Organizations: Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute, Beijing 100070, China · Institute of Artificial Intelligence, China Telecom (TeleAI), Beijing 100032, China · Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 637371, Singapore · Nanjing University, Nanjing 210023, China · School of Computing and Information Technology, Great Bay University, Dongguan 523000, China
Contrastive pretraining models such as CLIP and CLAP, serve as the ubiquitous perceptual backbones for modern multimodal large models, yet their reliance on web-scale data raises growing concerns about memorizing Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Auditing such models via membership inference is challenging in practice: shadow-model MIAs are computationally prohibitive for large multimodal backbones, and existing multimodal auditing methods typically require querying the target with paired biometric inputs, thereby directly exposing sensitive biometric information to the target model. To bypass this critical limitation, we demonstrate a highly desirable capability for privacy auditing: multimodal memorization within these foundational encoders can be accurately inferred using exclusively the text modality. We propose Unimodal Membership Inference Detector (UMID), a text-only auditing framework that performs text-guided cross-modal latent inversion and extracts two complementary signals, similarity (alignment to the queried text) and variability (consistency across randomized inversions). UMID compares these statistics to a lightweight non-member reference constructed from synthetic gibberish and makes decisions via an ensemble of unsupervised anomaly detectors. Comprehensive experiments across diverse CLIP and CLAP architectures demonstrate that UMID significantly improves the effectiveness and efficiency over prior MIAs, delivering strong detection performance with sub-second auditing cost using solely text queries, completely circumventing the need for biometric inputs and complying with strict privacy constraints.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: Overview of the UMID auditing framework and the resulting distributional gap. The UMID method enables text-only membership inference (a) and achieves clear geometric separation between training and non-training samples (b).
Fig. 2: Pipeline of UMID. We employ an optimizer guided by target model to align non-text embeddings with PII text embeddings, maximizing their cosine similarity. By analyzing similarity and variability features of these optimized samples relative to the synthetic gibberish baseline, an anomaly detection system identifies abnormal patterns to infer the membership of the input text.
Setting
Method
Real data
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Precision
Recall
Accuracy
Time
ResNet-50 (one-shot)
MIA [ 13 ]
1 img
.7251
.6873
.7042
4.32h
IDIA [ 42 ]
3 imgs
.6922
.4031
.6836
0.845s
WSA [ 15 ]
1 img
.6653
.2925
.6675
2158.1s
C-WSA [ 43 ]
1 img
.7210
.4530
.7125
2141.4s
UMID (Ours)
Null
.8634
.9821
.9172
0.628s
TABLE I: Comparison of CLIP (image-text) methods. Best and second-best results are bolded .
Setting
Method
Real data
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Precision
Recall
Accuracy
Time
LibriSpeech (one-shot)
Audio Auditor [ 58 ]
1 audio
.6338
.7324
.6519
1.273s
SLMIA-SR [ 60 ]
1 audio
.7521
.8864
.8342
1.528s
AuditMI [ 59 ]
1 audio
.8257
.9526
.8791
13.578s
UMID (Ours)
Null
.8649
.9649
.9127
0.603s
UMID (Ours)
1 audio
.8921
.9868
.9354
0.647s
TABLE II: Comparison of CLAP (audio-text) methods. Best and second-best results are bolded .
Fig. 3: Detection accuracy for CLIP model (ResNet-50) under various parameters.
Fig. 4: Detection accuracy for CLAP model (LibriSpeech) under various parameters.
Fig. 5: Empirical validation of geometric separation. (a) Convergence of similarity ( Sn ) and variability ( Dn2 ) as inversion runs ( n ) increase. (b) Cosine similarity distributions confirming the high-dimensional isotropy of non-members versus the directional bias of members.
Dataset
Training samples
Defense
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Accuracy
Time
CelebA (CLIP)
one-shot
Without
.9535
0.685s
DP
.8742
0.688s
many-shot
Without
.9562
0.691s
DP
.8595
0.689s
LibriSpeech (CLAP)
one-shot
Without
.9354
0.647s
TABLE III: UMID robustness evaluation under differential privacy defense ( ϵ=1.0 , δ=10−5 ).
Dataset
Training samples
Defense
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Accuracy
Time
CelebA (CLIP)
one-shot
Without
.9535
0.685s
CG
.9412
0.689s
many-shot
Without
.9562
0.691s
CG
.9385
0.687s
LibriSpeech (CLAP)
one-shot
Without
.9354
0.647s
TABLE IV: UMID robustness evaluation under covert gibberish defense.
Appendix figures & tables2 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
b+dh43u!f9de545w
53e(s3erg24=pnI<S
fe3_5fg;@f34f.e2w/
4teh<E{434fef234ter
5gt%b@5435-hgF
#4c3rd4scd324g
Appendix
TABLE V: Samples of randomly generated textual gibberish generated by GPT-3.5-turbo.
Karinix
Zylogene
Glycogenyx
Zylotrax
Vexilith
Exodynix
Novylith
Glycosyne
Xenolynx
Rynexis
Appendix
TABLE VI: Covert gibberish that seem to be real names generated by GPT-3.5-turbo.
Department of Data Science and Artificial Intelligence The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong SAR, China · Department of Applied Mathematics The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong SAR, China