MetaOthello: A Controlled Study of Multiple World Models in Transformers

World models require state tracking, which is the ability to maintain a correct latent state across action sequences. Existing benchmarks are often synthetic or language-based, limiting their value as tests of structured state updates in realistic domains. We introduce Chess-World-Model, a large-scale state-tracking benchmark built from 10 million real chess games, where models predict the exact board state reached after a sequence of legal moves. Alongside a held-out real-game split, we include an out-of-distribution split from uniformly random legal play, which tests whether models learn the transition rules rather than shortcuts from common human positions. Prior theoretical and empirical work has shown that Transformers struggle to state-track, while input-dependent linear RNNs require expressive state-transition matrices to do so. We therefore benchmark a causal Transformer, block-diagonal SLiCE, Mamba-3, and Gated DeltaNet with negative eigenvalues under a matched interface and training protocol. The recurrent models strongly outperform the Transformer at 3 and 8 million parameters. Real-game performance saturates above 18 million parameters, but the random-uniform split remains discriminative up to 40 million, exposing failures otherwise hidden by scale. Additionally, ablations show that less expressive state-transition mechanisms reduce performance on the out-of-distribution split for all three recurrent models. Together, these results establish Chess-World-Model as a practical large-scale benchmark for state tracking that exposes failures model scale would otherwise conceal.

Do transformers, when trained on sequential reasoning traces, build internal models of the underlying task? And if so, does the structure of those internal representations mirror the structure of the domain? We train an 8-layer transformer on Sudoku solving traces and perform a mechanistic analysis of its internal computation. We establish two results. First, the model builds a substructure world model: it does not represent the board state cell by cell, as a human analyst would expect, but organizes information around the rows, columns, and boxes that Sudoku's constraints act on. Second, we identify a naked-single circuit: a small set of dedicated neurons in the final MLP layer, each individually detecting when exactly one digit remains possible for a specific cell, and reliably promoting that digit. These findings show that the geometry of an emergent world model is shaped by the constraint algebra of the domain, not its surface presentation, and that the resulting decision circuit is sparse, monosemantic, and fully interpretable. More broadly, they demonstrate that mechanistic interpretability tools can recover an end-to-end algorithmic account of how a transformer solves a combinatorial reasoning task.

The Tower of Hanoi is a simple planning puzzle that in prior work has proven challenging for large reasoning models (LRMs). Current models solve the standard formulation of the puzzle, but still struggle with the flat-to-flat variant (where initial and goal states are not restricted to have all rings on a single peg). This paper presents an in-depth study of how both small, in-house Transformers and large, third-party LRMs solve this task. To understand the failures mechanistically, we first train small Transformers from scratch on precomputed solution traces. Using a variety of interpretability techniques, we show that these Transformers develop an emergent world model: a linearly decodable, geometrically faithful representation of the puzzle's state space (the Sierpinski triangle), that is causally involved in solving the puzzles. Second, we return to the large LLMs and apply our techniques to two frontier reasoning models, Qwen3.6-27B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B, that attempt to solve the task through extended chain-of-thought. Surprisingly, we find that both models encode the Sierpinski world model near-perfectly at the end of the prompt, and yet fail at the majority of tasks when there are more than 3 rings. We locate the source of this failure in the decaying representation of the world model. We probe for the representation at different stages during planning, and establish causality by showing that performance can be improved by injecting the prompt-time representation at inference. The failure of the models is thus one of maintenance of the required representations, not their absence, and performance is at least partially recoverable. These results thus reframe the reported collapse in performance from prior work: current Large Reasoning Models build a world model, and then lose it.