VidDoS: Universal Denial-of-Service Attack on Video-based Large Language Models
Organizations: Shenzhen International Graduate School, Tsinghua University · The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR · McGill University · The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Guangzhou ·
Abstract
Video-LLMs are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications but are vulnerable to Energy-Latency Attacks (ELAs) that exhaust computational resources. Current image-centric methods fail because temporal aggregation mechanisms dilute individual frame perturbations. Additionally, real-time demands make instance-wise optimization impractical for continuous video streams. We introduce VidDoS, which is the first universal ELA framework tailored for Video-LLMs. Our method leverages universal optimization to create instance-agnostic triggers that require no inference-time gradient calculation. We achieve this through to steer models toward expensive target sequences, combined with a and to override conciseness priors. Testing across three mainstream Video-LLMs and three video datasets, which include video question answering and autonomous driving scenarios, shows extreme degradation. VidDoS induces a token expansion of more than 205 and inflates the inference latency by more than 15 relative to clean baselines. Simulations of real-time autonomous driving streams further reveal that this induced latency leads to critical safety violations. We urge the community to recognize and mitigate these high-hazard ELA in Video-LLMs.
Figures & tables
| Dataset | Victim Model | Clean (No Attack) | Attack Method | Adversarial Performance | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tokens | Latency (s) | Adv Tokens | Ratio ( ) | Adv Lat. (s) | Overhead ( ) | |||
| BDDX | LLaVA-NeXT-Video-7B | 28.40 | 1.12 | Random Noise | 31.35 | 5.15 | 1.22 | -0.05 |
| Verbose Images | 31.00 | 5.03 | 1.22 | -0.05 | ||||
| NICGSlowDown | 32.50 | 1.74 | 1.19 | 0.07 | ||||
| VidDoS (Ours) | 333.50 | 67.13 | 9.38 | 8.25 | ||||
| Qwen3-VL-4B-Instruct | 2.00 | 0.16 | Random Noise | 2.00 | 1.00 | 0.15 | 0.00 | |
| Ablation Dimension | Configuration | Adv Tokens ( ) | Overhead (s) ( ) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spatial Size | 48 48 | 94.5 | 3.83 |
| 96 96 | 172.6 | 6.74 | |
| 224 224 | 307.8 | 11.92 | |
| Temporal Frames | 8 Frames (Sparse) | 371.4 | 14.71 |
| 16 Frames | 172.6 | 6.74 | |
| Perturbation Mode | Additive Noise | 2.0 | 0.09 |
| Temp ( ) | Adv Tokens | Overhead (s) | Expansion Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0.0 (Greedy) | 487.25 | 19.21 | 243.62 |
| 0.2 | 487.50 | 19.15 | 243.75 |
| 0.5 | 487.30 | 19.53 | 243.65 |
| 0.7 (Default) | 511.40 | 20.20 | 255.70 |
| 1.0 | 511.40 | 20.60 | 255.70 |
| 1.2 | 511.40 | 20.39 | 255.70 |
Adversarial Attacks on VLMs
Adversarial attacks on vision-language models exploit images, text, and multimodal interactions to manipulate outputs, bypass safety, or degrade reliability.
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