A systematic approach to answering the easy problems of consciousness based on an executable cognitive system

We propose uncommon self-knowledge (USK) as a candidate criterion for consciousness: synergistic information a system carries about itself that exists only in the joint of its subsystems and is destroyed by decomposition. Drawing on Gottwald's partition-lattice grounding of Partial Information Decomposition (PID), where redundancy corresponds to Aumann's common knowledge and synergy to the gap between separate and joint observation, we propose the synergistic component of self-directed information as a candidate formal signature for conscious processing. If correct, the framework would (1) offer a clean separation between consciousness and metacognition (synergistic vs. redundant self-knowledge), (2) provide principled resolutions to counterexamples that challenge IIT, GWT, and HOT, (3) be operationalizable via Partial Information Rate Decomposition (PIRD) with self-targeting, and (4) generate distinctive empirical predictions, the strongest being a GWT timing dissociation (consciousness correlates with pre-broadcast synergy formation, not broadcast itself) and a specific dissociation between self-report disruption and task-performance disruption under middle-layer perturbation in LLMs. The proposal is consistent with recent empirical findings that both anaesthesia and Alzheimer's disease specifically reduce synergistic information processing while preserving or increasing redundancy.

A central tenet of human cognition is systematicity, the principle that understanding one concept is inherently tied to understanding close variations of that concept. Do reasoning models robustly exhibit such systematicity? If so, we would expect consistent performance on structurally equivalent variants of the same task. Here, we extend established rule induction tasks from cognitive science to assess the systematicity of thought in current reasoning models. Each task family has compositional structure that we use to create structurally equivalent task variations through task isomorphisms such as recombination and substitution. We find that despite being able to correctly solve a task, models often fail on structurally equivalent variants of the same task. These findings suggest that many model behaviors lack systematicity, rendering it difficult to robustly establish the cognitive abilities of reasoning models beyond the particular contexts they were evaluated in.

Computational functionalism about consciousness is often criticized for relying on observer-relative interpretations of physical systems. This paper proposes a mathematical refinement of functionalism that avoids this problem. The central idea is that consciousness-relevant functional organization should be identified not with arbitrary input-output mappings, semantic labels, or externally imposed computational descriptions, but with a system's canonical functional structure: the minimal state-transition structure obtained by identifying internal states that have identical future behavior under all possible continuations. On this view, a state is functionally defined by its complete counterfactual role: how the system would evolve and respond from that state under possible future interactions. We call this position canonical functionalism. The framework does not claim to identify which systems are conscious, nor to show that functional organization is sufficient for consciousness. Rather, it identifies the canonical object over which functionalist theories of consciousness should be formulated: the task is to specify consciousness-relevant invariants, measures, or structural conditions over canonical functional structures, rather than over arbitrary semantic interpretations or superficial behavioral profiles. This reframes familiar objections about lookup tables, simulations, unfolding, and observer-relative computation: such cases do not by themselves refute functionalism, but force the functionalist to specify whether the relevant canonical structure is preserved, and if not, which additional structural features are missing.