Impact of arbitrage between leveraged ETF and futures on market liquidity during market crash
Authors: Ryuki Hayase, Takanobu Mizuta, Isao Yagi
Organizations: Department of Informatics, Graduate School of Engineering, Kogakuin University · SPARX Asset Management Co., Ltd. · Department of Information Science, Faculty of Informatics, Kogakuin University
Leveraged ETFs (L-ETFs) are exchange-traded funds that achieve price movements several times greater than an index by holding index-linked futures such as Nikkei Stock Average Index futures. It is known that when the price of an L-ETF falls, the L-ETF uses the liquidity of futures to limit the decline through arbitrage trading. Conversely, when the price of a futures contract falls, the futures contract uses the liquidity of the L-ETF to limit its decline. However, the impact of arbitrage trading on the liquidity of these markets has been little studied. Therefore, the present study used artificial market simulations to investigate how the liquidity (Volume, SellDepth, BuyDepth, Tightness) of both markets changes when prices plummet in either (i.e., the L-ETF or futures market), depending on the presence or absence of arbitrage trading. As a result, it was found that when erroneous orders occur in the L-ETF market, the existence of arbitrage trading causes liquidity to be supplied from the futures market to the L-ETF market in terms of SellDepth and Tightness. When erroneous orders occur in the futures market, the existence of arbitrage trading causes liquidity to be supplied from the L-ETF market to the futures market in terms of SellDepth and Tightness, and liquidity to be supplied from the futures market to the L-ETF market in terms of Volume. We also analyzed the internal market mechanisms that led to these results.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Market liquidity diagram
No arbitrage trading
Arbitrage trading permitted
Leveraged ETF
Futures
Leveraged ETF
Futures
Volume
1370.433
361.500
1336.933
1384.333
SellDepth
33.649
856.261
60.970
560.027
BuyDepth
164.257
855.100
162.713
934.415
Tightness
18.686
9.379
10.974
10.934
Table 1: Market liquidity indicator values during the erroneous order period in the event of an erroneous order in the leveraged ETF market
No arbitrage trading
Arbitrage trading permitted
Leveraged ETF
Futures
Leveraged ETF
Futures
bestsell
4816.153
10005.410
4940.756
9940.757
bestbuy
4797.467
9996.033
4929.782
9929.823
Table 2: Best bid and best ask prices during the erroneous order period when an erroneous order occurs in the leveraged ETF market
No arbitrage trading
Arbitrage trading permitted
Leveraged ETF
Futures
Leveraged ETF
Futures
Best Bid Price
2.53044
2.532407
1.523627
5.494221
1 tick down
3.107011
3.147141
2.883839
7.781648
10 ticks down
3.200591
5.862466
3.142820
8.539460
20 ticks down
3.299328
7.956378
3.280504
9.025146
30 ticks down
3.353885
8.589546
3.349862
9.247427
Table 3: Number of orders by number of ticks during the erroneous order period when an erroneous order occurs in the leveraged ETF market
No arbitrage trading
Arbitrage trading permitted
Leveraged ETF
Futures
Leveraged ETF
Futures
Volume
68.600
8025.533
2508.433
7425.400
SellDepth
173.503
120.479
20.255
157.807
BuyDepth
170.828
811.344
183.352
814.255
Tightness
5.309
24.343
17.517
17.594
Table 4: Market liquidity indicator values during the erroneous order period in the event of an erroneous order in the futures market
No arbitrage trading
Arbitrage trading permitted
Leveraged ETF
Futures
Leveraged ETF
Futures
bestsell
5002.437
9552.983
4695.787
9695.771
bestbuy
4997.128
9528.640
4678.270
9678.177
Table 5: Best bid and ask prices during the erroneous order period when an erroneous order occurs in the futures market
No arbitrage trading
Arbitrage trading permitted
Leveraged ETF
Futures
Leveraged ETF
Futures
Best Bid Price
1.812732
4.858940
3.190081
4.134082
1 tick down
1.652858
7.717149
3.521053
7.626708
10 ticks down
3.249156
7.843822
3.593917
7.803561
20 ticks down
3.494964
7.945150
3.679266
7.940020
30 ticks down
3.753843
8.033650
3.732040
8.070982
Table 6: Number of orders by number of ticks during the erroneous order period when an erroneous order occurs in the futures market
Appendix figures & tables5 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 2: Price time series under the following conditions: no erroneous orders or arbitrage transactions, erroneous orders present but no arbitrage transactions, erroneous orders and arbitrage transactions present but no rebalancing transactions, or erroneous orders, arbitrage transactions, and rebalancing transactions present
Figure 3: Price movements of leveraged ETFs and futures with misorders, arbitrage, and rebalancing ( S0=50000 ). Although both the left and right vertical axes span a 1000 range, the initial price of the leveraged ETF is 5000 , half that of the futures, at 10000 . Therefore, a 2 -fold change in the leveraged ETF will cause the graphs to overlap.
Figure 4: Incorrect orders placed, no arbitrage, and the decline in leveraged ETFs when S0 is altered with arbitrage, along with the sell volume resulting from leveraged ETF rebalancing.
Figure 5: Incorrect orders placed, no arbitrage, and the decline in futures when S0 is altered with arbitrage, along with the sell volume resulting from leveraged ETF rebalancing.
Figure 6: Mechanism of market disruption when leveraged ETFs become too large ( S0≥100000 )
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Hao Yang, Zhenguo Xu
North China Institute of Computer System Engineering, Beijing, China · University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China