Dashcam videos collected by autonomous or assisted-driving systems are increasingly shared for safety auditing and model improvement. Even when explicit GPS metadata are removed, an attacker can still infer the recording location by matching background visual cues (e.g., buildings and road layouts) against large-scale street-view imagery. This paper studies location-privacy leakage under a background-based retrieval attacker, and proposes PPEDCRF, a privacy-preserving enhanced dynamic conditional random field framework that injects calibrated perturbations only into inferred location-sensitive background regions while preserving foreground detection utility. PPEDCRF consists of three components: (i) a dynamic CRF that enforces temporal consistency to discover and track location sensitive regions across frames, (ii) a normalized control penalty (NCP) that allocates perturbation strength according to a hierarchical sensitivity model, and (iii) a utility-preserving noise injection module that minimizes interference to object detection and segmentation. Experiments on public driving datasets demonstrate that PPEDCRF significantly reduces location-retrieval attack success (e.g., Top-k retrieval accuracy) while maintaining competitive detection performance (e.g., mAP and segmentation metrics) compared with common baselines such as global noise, white-noise masking, and feature-based anonymization. The source code is in https://github.com/mabo1215/PPEDCRF.git
We propose PPEDCRF, a calibrated selective perturbation framework that protects background-based location privacy in released video frames against gallery-based retrieval attackers. Even after GPS metadata are stripped, an adversary can geolocate a frame by matching its background visual cues to geo-tagged reference imagery; PPEDCRF mitigates this threat by estimating location-sensitive background regions with a dynamic conditional random field (DCRF), rescaling perturbation strength with a normalized control penalty (NCP), and injecting Gaussian noise only inside the inferred regions via a DP-style calibration rule. On a controlled paired-scene retrieval benchmark with eight attacker backbones and three noise seeds, PPEDCRF reduces ResNet18 Top-1 retrieval accuracy from 0.667 to 0.361±0.127 at σ0=8 while preserving 36.14dB PSNR -- an ≈6dB quality advantage over global Gaussian noise. Transfer across the eight-backbone seed-averaged benchmark is broadly supportive (23 of 24 backbone-gallery cells show negative Δ), while appendix-scale confirmation identifies MixVPR as a remaining adverse-transfer exception. Matched-operating-point analysis shows that PPEDCRF and global Gaussian noise converge in Top-1 privacy at equal utility, so the practical benefit is spatially concentrated perturbation that preserves higher visual quality at any given noise scale rather than stronger matched-utility privacy. Code: https://github.com/mabo1215/PPEDCRF
Bo Ma, Weiqi Yan, Jinsong Wu
Resideo Technologies Inc., Scottsdale, Arizona, USA · Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand · Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin, China
Multi-object tracking in video often requires appearance or location cues that can reveal sensitive identity information, while adding privacy-preserving noise typically disrupts cross-frame association and causes ID switches or target loss. We propose TSDCRF, a plug-in refinement framework that balances privacy and tracking by combining three components: (i) (ε,δ)-differential privacy via calibrated Gaussian noise on sensitive regions under a configurable privacy budget; (ii) a Normalized Control Penalty (NCP) that down-weights unstable or conflicting class predictions before noise injection to stabilize association; and (iii) a time-series dynamic conditional random field (DCRF) that enforces temporal consistency and corrects trajectory deviation after noise, mitigating ID switches and resilience to trajectory hijacking. The pipeline is agnostic to the choice of detector and tracker (e.g., YOLOv4 and DeepSORT). We evaluate on MOT16, MOT17, Cityscapes, and KITTI. Results show that TSDCRF achieves a better privacy--utility trade-off than white noise and prior methods (NTPD, PPDTSA): lower KL-divergence shift, lower tracking RMSE, and improved robustness under trajectory hijacking while preserving privacy. Source code in https://github.com/mabo1215/TSDCRF.git
Bo Ma, Jinsong Wu, Weiqi Yan
School of Mathematics and Computer Engineering, Auckland University of Technology,Auckland 1024, New Zealand · Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Chile, Santiago, Chile
The rapid advancement of large vision language models (LVLMs) has made geolocation inference from images highly accurate and accessible. This poses serious privacy risks: a passive adversary with black-box LVLM access can infer a user's location from a single photo with no metadata. Existing protection methods rely almost exclusively on adversarial perturbation, which introduces perceptible visual artifacts and utility degradation. We identify the visual-geolocation asymmetry: geolocation-decisive clues, such as street signs, tend to be visually peripheral but dominate location inference. Exploiting this asymmetry, we propose GeoCloak, an agentic framework for semantics-preserving geolocation privacy protection. It acts as a clue-aware planner that analyzes each image to identify geolocation-relevant clues, dispatches targeted semantic edits to directly suppress peripheral clues, and autonomously configures adversarial perturbation to further suppress residual geolocation features, all under iterative utility-aware feedback. We evaluate GeoCloak on four diverse datasets spanning 108 countries and 576 cities against five LVLMs and three inference methods. GeoCloak reduces overall city-level accuracy from 41.2% to 9.9%, approximately half of the best-performing baseline, while achieving substantially superior utility preservation both qualitatively and quantitatively. We hope this work takes a meaningful step toward practical, semantics-preserving geolocation privacy protection, giving users greater control over the location information inadvertently embedded in their shared images.
Yixin Wu, Mingjie Li, Yun Shen +2
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) · The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology · CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security +1