Model Monotonicity in Autobidding Auctions: When Do Better Predictions Lead to Better Outcomes?

Real-time bidding is central to computational advertising, comprising three elements: Supply Side Platform (SSP) selling ad impressions, Demand Side Platform (DSP) bidding for advertisers, and Ad Exchange conducting auctions between them. Traditional auto-bidding algorithms focus solely on the DSP side, maximizing advertiser conversions by adjusting bids against competitors. However, current big ad platforms, such as social media and e-commerce companies, now integrate SSP, DSP, and Ad Exchange functions internally. From such ad platforms' perspective, the goal of the auto-bidding algorithms is not only to maximize the advertisers' conversions, but also the total revenue of the platform. Given the lack of platform-centric evaluation frameworks and the pressing need to advance auto-bidding research, we propose PlatformBid - the first comprehensive benchmark designed from a unified ad platform's perspective. To accurately reflect the real-world auto-bidding scenarios, we define three representative settings: (1) homogeneous competition with identical algorithms across advertisers, (2) heterogeneous competition with diverse algorithmic strategies, and (3) promotional competition where some advertisers surge budgets for boosting sales during promotional events like Black Friday. We systematically evaluate a broad spectrum of existing auto-bidding methods across these settings, encompassing classical control methods, RL-based methods, and recent generative methods. Besides these methods, we further propose a novel auto-bidding method based on flow-matching, termed BidFlow, which leverages the flow-matching method's expressive policy representation to effectively handle dynamic competitive environments. Online experiments on Kuaishou further show a +0.68% improvement in target cost, providing deployment evidence for the offline-online consistency of PlatformBid.

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is the marginal gain from paid exposure: even without winning a sponsored slot, an advertiser may still earn revenue via an organic search result (e.g., on Google or Amazon). Motivated by recent work, we model ad value as a treatment effect--the outcome difference between winning and losing the auction--and study online learning for bidding in second-price (Vickrey) auctions under this causal perspective. We develop algorithms that attain rate-optimal regret under several feedback models. A key ingredient exploits the information revealed by the second-price payment rule, which strictly improves regret relative to analogous learning problems in first-price auctions.

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.