Organizations: Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA · Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of California, Davis, CA, USA · Department of Computer Engineering and Computer Science, California State University, Long Beach, Long Beach, CA, USA
State-space models like Mamba offer linear-time sequence processing and low memory, making them attractive for medical imaging. However, their robustness under realistic software and hardware threat models remains underexplored. This paper evaluates Mamba on multiple MedM-NIST classification benchmarks under input-level attacks, including white-box adversarial perturbations (FGSM/PGD), occlusion-based PatchDrop, and common acquisition corruptions (Gaussian noise and defocus blur) as well as hardware-inspired fault attacks emulated in software via targeted and random bit-flip injections into weights and activations. We profile vulnerabilities and quantify impacts on accuracy indicating that defenses are needed for deployment.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: Architecture of Vision Mamba
Fig. 2: Overview of the threat model and evaluation pipeline for medical image classification. We consider input-level attacks including information corruption, information drop, and white-box adversarial perturbations, as well as hardware-level fault attacks such as random and layer-wise bit flips (e.g., Rowhammer-induced DRAM faults). The diagram highlights how these disturbances can propagate through the model and potentially lead to incorrect clinical predictions (misdiagnosis).
Dataset
Clean Acc
FGSM Acc
PGD Acc
PathMNIST
89.73
26.31
10.56
DermaMNIST
79.35
20.35
3.89
OCTMNIST
91.8
41.2
20.6
PneumoniaMNIST
93.27
13.46
0
RetinaMNIST
51.0
22.5
4.25
BreastMNIST
88.46
20.51
8.33
TABLE I: Model accuracy (%) on MedMNIST datasets under clean, FGSM, and PGD ( ϵ=1/255,20 steps).
Dataset
0%
6.25%
18.75%
25%
37.5%
50%
56.25%
PathMNIST
89.72
91.8
80.86
72.81
56.73
45.64
38.95
DermaMNIST
79.35
72.77
55.81
39.75
20.70
17.85
17.75
OCTMNIST
91.8
85.1
71.1
67.9
61.2
47.1
42.4
PneumoniaMNIST
93.27
91.03
85.26
78.53
62.82
56.73
43.11
RetinaMNIST
51.0
51.5
51.75
51.5
50.5
45.75
44.75
BreastMNIST
88.46
86.54
81.41
78.85
76.28
69.87
73.07
TABLE II: Robustness evaluation using PatchDrop showing classification accuracy (%) across MedMNIST datasets under increasing patch removal ratios.
Intensity 1
Intensity 2
Intensity 3
Intensity 4
Intensity 5
Dataset
Clean Acc
N
B
N
B
N
B
N
B
N
B
PathMNIST
89.72
61.99
81.89
33.20
72.94
23.22
57.73
9.04
45.89
6.13
40.89
DermaMNIST
79.35
70.47
78.80
66.73
78.06
66.93
76.51
66.88
75.86
66.88
74.96
OCTMNIST
91.80
84.40
83.90
71.10
71.50
54.70
57.00
26.90
48.70
25.00
42.60
PneumoniaMNIST
93.27
62.98
61.54
37.50
58.65
37.50
63.30
37.50
73.40
37.50
82.37
RetinaMNIST
51.00
45.75
50.75
44.50
51.50
43.50
51.00
43.50
50.75
43.50
51.00
TABLE III: Accuracy (%) under Gaussian noise and defocus blur at different intensity levels.
Dataset
Clean Acc
k=1
k=2
k=4
k=8
k=16
PathMNIST
89.72
81.73
76.19
72.25
52.04
32.32
DermaMNIST
79.35
78.64
75.15
77.96
48.10
34.42
OCTMNIST
91.80
85.08
79.63
76.04
45.22
43.33
PneumoniaMNIST
93.27
90.11
87.04
87.07
66.80
59.94
RetinaMNIST
51.00
49.00
50.70
49.80
41.03
42.21
BreastMNIST
88.46
87.08
85.55
85.54
56.19
54.52
TABLE IV: Model accuracy (%) under Random Bit Flip faults across MedMNIST datasets, where k denotes the number of random bit flips applied.
Patch_embed
stage0_layers.0
stage1_layers.1
stage2_layers.2
stage3_layers.3
classifier_head
ssm_related
Dataset
Clean Acc
1
2
4
8
16
1
2
4
8
16
1
2
4
8
16
1
2
4
8
16
1
2
4
8
16
1
2
4
8
16
1
2
4
8
16
PathMNIST
89.72
80.23
67.44
52.19
22.02
27.48
82.58
68.30
64.82
32.81
22.19
82.60
68.39
64.80
43.13
25.41
82.62
68.40
64.86
21.33
25.75
86.18
77.53
69.89
44.27
24.12
86.26
75.23
70.13
45.18
36.74
81.76
66.34
56.22
28.06
19.57
DermaMNIST
79.35
71.40
56.01
44.62
7.10
13.52
71.73
56.50
52.70
18.51
7.07
71.76
56.33
52.55
26.13
7.52
71.79
56.55
52.75
7.27
10.91
72.51
68.31
59.59
32.64
21.92
73.37
67.33
64.74
43.27
42.76
72.37
56.97
46.12
24.11
8.13
OCTMNIST
91.80
83.05
71.18
58.46
28.37
35.05
85.19
71.79
68.40
38.36
28.34
85.12
71.79
68.46
45.03
31.68
85.13
71.77
68.44
28.67
31.68
91.81
81.79
65.41
49.58
30.58
89.36
78.07
70.04
55.03
47.24
85.77
73.66
61.60
40.17
27.58
PneumoniaMNIST
93.27
87.44
72.60
68.45
40.32
45.68
87.72
76.52
73.75
48.61
40.29
87.80
76.59
73.79
54.24
40.30
87.70
76.54
73.74
40.72
43.10
88.94
88.94
78.74
67.09
48.32
89.61
85.55
76.39
52.13
62.85
89.65
76.77
75.99
54.78
44.06
RetinaMNIST
51.00
49.85
48.13
47.00
43.80
44.44
50.25
48.74
48.39
45.03
43.90
50.25
48.75
46.36
45.75
44.28
50.25
48.75
48.38
43.88
44.26
51.00
46.36
45.05
38.51
37.61
50.66
50.33
44.80
31.45
27.05
47.15
40.99
43.03
28.29
36.81
TABLE V: Accuracy (%) under layer-wise bit-flip faults for different values of k.
CNN- and Transformer-based architectures have achieved strong performance in medical image segmentation, but CNNs are limited in modeling long-range dependencies, while Transformers often suffer from quadratic computational and memory complexity. State space models, especially Mamba-based networks, offer an efficient alternative with linear sequence complexity. However, existing Mamba segmentation models still face two limitations: pixel-wise directional scanning can disrupt local 2D spatial structure, and simple summation-based fusion of scan directions cannot adapt well to diverse object sizes, shapes, and boundaries. To address these issues, we propose Patch-MoE Mamba, a patch-ordered mixture-of-experts state space architecture for medical image segmentation. It introduces a hierarchical patch-ordered scanning mechanism that preserves local spatial neighborhoods while capturing multi-scale context, and an MoE-based directional fusion module that adaptively combines multiple Mamba scanner outputs using four directional experts, a learnable concatenation expert, and residual directional aggregation. Experiments on five public polyp segmentation benchmarks and the ISIC 2017/2018 skin lesion segmentation datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and generality of Patch-MoE Mamba.
Diego Adame, Fabian Vazquez, Jose A. Nunez +7
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, Edinburg, TX 78539, USA
Mamba has attracted widespread interest as a general-purpose sequence model due to its low computational complexity and competitive performance relative to transformers. However, its performance can degrade when inference sequence lengths exceed those seen during training. We study this phenomenon using a controlled vision task in which Mamba reconstructs images from sequences of image patches. By analyzing reconstructions at different stages of sequence processing, we reveal that Mamba qualitatively adapts its behavior to the distribution of sequence lengths encountered during training, resulting in strategies that fail to generalize beyond this range. To support our analysis, we introduce a length-adaptive variant of Mamba that improves performance across training sequence lengths. Our results provide an intuitive perspective on length generalization in Mamba and suggest directions for improving the architecture.
Jan Rathjens, Robin Schiewer, Laurenz Wiskott +1
Institute for Neural Computation, Faculty of Computer Science, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany · CITEC, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany · Department of Computer Science, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK
State space models (SSMs) like Mamba offer efficient alternatives to Transformer-based language models, with linear time complexity. Yet, their adversarial robustness remains critically unexplored. This paper studies the phenomenon whereby specific short input phrases induce a partial amnesia effect in such models, by irreversibly overwriting information in their hidden states, referred to as a Hidden State Poisoning Attack (HiSPA). Our benchmark RoBench-25 allows evaluating a model's information retrieval capabilities when subject to HiSPAs, and confirms the vulnerability of SSMs against such attacks. Even the recent Jamba-1.7-Mini SSM--Transformer (a 52B hybrid model) collapses on RoBench-25 under some HiSPA triggers, whereas pure Transformers do not. We also observe that HiSPA triggers significantly weaken the Jamba model on the popular Open-Prompt-Injections benchmark, unlike pure Transformers. We further show that the theoretical and empirical findings extend to Mamba-2, and also analyse a Mamba-2-based hybrid (Nemotron-3-Nano). Finally, our interpretability study reveals patterns in Mamba's hidden layers during HiSPAs that could be used to build a HiSPA mitigation system. The full code and data to reproduce the experiments can be found at https://github.com/TortueSagace/hispa.
Alexandre Le Mercier, Chris Develder, Thomas Demeester