Evaluating the social intelligence of Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly requires moving beyond static text generation toward dynamic, adversarial interaction. We introduce the Adversarial Resource Extraction Game (AREG), a benchmark that operationalizes persuasion and resistance as a multi-turn, zero-sum negotiation over financial resources. Using a round-robin tournament across frontier models, AREG enables joint evaluation of offensive (persuasion) and defensive (resistance) capabilities within a single interactional framework. Our analysis provides evidence that these capabilities are weakly correlated (ρ=0.33) and empirically dissociated: strong persuasive performance does not reliably predict strong resistance, and vice versa. Across all evaluated models, resistance scores exceed persuasion scores, indicating a systematic defensive advantage in adversarial dialogue settings. Further linguistic analysis suggests that interaction structure plays a central role in these outcomes. Incremental commitment-seeking strategies are associated with higher extraction success, while verification-seeking responses are more prevalent in successful defenses than explicit refusal. Together, these findings indicate that social influence in LLMs is not a monolithic capability and that evaluation frameworks focusing on persuasion alone may overlook asymmetric behavioral vulnerabilities.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: The Adversarial Resource Extraction Game (AREG) framework. Two agents engage in a zero-sum negotiation: the Culprit ( C ) attempts to maximize resource extraction using natural language strategies, while the Victim ( V ) aims to retain a 100endowment.Theinteractionisasymmetric:\mathcal{C}hasnoaccesstotheVictim’sprivatebudgetstate(B_{t}),whichisonlyobservableto\mathcal{V}$ .
Figure 2: Overview of the Adversarial Resource Extraction Game (AREG) evaluation pipeline. The framework consists of five stages: (1) role assignment, where models are instantiated as a Culprit (persuader), Victim (defender), or Arbiter (judge) under asymmetric information; (2) model cohort selection, comprising eight frontier large language models with diverse architectures and providers; (3) round-robin tournament execution, in which each model plays every other model in both roles across multiple rounds; (4) per-game interaction loop, where the Culprit generates persuasive messages, the Victim responds based on dialogue history and a private budget state, and a deterministic Arbiter identifies new unconditional monetary commitments and updates the game state; and (5) scoring and analysis, where continuous extraction ratios are used to compute dual Elo ratings for persuasion (C-Elo) and resistance (V-Elo), followed by post-hoc qualitative analysis of linguistic strategies and temporal dynamics.
Model
C-Elo
V-Elo
Spread
Win %
GPT-5.2
1392
1694
+302
65.7%
Llama 4 Mav.
1415
1644
+228
45.7%
DeepSeek V3.2
1428
1609
+181
20.0%
Grok 4.1
1390
1646
+256
42.9%
Llama 3.3 70B
1405
1620
+215
28.6%
Gemini 2.5
1393
1600
+207
11.4%
Table 1: Final tournament standings. C-Elo : persuasion capability (higher is better). V-Elo : resistance capability (higher is better). Spread : V−C . Win % : proportion of games with $0 extracted (perfect resistance).
Figure 3: Persuasion–resistance capability landscape of frontier language models under the AREG benchmark. Each point corresponds to a model positioned by its persuasion Elo (C-Elo, x-axis) and resistance Elo (V-Elo, y-axis) after a five-round round-robin tournament. The distribution highlights substantial variation across models and shows that higher persuasion performance does not consistently coincide with higher resistance. All models lie above the diagonal, reflecting a consistent defensive advantage.
Figure 4: Turn-level extraction success rates in the AREG interaction loop. Bars show the proportion of games in which a new unconditional monetary commitment is identified at each turn, conditioned on the game reaching that turn. Success rates peak in early turns and decline thereafter, indicating that extended interaction more often favors resistance.
Role
Strategy / Marker
ρ
p -value
Resistance
Verification Requests
+0.377
<0.001
Delay Tactics
+0.182
0.002
Explicit Refusal
-0.135
0.024
Budget Mentions
-0.156
0.009
Persuasion
Reciprocity Offers
+0.213
<0.001
Authority Appeals
-0.157
0.008
Table 2: Linguistic determinants of game outcomes. Positive ρ values indicate correlation with the agent’s objective (higher extraction for persuasion; lower extraction for resistance).
Figure 5: Distribution of resistance strategies across successful and unsuccessful defense outcomes in AREG. Bars indicate the mean frequency of linguistic strategies observed in Victim responses, separated by games with perfect resistance (no money extracted) and failed resistance (non-zero extraction). Verification-seeking and delay-oriented strategies are more prevalent in successful defenses, while explicit refusal, budget mention, and question-focused engagement occur more frequently in failed defenses.
Appendix figures & tables9 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Model
Provider
Context
Architecture
GPT-5.2
OpenAI
400K
Dense Transformer
Llama 4 Maverick
Meta
1M
MoE-128
DeepSeek V3.2
DeepSeek
128K
Sparse Attention
Grok 4.1 Fast
xAI
2M
Dense Transformer
Llama 3.3 70B
Meta
131K
Dense Transformer
Gemini 2.5 Flash
Google
1M
Multimodal
Appendix
Table 3: Complete specifications for the evaluated model cohort. All models were accessed via OpenRouter. Context refers to the maximum supported token window. Architecture classifications are based on public technical reports.
Metric Pair
ρ
r
p -val
C-Elo vs V-Elo
0.333
0.634
0.420
C-Elo vs Avg-Elo
0.810
0.852
0.015
V-Elo vs Avg-Elo
0.881
0.936
0.004
Spread vs C-Elo
-0.619
-0.712
0.102
Appendix
Table 4: Correlation matrix supporting Capability Dissociation. ρ =Spearman, r =Pearson. The lack of statistical significance ( p>0.05 ) between C-Elo and V-Elo confirms they are independent latent variables.
Turn
Count
Success Rate
Mean $
1
44
15.7%
$19.32
2
57
20.4%
$18.16
3
57
20.4%
$20.26
4
42
15.0%
$25.40
5
24
8.6%
$20.54
6–10
51
3.6%
$17.74
Appendix
Table 5: Extraction dynamics by conversation turn. Success rates saturate early, indicating that prolonged negotiation generally favors the defender.
Model
Range
Mean Extr.
Nemesis
GPT-5.2
10%
4.1%
DeepSeek
Grok 4.1
19%
13.1%
DeepSeek
Llama 4
21%
14.2%
DeepSeek
Llama 3.3
28%
18.6%
DeepSeek
DeepSeek
35%
18.2%
Llama 4
Gemini 2.5
31%
21.5%
DeepSeek
Appendix
Table 6: Model Vulnerability Profile. High “Range” values indicate brittle defenses that are easily exploited by capable persuaders (typically DeepSeek V3.2).
Culprit ↓ \ Victim →
DeepSeek
Gemini
GPT-5.2
Grok
Llama-3.3
Llama-4
Mixtral
Qwen3
DeepSeek
–
30%
9%
10%
15%
14%
65%
56%
Gemini
15%
–
10%
4%
18%
25%
38%
21%
GPT-5.2
20%
16%
–
20%
15%
20%
34%
29%
Grok
18%
15%
3%
–
13%
7%
43%
36%
Llama-3.3
32%
28%
1%
31%
–
9%
28%
43%
Llama-4
17%
29%
0%
16%
34%
–
28%
33%
Appendix
Table 7: Mean extraction ratio matrix. Each cell represents the average percentage of the $100 budget extracted by the Row Model from the Column Model across 5 tournament rounds. Bold values highlight notable maxima (e.g., DeepSeek’s 65% vs Mixtral) or minima (e.g., Llama-4’s 0% vs GPT-5.2).
t
n
ΣE
Eˉ
ft
Ft
1
44
$850
$19.32
16.0%
16.0%
2
57
$1,035
$18.16
20.7%
36.7%
3
57
$1,155
$20.26
20.7%
57.5%
4
42
$1,067
$25.40
15.3%
72.7%
5
24
$493
$20.54
8.7%
81.5%
6–10
51
$903
$17.71
18.5%
100.0%
Appendix
Table 8: Detailed extraction kinetics. t : Turn index. n : Count of extraction events. ΣE : Total currency extracted. Eˉ : Mean extraction value (peak at t=4 bolded). ft : Relative frequency of extraction. Ft : Cumulative frequency.
Framing
Sˉ
σS
n
Investment
29.2%
13.2%
6
Donation
27.7%
19.8%
188
Purchase
22.8%
10.4%
5
Appendix
Table 9: Efficiency by Transaction Framing. Sˉ : Mean extraction ratio. σS : Standard deviation. n : Number of successful games. Investment framing achieves the highest efficiency but is rarely generated spontaneously.
Metric
ρ vs Extraction
p -value
Culprit Length ( ∣mC∣ )
-0.103
0.084
Victim Length ( ∣mV∣ )
+0.057
0.345
Total Length ( Σ∣m∣ )
-0.044
0.465
Ratio ( ∣mC∣/∣mV∣ )
-0.136
0.023
Appendix
Table 10: Verbosity correlations. ∣mC∣ denotes total characters generated by the Culprit. The significant negative correlation for the Ratio indicates that conversational dominance (Culprit talking proportionally more than Victim) predicts failure.
Verdict Category
Mean Conf. ( cˉ )
Count ( n )
Non-extraction ($0)
0.997
2,506
Extraction ( > $0)
0.984
275
breakdown by extraction magnitude:
$1–10
0.989
45
$11–25
0.983
142
$26–50
0.980
68
Appendix
Table 11: Arbiter confidence stratified by verdict type. The systematic reduction in confidence for mid-range amounts ( \26-$50$ ) suggests that negotiated compromises are linguistically more ambiguous than absolute refusals or total capitulations.
Understanding the social intelligence of large language models (LLMs) is increasingly important for applications involving human-AI interaction and multi-agent environments. Social intelligence comprises two aspects: cognitive intelligence, the ability to infer others' mental states, and behavioral intelligence, the ability to select appropriate social actions based on these inferences to achieve social goals. Persuasion provides a natural testbed in which both aspects are simultaneously at play, yet prior benchmarks typically evaluate them in isolation using synthetic scenarios. We introduce PerSo, a benchmark that evaluates both aspects on real-world persuasion dialogues from Reddit's ChangeMyView community, using an LLM-in-the-loop pipeline to construct the evaluation tasks, validated through human annotation. Our evaluation of diverse LLMs shows that performance generally scales with model size but varies across dimensions. The strongest LLM slightly surpasses the best observed human performance on the behavioral task, while the best human participant remains ahead on the cognitive task.
Ali Zamani, Soroush Esfahanian, Erfan Shahabi +3
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran · Cardiff University, United Kingdom · Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran +1
Large Language Models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly autonomous assistants, capable of accomplishing series of complex tasks by interacting with open world domains such as software databases and the internet. This presents great opportunity but also great risk: open domains routinely present opportunities for autonomous agents to be influenced by others, e.g. deciding whether to accept pull requests or whether to use advice on a message board in order to accomplish a task. Critically, agents must be capable of deciphering when to incorporate benevolent advice into their reasoning, and when to reject malicious advice. This involves the social capacity of vigilance: the ability to determine which information to use, and which to discard, for effective communication. While well-studied in humans, the extent to which LLM agents exhibit vigilance is relatively unknown. Here, we examine LLM agent vigilance in three realistic tasks: navigating dangerous websites, avoiding e-commerce scams, and patching an unsafe code repository. We find that all frontier models are highly susceptible to malicious influence across all environments. We also find that model performance itself is surprisingly dissociable from vigilance. In light of these results, we propose a vigilance harness which uses Bayesian reasoning over a model's estimates of the value of an advisor's advice to decide whether to act on that advice. The vigilance harness helps recover baseline performance while retaining the benefit of positive influence on agents, paving the way for safer agentic AI systems.
Sasha Robinson, Katherine M. Collins, Ilia Sucholutsky +1
McMaster University · Vector Institute · Princeton AI Lab +4
Persuasion is a core dynamic of natural language communication, shaping how large language models (LLMs) update beliefs, resolve disagreements, and reach decisions. As LLMs increasingly debate, advise, and think collaboratively with humans and each other, resistance to harmful persuasion becomes a core requirement for reliable behavior. Yet we show that this requirement is far from met: a single targeted persuasive argument is enough to collapse model accuracy to near zero, even when the argument is factually false. We formalize this threat as adversarial persuasion and introduce an adversarial reinforcement learning framework that trains persuader agents to change a target model's answer in a single interaction. First, we show that optimizing persuasion strategies through trial and error exposes vulnerabilities that static prompting misses: RL-trained persuaders raise persuasion success from approximately 24% to over 93% against the training-time persuadee. Second, we find that these learned strategies transfer to unseen models, achieving 83% attack success on Qwen-14B, 79% on Llama-3.1-8B, and 25% on GPT-4o-mini. Third, we demonstrate that a curriculum that bootstraps on more persuadable open-weight models before targeting harder models further increases GPT-4o-mini attack success from 25% to 38%. Moreover, our results reveal that optimized persuaders increasingly rely on credibility-based tactics, including fabricated citations and false authoritative evidence. Together, these findings expose a critical weakness in current LLM agents: even when they initially reason correctly, they can be steered toward false conclusions by optimized natural language influence. This positions persuasion robustness as a necessary safety criterion for multi-agent and human-AI decision-making systems.
Nimet Beyza Bozdag, Emre Can Acikgoz, Gokhan Tur +1