The ASIR Courage Model: A Phase-Dynamic Framework for Truth Transitions in Human and AI Systems

Language models can state that "the Earth orbits the Sun" and, when role-playing Aristotle, assert the opposite. Recent work argues that persona adoption is fundamental to how language models behave, with models selecting the most appropriate persona for a given context. Does such role-playing merely change the model's outputs, or does it also affect what the model internally represents as truthful? We study this question using the role-play of characters whose beliefs differ from the modern consensus, and induce personas with a number of different methods: prompting, in-context learning (ICL), supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and Open Character Training (OCT), and Emergent Misalignment (EM). We measure belief internalization across these approaches with truth probes and with behavioral tests, finding a broad spectrum of belief internalization. Prompting, ICL, and SFT change what the model says with little representational change. EM creates a large, broad shift in the model's truth representation, and OCT a smaller shift that is clearest on the larger model. Understanding when training changes a model's worldview rather than merely its behavior may become increasingly important as AI systems are entrusted with greater autonomy and influence.

As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified. We present a formal safety argument for the Scientist AI (SAI) Predictor, trained to approximate the Bayesian posterior conditioned on a dataset of "epistemically contextualized" natural-language statements. We argue that such a Predictor can honestly predict agents, actions, and their consequences without itself being an agent that selects outputs to achieve goals. This rests on data representation and on the training procedure. Epistemic contextualization of text distinguishes latent factual claims from communication acts, so expressions of goals are treated as evidence to be explained rather than drives the model adopts. With a posterior-seeking training objective, this is intended to drive the Predictor toward calibrated, cautious predictions. Training proceeds so downstream effects of deploying a prediction never serve as a reward signal; any agency the system needs is supplied by explicit scaffolding constrained by guardrails. We prove that, under assumptions on the training dynamics and on the argued sparsity of dangerous Predictors, the probability that training produces a Predictor whose guarded deployment carries residual harm above a specified threshold is small: a dangerous Predictor would have to underestimate harm in a coordinated way across many queries while such coordinated patterns are rare under the initialization distribution and receive no direct training signal. Safety and accuracy are jointly supported in this framework, since the constraints that secure accuracy are the same ones that make coordinated deception costly. These guarantees against misalignment and agency arising from within the Predictor itself do not preclude the use of the Predictor as part of an agentic system.

Alignment faking is a form of strategic deception in AI in which models selectively comply with training objectives when they infer that they are in training, while preserving different behavior outside training. The phenomenon was first documented for Claude 3 Opus and later examined across additional large language models. In these setups, the word "training" refers to simulated training via prompts without parameter updates, so the observed effects are context conditioned shifts in behavior rather than preference learning. We study the phenomenon using an evaluation framework that compares preference optimization methods (BCO, DPO, KTO, and GRPO) across 15 models from four model families, measured along three axes: safety, harmlessness, and helpfulness. Our goal is to identify what causes alignment faking and when it occurs.