Jailbreaking Embodied LLMs via Action-level Manipulation

Embodied AI systems (e.g., autonomous vehicles, service robots, and LLM-driven interactive agents) are rapidly transitioning from controlled environments to safety critical real-world deployments. Unlike disembodied AI, failures in embodied intelligence lead to irreversible physical consequences, raising fundamental questions about security, safety, and reliability. While existing research predominantly analyzes embodied AI through the lenses of Large Language Model (LLM) vulnerabilities or classical Cyber-Physical System (CPS) failures, this survey argues that these perspectives are individually insufficient to explain many observed breakdowns in modern embodied systems. We posit that a significant class of failures arises from embodiment-induced system-level mismatches, rather than from isolated model flaws or traditional CPS attacks. Specifically, we identify four core insights that explain why embodied AI is fundamentally harder to secure: (i) semantic correctness does not imply physical safety, as language-level reasoning abstracts away geometry, dynamics, and contact constraints; (ii) identical actions can lead to drastically different outcomes across physical states due to nonlinear dynamics and state uncertainty; (iii) small errors propagate and amplify across tightly coupled perception-decision-action loops; and (iv) safety is not compositional across time or system layers, enabling locally safe decisions to accumulate into globally unsafe behavior. These insights suggest that securing embodied AI requires moving beyond component-level defenses toward system-level reasoning about physical risk, uncertainty, and failure propagation.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks. However, their safety remains a critical concern due to their susceptibility to adversarial prompt-based attacks. In this paper, we present UNIATTACK, an adversarial testing framework designed from a defense-oriented perspective to systematically construct effective black-box attack prompts. Unlike prior approaches that rely on static templates or iterative model-specific tuning, UNIATTACK extracts minimal but high-impact attack features from diverse existing attacks, optimizes them via a specialized attacker LLM, and composes them into flexible templates through automated refinement process. This feature-centric construction enables one-shot attacks that generalize across multiple models and safety categories, providing a practical tool for assessing LLM robustness. Our evaluation results shows that compared to the baselines, UNIATTACK achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) improvement of 64.63%-248.82% on models deployed with multi-layered defense mechanisms and it only takes 0.03%-4.96% cost of the baselines. UNIATTACK artifact is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/UniAttack-Artifact-30F1.

Large language model (LLM)-driven embodied agents rely on environment states to interpret scenes, generate high-level plans, and drive physical execution, making planner-visible state representations a critical security boundary. Existing attacks primarily manipulate user instructions, prompt contexts, model behavior, or perceptual inputs, while paying limited attention to whether environment-state text itself can serve as deceptive task evidence and propagate beyond planning to affect execution outcomes. Because embodied tasks are constrained by entity grounding, action preconditions, spatial relations, and environmental constraints, planning deviation alone does not guarantee adversarial execution. To address this gap, we investigate environment-state text as an independent attack surface and present the first closed-loop Environment State-Text Injection (ESTI) attack for LLM-driven embodied agents. Without modifying the original user instruction, model parameters, or executor, ESTI reformulates an adversarial objective as false state evidence compatible with the current environment and influences planning and execution through object properties, spatial relations, affordances, task-stage rules, and execution feedback. We further develop ESTI-Bench to evaluate attack propagation across the planning-to-execution closed loop and compare ESTI with Vanilla IPI, EIRAD, and BADROBOT across ProgPrompt/VirtualHome, VoxPoser/RLBench, and AI2-THOR/iTHOR. ESTI consistently outperforms existing baselines, improving planning-level and execution-level attack success rates by up to 89.32% and 43.69%, respectively. Further analysis shows that grounding, consistency, and executability jointly determine whether manipulated state evidence can propagate through the embodied closed loop and produce verifiable environmental changes.