cs.MAFeb 19, 2026

MultiVer: Zero-Shot Multi-Agent Vulnerability Detection

Authors: Shreshth Rajan

Organizations: Harvard College, Cambridge, MA, USA

Abstract

We present MultiVer, a zero-shot multi-agent system for vulnerability detection that achieves state-of-the-art recall without fine-tuning. A four-agent ensemble (security, correctness, performance, style) with union voting achieves 82.7% recall on PyVul, exceeding fine-tuned GPT-3.5 (81.3%) by 1.4 percentage points -- the first zeroshot system to surpass fine-tuned performance on this benchmark. On SecurityEval, the same architecture achieves 91.7% detection rate, matching specialized systems. The recall improvement comes at a precision cost: 48.8% precision versus 63.9% for fine-tuned baselines, yielding 61.4% F1. Ablation experiments isolate component contributions: the multi-agent ensemble adds 17 percentage points recall over single-agent security analysis. These results demonstrate that for security applications where false negatives are costlier than false positives, zero-shot multi-agent ensembles can match and exceed fine-tuned models on the metric that matters most.

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