The trade-off between clean accuracy and adversarial robustness is a pervasive phenomenon in deep learning, yet its geometric origin remains elusive. In this work, we utilize Symmetry-Breaking Dimensional Expansion (SBDE) as a controlled probe to investigate the mechanism underlying this trade-off. SBDE expands input images by inserting constant-valued pixels, which breaks translational symmetry and consistently improves clean accuracy (e.g., from 90.47% to 95.63% on CIFAR-10 with ResNet-18) by reducing parameter degeneracy. However, this accuracy gain comes at the cost of reduced robustness against iterative white-box attacks. By employing a test-time mask projection that resets the inserted auxiliary pixels to their training values, we demonstrate that the vulnerability stems almost entirely from the inserted dimensions. The projection effectively neutralizes the attacks and restores robustness, revealing that the model achieves high accuracy by creating sharp boundaries (steep loss gradients) specifically along the auxiliary axes. Our findings provide a concrete geometric explanation for the accuracy-robustness paradox: the optimization landscape deepens the basin of attraction to improve accuracy but inevitably erects steep walls along the auxiliary degrees of freedom, creating a fragile sensitivity to off-manifold perturbations.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Symmetry-breaking dimensional expansion (illustration). Original image pixels are mapped to designated locations in the expanded grid; constant-valued rows/columns fill the rest.
Figure 2: Test accuracy trajectory on raw vs. SBDE-expanded data (ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10).
Method
Clean
PGD
AutoAttack
BIM
APGD
APGDT
AVG
Natural
90.47
0.07
0.01
0.11
0.10
0.02
0.06
SBDE (without Π )
95.63
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
SBDE (with Π )
95.63
88.11
86.25
60.02
88.10
86.86
81.87
Table 1: CIFAR-10, ResNet-18. Highly accurate neural network is more fragile under attacks. Using projection Π at inference strongly mitigates iterative attacks on SBDE models.
Figure 3: Perturbation trajectory after an iterative attack. The Z-axis corresponds to the value of the loss function for the attacked image at each iterative step. The X-axis and Y-axis correspond to the pixel value of a randomly selected pixel and its adjacent auxiliary pixel, respectively. Blue lines represent the iterative attacks of PGD (with the increase of the step, the loss value increases). Red line links the start point (no attack) and end point (Projection of attacked image). After projection, the loss function drops prominently, indicating that high-magnitude pixels concentrate on SBDE’s auxiliary coordinates Ωaux .
Fill Constant
Clean
PGD
AutoAttack
BIM
APGD
APGDT
AVG
0.0 (without Π )
95.63
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.0 (with Π )
95.63
88.11
86.25
60.02
88.10
86.86
85.88
0.5 (without Π )
95.65
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.5 (with Π )
95.65
86.49
80.62
56.85
83.60
83.96
83.26
0.2 (without Π )
95.34
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.2 (with Π )
95.34
86.59
85.98
56.43
88.15
79.22
83.86
Table 2: SBDE: varying the fill constant c .
Expansion Factor
Clean
PGD
AutoAttack
BIM
APGD
APGDT
AVG
2
95.13
0.01
0.00
0.08
0.02
0.00
0.02
3
95.55
81.57
83.37
56.47
86.80
72.50
76.14
4
95.83
12.67
35.57
4.22
39.32
42.57
26.87
5
95.63
88.11
86.25
60.02
88.10
86.86
81.87
6
95.33
64.12
66.96
34.27
69.99
60.55
59.18
7
95.03
80.63
80.42
47.81
79.18
86.51
74.91
Table 3: SBDE, stride=2: expansion factor F and alignment with the first convolution. Odd F values align better in this setting.
Expansion factor
Clean
PGD
AutoAttack
BIM
APGD
APGDT
AVG
2
93.70
40.44
69.61
26.13
72.36
64.80
54.67
3
95.10
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.01
0.00
0.02
4
95.00
73.57
80.62
57.92
84.93
70.35
73.48
5
95.70
89.51
88.40
61.89
89.27
86.87
83.19
6
95.77
13.57
43.65
3.66
48.56
46.49
31.19
7
95.47
90.39
86.73
62.22
86.80
89.94
83.22
Table 4: SBDE, stride=3: expansion factor F and alignment with the first convolution. Odd F values align better in this setting.
Expansion factor
Clean
PGD
AutoAttack
BIM
APGD
APGDT
AVG
2
93.33
0.07
0.00
0.20
0.01
0.01
0.02
3
94.18
79.24
84.02
60.36
86.13
76.07
77.16
4
95.39
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.01
5
95.44
92.12
91.37
69.32
92.25
90.54
87.12
6
95.35
78.49
80.94
53.69
84.80
69.38
73.46
7
95.40
92.85
91.02
71.61
91.66
92.41
87.91
Table 5: SBDE, stride=4: expansion factor F and alignment with the first convolution. Odd F values align better in this setting.
Adversarial Training (AT) is one of the most effective methods for developing robust deep neural networks (DNNs). However, AT faces a trade-off problem between clean accuracy and adversarial robustness. In this work, we reveal a surprising phenomenon for the first time: Varying input perturbation intensities for training samples near decision boundaries in AT have minimal impact on model robustness. This finding directly exposes the inconsistency between accuracy and robustness score fluctuations, leading us to identify the misalignment between input and latent spaces as a critical driver of the robustness-accuracy trade-off. To mitigate this misalignment for harmonizing accuracy and robustness, we define Robust Alignment as a new AT target, encouraging the model perception to change with input perturbations provided the final label prediction remains unchanged, which can be achieved via two novel ideas. First, we suggest a reduced and fixed perturbation intensity for those boundary samples, which facilitates the model to utilize the perturbations as learnable patterns, instead of noises that complicate decision boundaries meaninglessly. Second, we propose a Domain Interpolation Consistency Adversarial Regularization (DICAR), based on rigorous theoretical derivations, which explicitly introduces semantic alignment between input and latent spaces into AT. Based on these two ideas, we end up with a new Robust Alignment Adversarial Training (RAAT) method, effectively harmonizing accuracy and robustness. Extensive experiments on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet with ResNet-18, PreActResNet-18, and WideResNet-28-10 demonstrate the effectiveness of RAAT in improving the trade-off beyond four common baselines and a total of 14 related state-of-the-art (SOTA) works.
PGD adversarial training, the standard robustness method, can reduce Jacobian Frobenius norm yet worsen clean-input geometry (e.g., TDI 1.336 vs. ERM 1.093). We show this is not an implementation artifact but a theorem-level consequence of supervised learning. We prove that any encoder minimizing supervised loss must retain non-zero sensitivity along directions correlated with training labels, including directions that are nuisance at test time. This holds across proper scoring rules, architectures, and dataset sizes. We call this the geometric blind spot of supervised learning. This theorem unifies four empirical phenomena often treated separately: non-robust features, texture bias, corruption fragility, and the robustness-accuracy tradeoff. It also explains why suppressing sensitivity in one adversarial direction can redistribute sensitivity elsewhere. We introduce Trajectory Deviation Index (TDI), a diagnostic of geometric isotropy. Unlike CKA, intrinsic dimension, or Jacobian Frobenius norm alone, TDI captures the failure mode above. In our experiments, PGD attains low Frobenius norm but high TDI, while PMH attains the lowest TDI with one additional training term and no architectural changes. Across seven tasks, BERT/SST-2, and ImageNet ViT-B/16 (backbone family underlying CLIP/DINO/SAM), the blind spot is measurable and repairable. It appears at foundation-model scale, worsens with model scale and task-specific fine-tuning, and is substantially reduced by PMH. PMH also leads on non-Gaussian corruption types (blur/brightness/contrast) without corruption-specific training.
For non-parametric binary classification in the presence of an adversary, we prove an optimal quantitative estimate for adversarial classifiers controlling geometric accuracy, as measured by the Hausdorff distance to the Bayes classifier, in terms or their robustness, as encoded by the adversarial budget ε. This rigorously shows that robust classifiers sacrifice at most O(ε) or O(ε) in accuracy, depending on the regularity of the underlying Bayes classifier. In contrast to prior work on the incompatibility of robustness and accuracy over low-complexity hypothesis classes, our work shows that high-complexity hypothesis classes allow for robust classifiers with precisely quantified accuracy. Our results apply for adversaries determined by any norm on Euclidean space and in both the infinite and finite data settings.