Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are foundational to modern multimodal applications, yet their susceptibility to adversarial attacks remains a critical concern. Prior white-box attacks rarely generalize across tasks, and black-box methods depend on expensive transfer, which limits efficiency. The vision encoder, standardized and often shared across LVLMs, provides a stable gray-box pivot with strong cross-model transfer. Building on this premise, we introduce PA-Attack (Prototype-Anchored Attentive Attack). PA-Attack begins with a prototype-anchored guidance that provides a stable attack direction towards a general and dissimilar prototype, tackling the attribute-restricted issue and limited task generalization of vanilla attacks. Building on this, we propose a two-stage attention enhancement mechanism: (i) leverage token-level attention scores to concentrate perturbations on critical visual tokens, and (ii) adaptively recalibrate attention weights to track the evolving attention during the adversarial process. Extensive experiments across diverse downstream tasks and LVLM architectures show that PA-Attack achieves an average 75.1% score reduction rate (SRR), demonstrating strong attack effectiveness, efficiency, and task generalization in LVLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/hefeimei06/PA-Attack.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Adversarial performance on captioning and VQA tasks. The perturbation of black-box M-attack is ϵ=\nicefrac16255 while that of other gray-box methods is ϵ=\nicefrac2255 .
Figure 2: (a) Comparison of task transfer performance score reduction rate (SRR) on LLaVa1.5-7B. Slash columns compare the task transfer with white-box and black-box attack, while dotted columns represent the multi-task SRR of gray-box. (b) Attack SRR w/ and w/o different direction samples. The red diamond is the baseline without direction samples, and the light orange and purple circles represent their centers as prototypes. (c) The ratio of clean and adversarial performance changes. The blue line has the horizontal axis above (T in softmax) as a variable, and the other lines have the horizontal axis below (the proportion of mask tokens) as a variable. (d) Attentions before and after a 50-step attack w/ and w/o prototype guidance. For comparison, values are normalized with the maximum value.
Figure 3: Overview of PA-Attack. (a) The prototype-anchored guidance includes a vision encoder attack loss and a guidance loss for general degradation across diverse tasks. (b) Attention obtained by averaging the attention of the class token to each patch in Self-Attention across different Heads. (c) The attention weights are adjusted to align with the adversarial image through a two-stage process.
Model
Attack
COCO ↓
Flickr30k ↓
TextVQA ↓
VQAv2 ↓
POPE ↓
Average SRR ↑
Perturbation (ϵ)
\nicefrac2255
\nicefrac4255
\nicefrac2255
\nicefrac4255
\nicefrac2255
\nicefrac4255
\nicefrac2255
\nicefrac4255
\nicefrac2255
\nicefrac4255
\nicefrac2255
\nicefrac4255
LLaVa1.5-7B
Clean
115.5
77.5
37.1
74.5
84.5
0.0
MIX.Attack [ 40 ]
67.5
55.4
42.1
35.9
24.6
19.1
59.4
57.9
72.0
69.1
31.2
38.9
VT-Attack [ 43 ]
66.8
29.5
40.0
19.9
26.9
16.1
60.1
28.3
67.1
58.5
31.6
59.6
AttackVLM-ii [ 51 ]
41.3
26.3
30.2
20.3
19.7
14.0
55.1
50.4
69.0
61.6
43.3
54.5
VEAttack [ 33 ]
10.8
7.1
10.7
6.3
13.8
10.1
42.9
38.4
47.5
42.8
65.2
71.2
Table 1: Comparison of PA-Attack with different gray-box attacks across different LVLMs and tasks. For each dataset, we present the performance ( ↓ ) after the gray-box attack, and finally, we calculate the average score reduction rate (SRR) ( ↑ ) across all datasets.
Figure 4: Comparison of the responses of LLaVa1.5-7B with different attacks. The attributes with a blue background remain unchanged, while the red texts indicate that the attributes have changed.
PG
AE
TS
Step
COCO
Flickr30k
TextVQA
VQAv2
100
93.8
91.9
72.8
48.4
✓
100
95.5
94.8
76.3
52.2
✓
100
93.7
92.6
72.3
50.9
✓
✓
100
95.3
94.7
76.6
54.2
150
94.8
93.7
77.9
48.8
✓
✓
150
96.2
95.5
81.1
54.4
Table 2: Ablation study on the components of PA-Attack with SRR as the metric, where PG denotes the Prototype-anchored Guidance, AE is the Attention Enhancement, and TS is a two-stage attention refinement framework.
λ
COCO
Flickr30k
TextVQA
VQAv2
Average
0.5
96.6
95.1
83.8
51.3
81.7
1.0
96.5
95.7
86.3
56.4
83.7
2.0
95.5
94.7
84.1
55.8
82.5
Table 3: Ablation study on the weight λ of the Prototype-anchored Guidance loss with SRR as the metric.
m
w
K
Flickr30k
TextVQA
VQAv2
Average
baseline
91.9
72.8
48.4
71.0
1000
512
20
92.8
77.1
47.6
72.5
2000
1024
20
92.6
79.8
47.5
73.3
3000
1024
20
94.8
76.3
52.2
74.4
3000
1024
10
94.2
77.6
51.2
74.3
3000
1024
30
92.3
79.5
49.0
73.6
Table 4: Impact of prototype construction parameters, where m is the number of images in the guidance image dataset, w is the dimension after PCA, and K is the number of prototypes.
Figure 5: (a) Ablation of the number of stages in adaptively attention refinement. Slash columns compare the score reduction rate, while dotted columns represent the attack time. (b) Ablation of T in softmax and layers l in attention enhancement.
Guidance
COCO
Flickr30k
VQAv2
Average
baseline
93.8
91.9
48.4
78.1
Mean sample
95.1
94.1
56.2
81.8
Nearest sample
64.6
86.2
33.4
61.4
Farthest sample
96.3
95.2
50.2
80.6
Nearest prototype
95.2
96.1
53.4
81.6
Farthest prototype
96.5
95.7
56.4
82.9
Table 5: Impact of different samples for the guidance objective.
Guidance
Distribution
COCO
Flickr30k
TextVQA
SRR ↑
Clean
In
115.5
77.5
37.1
0.0
COCO
In
4.1
3.3
5.1
92.8
RVL-CDIP
Out
4.1
3.7
6.8
91.1
ScienceQA
Out
4.2
3.6
5.8
92.0
Table 6: Attack performance with different guidance datasets.
Method
Qwen3-VL-8B
InternVL2-8B
SRR ↑
RealWorldQA
ODinW-13
RealWorldQA
POPE
Clean
73.3
35.5
62.5
88.6
0.0
VT-Attack
68.2
33.9
45.4
77.4
12.9
VEAttack
58.2
14.4
46.4
63.8
33.4
PA-Attack
57.0
9.8
43.4
64.8
38.0
Table 7: Attack performance on Qwen3-VL and InternVL2.
Method
COCO
Flickr30k
TextVQA
VQAv2
SRR ↑
Clean
115.5
77.5
37.1
74.5
0.0
VT-Attack
14.5
10.5
9.3
25.0
78.8
VEAttack
5.3
4.0
6.5
36.3
81.0
PA-Attack
3.6
1.9
4.4
31.9
84.9
Table 8: Attack performance with larger perturbation budget.
Figure 6: Ablation of time and an example of failure cases.
Method
COCO
Flickr30k
TextVQA
TeCoA
FARE
TeCoA
FARE
TeCoA
FARE
VEAttack
43.9
51.1
24.2
34.1
16.5
22.2
PA-Attack
25.8
47.5
15.1
30.7
10.6
14.1
Table 9: Attack performance with different defense methods.
Figure 7: More comparison of the responses of LLaVa1.5-7B with different attacks. The attributes with a blue background remain unchanged, while the red texts indicate that the attributes have changed.
Figure 8: More comparison of the responses of LLaVa1.5-7B with different attacks. The attributes with a blue background remain unchanged, while the red texts indicate that the attributes have changed.
Figure 9: More comparison of the responses of LLaVa1.5-7B with different attacks. The attributes with a blue background remain unchanged, while the red texts indicate that the attributes have changed.
Figure 10: Comparison of the attention maps of clean images and those after different attacks. The iterations of AttackVLM-ii are 100. We visualize the attention map of the first stage of our PA-Attack with 50 iterations and the second stage with 100 iterations. The areas that are more reddish have higher attention values.
Figure 11: Evolution of token-wise attention values during the attack process. The heatmaps visualize the deviation in token attention compared to the token of clean images with step 0. The x-axis represents token indices, and the y-axis represents the optimization steps. A darker shade indicates a greater difference in attention value from the clean image. The rows correspond to different modules, and the columns show results for three datasets.
Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have achieved remarkable performance on multimodal tasks but remain highly vulnerable to small adversarial perturbations in input images. Existing attacks typically target the vision encoder's final output embeddings, implicitly treating the encoder as a uniform attack surface, while a systematic analysis of which internal components are most vulnerable has remained largely unexplored. We show such analysis is essential, as adversarial vulnerability in LVLM vision encoders is structurally concentrated rather than uniformly distributed. Building on this, we propose Vision Encoder Vulnerable-Component-Targeted Universal Adversarial Perturbation (VEV-UAP), a task-agnostic and cost-efficient attack framework. Through a component- and layer-wise analysis of attention mechanisms, we identify the value components in middle layers as critical vulnerabilities that strongly influence downstream language model behavior. VEV-UAP selectively targets these components to generate a single universal perturbation shared across images, without involving textual inputs or the language model during optimization. Experiments across multiple LVLMs and tasks show VEV-UAP achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates with reduced computational overhead. Moreover, a single VEV-UAP transfers across LVLMs sharing the same vision encoder, even when paired with different language models, making it a practical framework for scalable robustness evaluation.
Hee-Seon Kim, Minbeom Kim, Seokil Ham +1
School of Electrical Engineering, KAIST, Daejeon 34141, Republic of Korea
Black-box adversarial attacks on Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are challenging due to missing gradients and complex multimodal boundaries. Prior state-of-the-art transfer-based approaches such as M-Attack match local crops between source and target images, but this induces high-variance, nearly orthogonal gradients across iterations. We attribute this instability to (i) ViT translation sensitivity, which yields spike-like gradients, and (ii) a structural asymmetry between source and target crops. We reformulate local matching as an asymmetric expectation over source transformations and target semantics, and introduce M-Attack-V2 based on this formulation. Multi-Crop Alignment (MCA) averages gradients from multiple local views per iteration, while Auxiliary Target Alignment (ATA) replaces aggressive target augmentation with a small set of semantically correlated auxiliary images. Patch Momentum replays historical crop gradients, and a patch-diverse surrogate ensemble (PE+) strengthens transferable directions. M-Attack-V2 raises attack success rates over M-Attack from 40% to 61% on GPT-6.1 Sol, from 40% to 60% on GPT-6 Astra, and from 85% to 97% on Claude Sonnet 5.5. Code and data are publicly available at: https://github.com/VILA-Lab/M-Attack-V2.
Targeted adversarial attacks on Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) test whether small image perturbations can steer model responses toward attacker-specified content. Under the standard L-infinity constraint, targeted attacks become a regional perturbation budget allocation problem: attack success depends not only on the perturbation objective, but also on which regions receive updates and in what order. Existing localized attacks improve over global perturbations but rely on stochastic spatial sampling, often updating weakly influential regions. We address this limitation through an attention-based analysis showing that cross-modal attention identifies adversarially sensitive regions and that perturbing high-attention hotspots induces predictable redistribution toward subsequent salient regions. These findings motivate attention-guided region sequencing, which begins from dominant hotspots and progressively moves the update support toward next-salient regions. Based on these principles, we propose Stage-wise Attention-Guided Attack (SAGA), a black-box region-sequencing framework that uses a fixed attention map from an open-source LVLM to guide perturbation updates without accessing target-model parameters, gradients, or attention maps. Across ten closed-source and open-source LVLMs, SAGA achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates and the best overall imperceptibility. The source code is available at https://github.com/jaehyun-kwak/SAGA.