Robust watermarking is critical for intellectual property protection, whereas existing methods face a severe vulnerability against regeneration-based AIGC attacks. We identify that existing methods fail because they entangle the watermark with high-frequency cover texture, which is susceptible to being rewritten during generative purification. To address this, we propose WaterVIB, a theoretically grounded framework that reformulates the encoder as an information sieve via the Variational Information Bottleneck. Instead of overfitting to fragile cover details, our approach forces the model to learn a Minimal Sufficient Statistic of the message. This effectively filters out redundant cover nuances prone to generative shifts, retaining only the essential signal invariant to regeneration. We theoretically prove that optimizing this bottleneck is a necessary condition for robustness against distribution-shifting attacks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that WaterVIB significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, achieving superior zero-shot resilience against unknown diffusion-based editing.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Vulnerability of standard watermarking versus the robustness of our VIB method. The residual visualizations (Top) reveal a strong correlation between the watermark signal and AIGC purification, highlighting the fragility of texture-entangled methods. We visualize the Bit Accuracy (higher is better) across six AIGC editing benchmarks. To clearly demonstrate the relative improvements on tasks with varying difficulty levels, each axis is independently normalized to its effective range
(a) Spectral Energy Distribution Alignment
Signal Component
High Freq.
Mid Freq.
Low Freq.
Dominant
Watermark Signal ( δ )
30.20%
45.45%
24.35%
Mid-High
AIGC Distortion ( satk )
23.36%
20.49%
56.15%
Mid-High*
Natural Images ( x )
1.16%
11.92%
86.91%
Low
(b) Structural Dependence (PCC with Cover Image)
Table 1: Evidence of Signal-Spatial Alignment. Top: Spectral energy distribution shows the AIGC distortion ( satk ) targets the same high-frequency bands as the watermark ( δ ). Bottom: Pearson Correlation (PCC) shows the attack is structurally dependent on the cover image, unlike random noise.
Vector Component
Projection Value
Direction
Effect on Decoding
Gradient Direction ( ∇xL )
N/A
Target
N/A
Watermark Signal ( δ )
−0.063
Anti-Gradient
Minimizes Error
AIGC Distortion ( satk )
+0.027
Gradient
Maximizes Error
Table 2: Gradient Counter-Optimization Analysis. We project the signals onto the loss gradient direction ∇xL . A negative projection implies loss minimization, while a positive projection implies loss maximization.
Figure 2: The WaterVIB Architecture. We propose a Stochastic Information Sieve mechanism (Part 2) to defend against generative purification (Part 1). By injecting noise via a learnable bottleneck layer, WaterVIB penalizes the retention of cover-specific details ( I(Z;X) ) via the Information Bottleneck principle. This explicitly disentangles the watermark signal from the cover texture, yielding a stochastic representation U that is invariant to the semantic projections performed by diffusion models.
Attack Method
EditGuard
+VIB (Ours)
Red.
(I) Local Editing (BER ‰)
SD-Inpainting
0.35
0.03
91%
ControlNet-Inp.
0.13
0.14
-7%
SDXL-Refiner
0.30
0.03
90%
RePaint
0.26
0.08
69%
(II) Global Purification (BER %)
Table 3: Zero-shot Robustness against Generative Editing. Evaluation under (I) Local Editing and (II) Global Purification. The reported metric is Bit Error Rate (BER). Red. denotes the relative reduction in error rate.
Method
Payload
PSNR ↑
Clean ‰ ↓
Noise ‰ ↓
DWT-DCT
100 bits
38.1
0.56
10.84
TrustMark
100 bits
42.3
1.00
6.60
WM-A
30 bits
38.6
0.63
140.20
EditGuard
100 bits
40.4
0.05
3.21
+VIB (Ours)
100 bits
40.3
0.03
0.08
Table 4: Comparison with SOTA on Standard Distortions. Evaluation on EditGuard(+VIB) architecture. We report PSNR (dB) for imperceptibility and Bit Error Rate (BER %) for robustness.
Distortion Type
Baseline
+VIB(Ours)
Red.
Gaussian Noise‰
0.09
0.01
89%
JPEG ‰
9.61
0.40
96%
Poisson Noise‰
0.01
0.02
-
Cropout%
29.61
32.82
-
Dropout%
9.11
4.50
51%
Resize (Scaling)%
81.75
0.01
99.99%
Table 5: Detailed Robustness Analysis (EditGuard). Comparison of Bit Error Rate (BER %). Red. denotes the relative reduction in error rate.
Metric
Baseline
+VIB(Ours)
Red.
(I) Visual Quality & Clean Accuracy
PSNR (dB) ↑
36.5
37.0
-
SSIM ↑
0.97
0.97
-
Clean BER (%)
9.92
9.54
4%
(II) Standard Distortions
Crop (0.5)
10.37
9.76
6%
Table 6: Universality on Lightweight Models (HiDDeN). Evaluation on HiDDeN (30 bits). We report PSNR (dB) and Bit Error Rate (BER %). Red. denotes the relative reduction in error rate. Note the significant improvements across structural (Resize/Cropout) and adversarial attacks.
Figure 3: Feature Space Visualization (t-SNE). We visualize the latent embeddings of 10 random messages (different colors), each embedded into 20 cover images. In the Baseline (EditGuard), attacked samples (triangles) undergo significant feature drift, collapsing toward a shared manifold region regardless of their original message identity, which leads to high bit error rates. (b) With our WaterVIB, the drift paths (lines) are significantly reduced, and attacked samples remain anchored within the high-density clusters of their respective clean counterparts.
Method
EditGuard
+VIB (Ours)
Red.
Ratio ρ↓
0.4285
0.1167
73%
Table 7: Gradient Interference Analysis. Comparison of the Gradient Interference Ratio ( ρ ). Lower is better.
Figure 4: Generalization Gap Analysis. We evaluate the training dynamics by plotting the ratio of validation loss to training loss ( Lval/Ltrain ) across epochs. A ratio significantly greater than 1 indicates overfitting. The plots correspond to the Encoder (top), Decoder (middle), and Total Loss (bottom).
Figure 5: Impact of β on Robustness. We plot the BER under AIGC purification as a function of β . The Baseline coresponds to β=0 . The curve reveals a distinct “sweet spot” at β=0.00015 .
Appendix figures & tables8 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Distortion Type
Parameter
Range / Value
Crop
Ratio
[0.4,0.55]
Cropout
Ratio
[0.25,0.35]
Dropout
Keep Prob.
[0.65,0.75]
Resize (Scaling)
Scale Factor
[0.4,0.6]
JPEG Compression
Coefficients
(25,9,9)
Appendix
Table 8: Configuration of Differentiable Noise Layers used in HiDDeN-VIB Training.
Method
Blender Dataset
LLFF Dataset
BER ↓
PSNR ↑
LPIPS ↓
SSIM ↑
BER ↓
PSNR ↑
LPIPS ↓
SSIM ↑
NeRF-Sig
0.00
57.17
5×10−5
0.9998
0.10
46.51
0.0016
0.9973
+ WaterVIB
0.00
58.99
3×10−5
0.9999
0.10
49.61
0.0009
0.9984
Appendix
Table 9: Comparison of watermarking imperceptibility on NeRF-Signature. We measure the quality of watermarked renderings against clean NeRF renderings. Metrics include Bit Error Rate (BER, lower is better), PSNR (higher is better), LPIPS (lower is better), and SSIM (higher is better).
Method
Rotation
Scaling
Blurring
Brightness
JPEG
Cropping
Average
Acc
PSNR
Acc
PSNR
Acc
PSNR
Acc
PSNR
Acc
PSNR
Acc
PSNR
Acc
PSNR
NeRF-Sig
0.999
52.36
1.000
54.94
1.000
55.55
1.000
55.20
0.999
51.76
1.000
56.23
0.999
54.32
+ WaterVIB
0.997
53.26
1.000
55.76
1.000
57.07
1.000
55.98
0.998
51.93
1.000
57.54
0.999
55.26
Appendix
Table 10: Robustness evaluation on the Blender dataset (32 bits). We report the Bit Accuracy (ACC, ↑ ) and the PSNR ( ↑ ) of the watermarked views. WaterVIB maintains high robustness while consistently improving visual quality.
Figure 6: Visualization of Nerf-VIB
Method
Cosine Sim. ( cosθ )
Effective Proj. ( η⋅∣cosθ∣ )
Baseline (EditGuard)
−0.0395
0.1572
WaterVIB (Ours)
0.0077
0.0306
Appendix
Table 11: Orthogonality Analysis. We compare the cosine similarity and the effective projection of the attack noise onto the watermark direction. Effective Proj. serves as the decisive metric for signal survival.
Noise Type
Cosine Sim. ( s⋅x )
Pearson Corr. (PCC)
Random Gaussian
≈0.000
≈0.000
AIGC (SDXL 1.0)
-0.1918
-0.3399
Appendix
Table 12: Correlation Analysis: AIGC Distortion vs. Cover Image. Unlike random noise (Gaussian) which is statistically orthogonal to the image content, AIGC distortion exhibits a significant negative correlation, indicating an active subtraction of image features.
Figure 7: Qualitative Comparison of Watermark Residuals. We visualize the absolute difference ∣xwm−x∣ (amplified for visibility) between the watermarked and original images. The Baseline (HiDDeN) residuals are heavily entangled with high-frequency image textures. In contrast, WaterVIB produces a more dispersed noise pattern, indicating that the Information Bottleneck constraint successfully decouples the watermark signal from fragile cover details.
Model
FP (Clean)
FN (Watermarked)
FN (WM + Noised)
KL-Div ↑
HiDDeN (Baseline)
0.00%
0.00%
38.50%
3.33
HiDDeN-VIB (Ours)
0.00%
0.00%
1.98%
3.84
Appendix
Table 13: Re-Embedding Defense Performance. Comparison of detection robustness. The VIB constraint significantly improves detection under noise, preventing unauthorized re-embedding.
Diffusion-based watermarking methods embed verifiable marks by manipulating the initial noise or the reverse diffusion trajectory. However, these methods share a critical assumption: verification can succeed only if the diffusion trajectory can be faithfully reconstructed. This reliance on trajectory recovery constitutes a fundamental and exploitable vulnerability. We propose Stochastic Hidden-Trajectory Deflection (SHIFT), a training-free attack that exploits this common weakness across diverse watermarking paradigms. SHIFT leverages stochastic diffusion resampling to deflect the generative trajectory in latent space, making the reconstructed image statistically decoupled from the original watermark-embedded trajectory while preserving strong visual quality and semantic consistency. Extensive experiments on nine representative watermarking methods spanning noise-space, frequency-domain, and optimization-based paradigms show that SHIFT achieves 95%--100% attack success rates with nearly no loss in semantic quality, without requiring any watermark-specific knowledge or model retraining.
Rui Bao, Zheng Gao, Xiaoyu Li +3
University of New South Wales · Griffith University
Invisible watermarking has become a central tool for tracing AI-generated images, but its robustness against adaptive removal attacks remains an open security question. We introduce Latent Frequency Masking, an attack that erases watermark evidence by replacing selected Fourier coefficients in the latent representation of a watermarked image. The replacement can be sampled from Gaussian noise for efficiency or derived from diffusion regeneration for improved image preservation. We provide a theoretical distortion bound relating the change between the reconstructed adversarial image and the masked latent-frequency perturbation. We evaluate the proposed attack against six diffusion watermarking methods on images generated from DiffusionDB and MS-COCO prompts. Latent Frequency Masking removes or substantially weakens several watermarks while preserving perceptual quality and achieving favorable runtime compared with existing attacks. These results identify latent-frequency manipulation as a practical attack surface and highlight the need to include such attacks in robustness evaluations of generative image watermarking.
Kirill Aistov, Khaled Abud, Irina Serzhenko +8
MSU AI Institute, Moscow, Russia · Trusted AI Research Center RAS, Moscow, Russia
Diffusion watermarking embeds verifiable signals into the generative process and commonly verifies them by recovering trajectory-dependent evidence, making the marks robust to conventional pixel-space distortions. Existing removal attacks either regenerate along deterministic trajectories, which often preserve the watermark-bearing latent structure, or optimize every image separately. We identify the reliance on a recoverable generative trajectory as a common attack surface among the schemes we study. Based on this observation, we propose DRIFT, a black-box attack that combines partial forward diffusion with stochastic reverse resampling. Forward re-noising limits source information available to a fixed-depth recovery pipeline, while stochastic reversal supplies alternative noise-driven paths whose removal benefit we isolate through matched sampler comparisons. Adaptive DRIFT searches a selected ladder for each image's first verifier-rejected rung and refines fidelity while retaining only updates rejected by the same verifier. At fixed depth, we derive information-theoretic and Wasserstein source-dependence bounds; under realized-ladder monotonicity, the first rejected rung is least distorted among rejected rungs on that ladder, and verifier-gated refinement preserves rejection. Across nine watermarks spanning three paradigms, DRIFT achieves 98-100% attack success and the best image quality among the compared attacks, without secret keys, verifier internals, or per-image gradient optimization.
Rui Bao, Zheng Gao, Xiaoyu Li +3
University of New South Wales · Griffith University