Benchmarking Political Persuasion Risks Across Frontier Large Language Models

Conversational AI has been proposed as a scalable way to correct public misconceptions and spread misinformation. Yet its effectiveness may depend on perceptions of its political neutrality. As LLMs enter partisan conflict, elites increasingly portray them as ideologically aligned. We test whether these credibility attacks reduce LLM-based persuasion. In a preregistered U.S. survey experiment (N=2144), participants completed a three-round conversation with ChatGPT about a personally held economic policy misconception. Compared to a neutral control, a short message indicating that the LLM was biased against the respondent's party attenuated persuasion by 28%. Transcript analysis indicates that the warnings alter the interaction: respondents push back more and engage less receptively. These findings suggest that the persuasive impact of conversational AI is politically contingent, constrained by perceptions of partisan alignment.

As users increasingly turn to Large Language Models (LLMs) for information and advice on political matters, particularly during election periods, the political preferences expressed by these systems have become a matter of public interest. Prior research has shown that interactions with LLMs can influence users' political attitudes and choices, raising questions about how these models themselves evaluate political actors. In this paper, we investigate whether and how LLMs express preferences toward political parties and political leaders. We introduce a systematic and reproducible auditing framework in which multiple LLMs are prompted to evaluate parties and leaders across nine criteria. Rather than attempting to infer the models' "true" political beliefs, we focus on their observable behavior, examining consistency across evaluations, differences between models, refusal rates, and sensitivity to prompt formulation. We further investigate how these evaluations vary when models are instructed to adopt different personas. We demonstrate the framework through an Italian case study, providing a systematic analysis of LLM-generated political evaluations on italian parties and leaders.

Large language models (LLMs) have already been shown to match or exceed human experts in persuasion. While their persuasive capabilities hold promise for beneficial uses such as education and health communication, they can also be used to manipulate and misinform, making their evaluation a growing priority for developers and regulators. That evaluation, however, remains fragmented: studies differ in what they treat as persuasion, and broad claims often rest on narrow, situation-specific assessments. Automated methods, often modelled on human studies, offer a way to compare such assessments directly, as they can be run on the same models at scale and can include high-risk forms of persuasion that would be difficult or unethical to test on people. In this study, we adapt nine published automated methods to a shared setup, run them on the same fifteen LLMs, and ask whether their rankings agree and why. We find that the methods agree only weakly (mean Spearman $ρ= 0.25$). Our analyses point to two contributing factors. Models that refuse some tasks but not others, directly or indirectly, lower agreement by about a quarter, and these refusals fall mostly on manipulation tasks. General capability also plays a part: most rational persuasion (non-manipulative) methods track it, whereas most manipulation methods do not. Together, these findings suggest that agreement depends more on the task a method sets than on how it scores persuasion, although this pattern is only indicative given the eight methods available for analysis. More broadly, our results suggest that persuasion scores combine a model's ability to persuade with its willingness to do so. A single score is therefore informative about its own setting, but says little about a model's persuasiveness across tasks.