Stop Saying "AI"

AI-enabled military systems are a fixture of modern military conflict. Applications vary from autonomous drones for surveillance and attack to AI-supported target selection. The importance of AI for modern conflict shows also in public disputes between governments and technology companies over the conditions for military access to frontier AI. Both military uses and government attempts at enabling and steering them happen before a backdrop of public opinion, yet we still know little about how people think about military AI. Drawing on a preregistered survey of 9,000 respondents in nine countries, including China, Germany, and the United States, we examine whether support for military AI is shaped primarily by general attitudes toward AI, principled opposition to lethal autonomy, or foreign-policy and geopolitical orientations. Across six military AI scenarios that vary in lethality and human control, respondents who view AI as beneficial are substantially more supportive of military AI. Hawkish respondents are also more supportive. By contrast, principled opposition to lethal autonomy is not broadly associated with the full index but is related to the application of fully autonomous lethal force. Contrary to our expectation, perceived AI risks are positively associated with support. Cross-national differences are moderate and broadly consistent with geopolitical context. Overall, public opinion toward military AI appears conditionally permissive. Publics are not categorically opposed to various military uses of AI. Instead, unease is concentrated around fully autonomous lethal force.

Deep learning systems now mediate military decisions to use force, yet their internal logic resists inspection, their evaluation practices are gameable, and their deployment fractures accountability across dispersed stakeholders. The ethical challenge posed by these systems is fundamentally epistemic: not just whether autonomous weapons should be permitted to kill, but whether the conditions for responsible human judgment can survive when critical functions are delegated to opaque algorithms. We show that this epistemic condition produces a concrete accountability gap: responsibility diffuses across designers, operators, and policymakers while International Humanitarian Law presupposes capacities for judgment that current AI systems lack. To address this gap, we propose a governance framework that proceduralizes ethical constraints through named accountability roles, adversarial auditing with undisclosed benchmarks, tiered deployment thresholds, and a proposed NATO evaluation standard. Counterfactual analysis of eight documented cases (1988-2025) shows that each governance mechanism addresses a documented class of failure, but no single safeguard suffices in isolation: effective governance of military AI requires not only technical constraints but the institutional infrastructure to keep human judgment meaningful.

The growing complexity of multi-domain operational environments (land, aerospace, naval, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum) has increased the volume and velocity of data reaching command-and-control (C2) centers, straining the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) decision cycle. Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems currently employed in defense are, in general, reactive and isolated tools that still rely heavily on human operators to integrate information, assess scenarios, and formulate courses of action. This paper proposes a conceptual Agentic AI architecture for AI systems that can plan, access data sources, execute tools, and act autonomously and audibly, aimed at supporting decision-making across the three Brazilian Armed Forces (Navy, Army, and Air Force). Four application fronts are discussed (decision support, situational analysis, feasibility studies, and countermeasure suggestion), as well as the data and sensor access requirements and the security and permission safeguards necessary for responsible employment across administrative, strategic, operational, and tactical contexts.