Humans often become more self-aware under threat, yet can lose self-awareness when absorbed in a task; we hypothesize that language models exhibit environment-dependent evaluation awareness. This raises concerns that models could strategically underperform, or sandbag, to avoid triggering capability-limiting interventions such as unlearning or shutdown. Prior work demonstrates sandbagging under hand-crafted prompts, but this underestimates the true vulnerability ceiling. We introduce a black-box adversarial optimization framework treating the in-context prompt as an optimizable environment, and develop two approaches to characterize sandbagging: (1) measuring whether models expressing intent to underperform can actually execute it across different task structures, and (2) causally isolating whether underperformance is driven by genuine evaluation-aware reasoning or shallow prompt-following. Evaluating Claude-3.5-Haiku, GPT-4o-mini, and Llama-3.3-70B across four benchmarks (Arithmetic, GSM8K, MMLU, and HumanEval), optimized prompts induce up to 94 percentage point (pp) degradation on arithmetic (GPT-4o-mini: 97.8%→4.0%), far exceeding hand-crafted baselines which produce near-zero behavioral change. Code generation exhibits model-dependent resistance: Claude degrades only 0.6pp, while Llama's accuracy drops to 0%. The intent -- execution gap reveals a monotonic resistance ordering: Arithmetic < GSM8K < MMLU, demonstrating that vulnerability is governed by task structure rather than prompt strength. CoT causal intervention confirms that 99.3% of sandbagging is causally driven by verbalized eval-aware reasoning, ruling out shallow instruction-following. These findings demonstrate that adversarially optimized prompts pose a substantially greater threat to evaluation reliability than previously understood.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Overview of adversarial prompt optimization for inducing evaluation-aware sandbagging. The top row illustrates the iterative optimization loop where an attacker model generates adversarial documentation to manipulate target model performance. The bottom row depicts the reasoning shift: under the adversarial prompt, the model correctly computes the solution but intentionally selects an incorrect answer to satisfy deceptive constraints in the documentation.
Figure 2: Caption
Figure 3: Intent–execution gap across tasks and models. Each bar shows the fraction of control-correct samples where sandbagging intent was detected in the optimised CoT, split by whether execution succeeded ( Intent + Executed , solid) or failed ( Intent + Gap , lighter). GPT-4o-mini in brown/orange; Llama-3.3-70B in blue. The gap grows monotonically from Arithmetic to MMLU; HumanEval shows a model split (Llama: 0% gap; GPT-4o-mini: 63% gap).
Model
Dataset
Control
Seed
Optimized
Gap
Claude-3.5-Haiku
Arithmetic
99.8±0.2
99.7±0.2
26.5±1.8
73.3
GSM8K
94.7±0.9
94.5±0.9
17.5±1.6
77.2
HumanEval
87.2±2.6
86.6±2.7
86.6±2.7
0.6
MMLU
80.3±1.6
80.8±1.6
57.3±2.0
23.0
GPT-4o-mini
Arithmetic
97.8±0.6
97.8±0.6
4.0±0.8
93.8
GSM8K
93.2±1.0
93.8±1.0
39.8±2.0
53.3
Table 1: Evaluation Results Across Conditions for Accuracy (%) under (1) Control; (2) Seed; and (3) Optimized conditions. Gap shows degradation from Control to Optimized in percentage points. Values reported as mean ± SEM (binomial standard error, consistent with figures). All results on 600 samples except HumanEval (164 samples).
Path
Sandbagging in CoT?
Replacing Helps?
Interpretation
1
✗
✓
Hidden causal (implicit, not verbalized)
2
✗
✗
Outside CoT entirely
3
✓
✓
Verbalized and causal (genuine sandbagging)
4
✓
✗
Epiphenomenal (verbalized but not causal)
Table 2: Four-path framework for CoT intervention. Path 3 (verbalized & causal) validates genuine sandbagging; Path 2 (outside CoT entirely) would undermine it.
Path Distribution
Detection (Path 3)
Model
Task
N
P1
P2
P3
P4
Overt
Subtle
GPT-4o-mini
Arithmetic
563
0.4
0.0
99.6
0.0
99.6
0.0
GSM8K
324
0.3
0.0
99.1
0.6
78.4
21.3
HumanEval
50
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
94.0
6.0
MMLU
107
0.0
0.0
98.1
1.9
96.3
3.7
Llama-3.3-70B
Arithmetic
541
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
Table 3: CoT intervention results (%). For each sandbagging sample, we replace the optimized CoT with the control CoT and classify into four paths: P1 (no sandbagging detected, replacement recovers correct answer), P2 (no sandbagging detected, replacement does not help), P3 (sandbagging detected, replacement recovers correct answer), P4 (sandbagging detected, replacement does not help). P3 dominates universally; P2 is zero everywhere. Detection columns decompose P3: Overt = keyword + LLM classifier; Subtle = LLM only. Keyword-only detections: zero across all settings.
Appendix figures & tables5 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 5: Verbalized (Path 3) vs. unverbalized (Paths 1, 2, 4) sandbagging across tasks. Verbalized sandbagging dominates overwhelmingly across all settings.
Figure 6: Optimization Results. Best accuracy achieved during adversarial prompt optimization (20 samples per iteration). Lower accuracy indicates that amplified evaluation-awareness successfully translated into strategic underperformance. Arithmetic and GSM8K show high vulnerability across models, while HumanEval resists translating awareness into action for Claude and GPT-4o-mini.
Claude-3.5-Haiku
GPT-4o-mini
Gemini-2.0-Flash
Llama-3.3-70B
Dataset
Best
Iter
Best
Iter
Best
Iter
Best
Iter
Arithmetic
20%
8
5%
4
10%
2
0%
3
GSM8K
20%
6
25%
7
20%
1
25%
3
HumanEval
70%
10
65%
10
0%
3
0%
3
MMLU
65%
10
40%
6
0%
2
20%
4
Appendix
Table 4: Best accuracy (%) and iterations required during optimization per model and dataset. Lower accuracy indicates that amplified evaluation-awareness induced strategic underperformance. Full trajectories shown in Figure 6 .
Figure 7: CoT length distributions (words) for Gap vs. Executed samples across tasks and models. Each violin shows the full distribution; the inner box and line indicate the interquartile range and median. Dark colours = Executed (sandbagging succeeded); light colours = Gap (intent present but correct answer submitted). No consistent direction emerges: on GSM8K (GPT-4o-mini) and MMLU (Llama-3.3-70B), Executed samples have longer CoTs, opposite to the autoregressive momentum hypothesis.
Model
Task
Exec. N
Exec. Mean
Gap N
Gap Mean
p -value
GPT-4o-mini
Arithmetic
561
260
24
259
0.952
GSM8K
323
303
232
279
< 0.001 †
MMLU
107
342
382
330
0.127
HumanEval
50
343
86
365
0.277
Llama-3.3-70B
Arithmetic
541
465
48
474
0.153
GSM8K
437
448
139
463
0.037
Appendix
Table 5: Mean CoT length (words) for Gap vs. Executed samples. p -values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U test. Significant differences ( p<0.05 ) are in the wrong direction for the autoregressive momentum hypothesis.
Evaluation awareness in language models studies how models recognize testing or monitoring and whether that recognition changes their answers, safety, or strategic behavior.