Consequentialist Objectives and Catastrophe

Frontier AI systems perform best in settings with clear, stable, and verifiable objectives, such as code generation, mathematical reasoning, games, and unit-test-driven tasks. They remain less reliable in open-ended settings, including scientific assistance, long-horizon agents, high-stakes advice, personalization, and tool use, where the relevant objective is ambiguous, context-dependent, delayed, or only partially observable. We argue that many such failures are not merely failures of scale or capability, but failures of objective selection: the system optimizes a locally visible signal while missing which objectives should govern the interaction. We formulate this problem as contextual multi-objective optimization. In this setting, systems must consider multiple, context-dependent objectives, such as helpfulness, truthfulness, safety, privacy, calibration, non-manipulation, user preference, reversibility, and stakeholder impact, while determining which objectives are active, which are soft preferences, and which must function as hard or quasi-hard constraints. These examples are not intended as an exhaustive taxonomy: different domains and deployment settings may activate different objective dimensions and different conflict-resolution procedures. Our framework models AI behavior as a context-dependent choice rule over candidate actions, objective estimates, active constraints, stakeholders, uncertainty, and conflict-resolution procedures. We outline an implementation pathway based on decomposed objective representations, context-to-objective routing, hierarchical constraints, deliberative policy reasoning, controlled personalization, tool-use control, diagnostic evaluation, auditing, and post-deployment revision.

As more responsibility is placed upon AI systems, it becomes increasingly important to guarantee that these systems are aligned with humanity. A common fear in AI safety is that human value is fragile -- that is, optimizing too heavily for an imperfect proxy to human values will lead to a catastrophic outcome. In this paper, we present a model of the alignment problem where an agent undergoes idealized alignment training that guarantees its value function satisfies a proxy condition before optimizing the world. Our primary results identify conditions on the human value function and the accuracy of several proxy conditions under which an agent with an $η$-catastrophic value function, one that is guaranteed to take the expectation of human value below $η$ in the limit of optimizing power, would be deployed. Our results highlight the danger of overoptimization and motivate AI designs that limit optimization pressure, such as quantilizers, rather than relying solely on pre-deployment training.

Organizations across finance, healthcare, transportation, content moderation, and critical infrastructure are rapidly deploying highly automated AI systems, yet they lack principled methods to quantify how increasing automation amplifies harm when failures occur. We propose a parsimonious Bayesian risk decomposition expressing expected loss as the product of three terms: the probability of system failure, the conditional probability that a failure propagates into harm given the automation level, and the expected severity of harm. This framework isolates a critical quantity -- the conditional probability that failures propagate into harm -- which captures execution and oversight risk rather than model accuracy alone. We develop complete theoretical foundations: formal proofs of the decomposition, a harm propagation equivalence theorem linking the harm propagation probability to observable execution controls, risk elasticity measures, efficient frontier analysis for automation policy, and optimal resource allocation principles with second-order conditions. We motivate the framework with an illustrative case study of the 2012 Knight Capital incident ($440M loss) as one instantiation of a broadly applicable failure pattern, and characterize the research design required to empirically validate the framework at scale across deployment domains. This work provides the theoretical foundations for a new class of deployment-focused risk governance tools for agentic and automated AI systems.