Competition-Aware CPC Forecasting with Near-Market Coverage
Authors: Sebastian Frey, Edoardo Beccari, Maximilian Kranz, Nicolò Alberto Pellizzari, Ali Mete Karaman, Qiwei Han, Maximilian Kaiser
Organizations: *Nova School of Business and Economics, Portugal · †University of Hamburg, Germany
Abstract
Cost-per-click (CPC) in paid search is an auction-generated outcome shaped by a competitive landscape that is only partially observable from any single advertiser's history. From 1.66 billion Google Ads log records for a concentrated car-rental market (2021-2023), we construct a weekly panel of 1,811 keyword series over 127 weeks (218,924 keyword-week observations) and build competition-aware proxies from keyword text, CPC trajectories, and geographic market structure. The design combines (i) semantic neighborhoods and a semantic keyword graph from pretrained transformer-based keyword representations, (ii) behavioral neighborhoods from Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) alignment of CPC trajectories, and (iii) geographic-intent covariates capturing localized demand and marketplace heterogeneity. We evaluate these signals both as exogenous covariates and as relational priors in spatiotemporal graph forecasters, benchmarking them against statistical, neural, and time-series foundation-model baselines. The results reveal a clear horizon crossover. At one week, graph-based models achieve the lowest error, reducing sMAPE by 15.1% relative to the strongest classical/ML baseline; at the six- and twelve-week horizons, covariate-augmented foundation models dominate, reducing sMAPE by 22.5% and 27.6%, respectively. The gains concentrate in the high-CPC, high-volatility keywords where forecasting errors are most costly. A falsification battery supports the competition interpretation at the planning horizon: the semantic competition graph outperforms a confounder-matched non-competitive graph by 4.05 sMAPE points, and matched-neighbour and time-shuffled controls show the six-week gains are competition-specific rather than generic smoothing. Together, the findings establish a horizon-dependent competition-aware forecasting design for auction-driven advertising markets under partial observability.
Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is the marginal gain from paid exposure: even without winning a sponsored slot, an advertiser may still earn revenue via an organic search result (e.g., on Google or Amazon). Motivated by recent work, we model ad value as a treatment effect--the outcome difference between winning and losing the auction--and study online learning for bidding in second-price (Vickrey) auctions under this causal perspective. We develop algorithms that attain rate-optimal regret under several feedback models. A key ingredient exploits the information revealed by the second-price payment rule, which strictly improves regret relative to analogous learning problems in first-price auctions.
Online advertising platforms rely on machine learning models to predict click-through rates (pCTR) and conversion rates (pCVR) for auction mechanisms. We introduce a novel framework to study the interaction between recommender system model quality, auction format, and autobidder behavior. We formalize when model improvements -- defined via a refinement relation inspired by filtrations in probability theory -- lead to improvements in platform-level Evaluation Criteria Metrics (ECM) such as revenue, welfare, or liquid welfare. Our main contributions are: (1) a formal definition of model improvement based on cluster refinement, and (2) a systematic characterization of ECM monotonicity across different combinations of bidder types (tCPA, max-CPA), auction formats (first-price, second-price, VCG), and budget constraints. We show that first-price auctions with uniform bidding guarantee revenue monotonicity for tCPA bidders without budgets (via Jensen's inequality), while second-price auctions and budget constraints can break this property. We provide full numerical constructions for the non-monotonicity results. Our findings have practical implications for advertising platforms seeking to align model improvements with business outcomes.
Real-time bidding is central to computational advertising, comprising three elements: Supply Side Platform (SSP) selling ad impressions, Demand Side Platform (DSP) bidding for advertisers, and Ad Exchange conducting auctions between them. Traditional auto-bidding algorithms focus solely on the DSP side, maximizing advertiser conversions by adjusting bids against competitors. However, current big ad platforms, such as social media and e-commerce companies, now integrate SSP, DSP, and Ad Exchange functions internally. From such ad platforms' perspective, the goal of the auto-bidding algorithms is not only to maximize the advertisers' conversions, but also the total revenue of the platform. Given the lack of platform-centric evaluation frameworks and the pressing need to advance auto-bidding research, we propose PlatformBid - the first comprehensive benchmark designed from a unified ad platform's perspective. To accurately reflect the real-world auto-bidding scenarios, we define three representative settings: (1) homogeneous competition with identical algorithms across advertisers, (2) heterogeneous competition with diverse algorithmic strategies, and (3) promotional competition where some advertisers surge budgets for boosting sales during promotional events like Black Friday. We systematically evaluate a broad spectrum of existing auto-bidding methods across these settings, encompassing classical control methods, RL-based methods, and recent generative methods. Besides these methods, we further propose a novel auto-bidding method based on flow-matching, termed BidFlow, which leverages the flow-matching method's expressive policy representation to effectively handle dynamic competitive environments. Online experiments on Kuaishou further show a +0.68% improvement in target cost, providing deployment evidence for the offline-online consistency of PlatformBid.