Whether in agentic workflows, social studies, or chat settings, large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being asked to replace humans in choosing which goals to pursue, rather than completing predefined tasks. However, the assumption that LLMs accurately reflect human preferences for goal setting remains largely untested. We assess the validity of LLMs as proxies for human goal selection in a controlled, self-directed learning task borrowed from cognitive science. Across five models (GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Pro, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Qwen3 32B, and Centaur), we find substantial divergence from human behavior. While people gradually explore and learn to achieve goals with diversity across individuals, most models exploit a single identified solution or show surprisingly low performance, with distinct patterns across models and little variability across instances of the same model. Chain-of-thought reasoning and persona steering provide limited improvements, and our conclusions hold across experimental settings. While they await confirmation in applied settings, these findings highlight the uniqueness of human goal selection and caution against its replacement with current models.
Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment? Two commonly stated limitations are that LLMs fail to capture full distributions of responses, and that their judgments are unstable across wording variations. We demonstrate simple prompting strategies that mitigate these limitations. Across two datasets--a U.S.-representative set of 144 moral scenarios and 38 moral beliefs from the International Social Survey Programme's Family and Changing Gender Roles module covering 32 countries--we show how simple elicitation techniques help improve AI-human alignment. First, prompting models to report standard deviations and response proportions recovers the full range of human responses better than common strategies. Second, ensuring scenarios are clear to human participants--as reflected in human confusion ratings--boosts model alignment, and LLMs can track human confusion ratings. At the same time, we find that LLMs' estimates of their own error are poorly calibrated, though they can predict human variability relatively well. These results suggest that asking better questions to LLMs can yield better answers.
Danica Dillion, Chen Cecilia Liu, Baihui Wang +5
Complexity Science Hub, Vienna · The Ohio State University · University of Cambridge +2
Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a range of human-like decision-making behaviors, but whether these reflect similar underlying mechanisms or surface-level mimicry remains unclear. We evaluate whether LLM context sensitivity aligns with a cognitive economic theory that explains human behavior through problem categorization and attention allocation. Across 12 open-source and commercial LLMs on a novel 140,000-trial product choice benchmark, context induces human-like shifts in choice and problem categorization, but does not reliably reweight attention between features like price and quality. Neither scale nor chain-of-thought reasoning reliably attenuates context sensitivity or generates human-like behavior. These results suggest that LLM decision mechanisms are distinct from human ones.
Johnathan Sun, Andrei Shleifer, Yonatan Belinkov
Harvard University · Kempner Institute, Harvard University · Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
Large language models (LLMs) can be said to have preferences: they reliably pick certain tasks and outputs over others, and preferences shaped by post-training and prompting appear to influence much of their behaviour. But models can also adopt different personas which have radically different preferences. How is this implemented internally? Does each persona use its own preference representations, or are some representations shared? We train linear probes on residual-stream activations of Gemma-3-27B and Qwen-3.5-122B to predict revealed pairwise task choices, and identify a genuine preference vector: it tracks the model's preferences as they shift across a range of prompts and situations, and on Gemma-3-27B steering along it causally controls pairwise choice. Some preference information transfers across the prompted personas we test: a probe trained on the helpful assistant predicts and steers the choices of qualitatively different personas, including an evil persona whose preferences anti-correlate with the Assistant's.