philosophical intuition behind AGM. Instead, it is captured by the function $*^0$ originally defined in this paper (but highly inspired by (van Benthem, 2007)). An implementation of this function is also provided.