RESQ: A Unified Framework for REliability- and Security Enhancement of Quantized Deep Neural Networks
Authors: Ali Soltan Mohammadi, Samira Nazari, Ali Azarpeyvand, Mahdi Taheri, Milos Krstic, Michael Huebner, Christian Herglotz, Tara Ghasempouri
Organizations: University of Zanjan, Zanjan, Iran · Brandenburg Technical University, Cottbus, Germany · Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia · Leibniz Institute for High Performance Microelectronics, Frankfurt Oder, Germany
This work proposes a unified three-stage framework that produces a quantized DNN with balanced fault and attack robustness. The first stage improves attack resilience via fine-tuning that desensitizes feature representations to small input perturbations. The second stage reinforces fault resilience through fault-aware fine-tuning under simulated bit-flip faults. Finally, a lightweight post-training adjustment integrates quantization to enhance efficiency and further mitigate fault sensitivity without degrading attack resilience. Experiments on ResNet18, VGG16, EfficientNet, and Swin-Tiny in CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and GTSRB show consistent gains of up to 10.35% in attack resilience and 12.47% in fault resilience, while maintaining competitive accuracy in quantized networks. The results also highlight an asymmetric interaction in which improvements in fault resilience generally increase resilience to adversarial attacks, whereas enhanced adversarial resilience does not necessarily lead to higher fault resilience.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1 : Overview of the RESQ framework. The pipeline sequentially enhances DNN resilience and produces a final model robust to both input perturbations and hardware faults.
Model
Dataset
Baseline
BPFC Stage
FA Stage
Q-FA Stage
ResNet-18
CIFAR-10
92.82
92.13
91.34
91.69
VGG-11
CIFAR-10
90.44
90.05
89.26
89.83
EfficientNet-B0
GTSRB
99.89
99.73
99.05
96.40
Swin-Tiny
CIFAR-100
85.30
81.39
78.20
73.12
TABLE I : Baseline and Stage-Wise Accuracy (%) of RESQ across Architectures and Datasets
Fig. 2 : Top ten critical layers for ResNet-18 via EMA-based gradient norms.
Fig. 3 : Impact of training stages on resilience of ResNet-18
Model
Clean
FGSM
IFGSM
PGD
BIM
MIM
ϵ
VGG11
89.83
36.92
10.22
12.28
10.90
16.33
0.1
Q-FA-VGG11
90.02
50.94
24.52
27.57
25.57
30.77
0.1
ResNet18
91.69
41.95
10.52
12.68
11.06
17.43
0.1
Q-FA-ResNet18
92.82
52.30
30.45
31.01
30.86
34.80
0.1
EfficientNet
96.40
58.39
51.47
46.57
51.65
54.44
0.001
Q-FA-EfficientNet
97.80
86.35
84.97
83.55
85.01
85.57
0.001
TABLE II : Adversarial Resilience of Models with Different Perturbation Magnitudes
Model
BER 1
BER 2
BER 3
Q-FA-VGG11
91.21
49.97
13.95
VGG11
89.83
49.22
10.01
Q-FA-ResNet18
91.52
90.58
74.71
ResNet18
79.05
18.92
9.99
Q-FA-EfficientNet
96.15
95.57
93.68
EfficientNet
89.14
87.31
86.17
TABLE III : Fault Resilience of Models under Varying BERs
Deep neural networks (DNNs) deployed on resource-constrained neuromorphic hardware face three concurrent challenges: the need for model compression through pruning, vulnerability to adversarial input perturbations, and susceptibility to hardware-induced weight faults such as stuck-at-zero errors. While each of these factors has been studied in isolation, their combined effects on model reliability have received little attention. This paper presents an empirical investigation of how pruning, adversarial training, and hardware fault injection interact to affect the robustness of convolutional neural networks. Using a compact three-layer CNN trained on MNIST, we conduct three experiments: (1) comparing the fault tolerance of naturally and adversarially trained models under simultaneous hardware faults and adversarial attacks, (2) evaluating how pruning affects adversarial robustness, and (3) characterizing the joint accuracy surface across fault rates, adversarial perturbation magnitudes, and pruning levels. Our results show that adversarial training improves robustness against input perturbations but increases sensitivity to stuck-at-zero weight faults. Contrary to intuition, pruning did not significantly increase fault sensitivity, and varying the pruning level had little effect across fault rates and attack strengths. These results highlight the need to jointly consider adversarial robustness and hardware reliability.
Manali Dangarikar, Cory Merkel
Brain Lab Rochester Institute of Technology Rochester, NY, USA
Post-training quantization is a powerful tool for compressing large language models. The most scalable methods quantize every layer in parallel, but quantization errors then compound through the residual stream, as no layer corrects for the errors of the layers before it. Sequential quantization accounts for this error compounding by re-calibrating each layer on the already-quantized outputs of its predecessors, yielding stronger results but at the cost of a serial schedule that becomes a bottleneck at scale. As a solution, we propose parallel quantization with activation denoising, which recovers much of the sequential benefit while keeping quantization fully parallel. Rather than re-calibrating layer-by-layer, we take a robustness perspective and model the upstream error as noise, regularizing to be robust to it through a preprocessing step followed by metric-weighted rounding. Applied at every layer, this regularization forms a depth-compounding smoothness penalty that dampens how strongly quantization errors amplify through the model. Unlike orthogonal rotations commonly used in quantization, which must preserve the model's function, we multiply the weights by a more general linear transformation. We find that the two are complementary and their effects compound. Empirically, our robustness regularization recovers a significant part of sequential quantization's benefit in a single parallel pass, at a fraction of its time. Overall, by treating compounding quantization errors as a robustness problem, we offer a principled foundation for more efficient and accurate LLM quantization at scale.
Yan Scholten, Rachel Lawrence, James Hensman +3
Dept. of Computer Science & Munich Data Science Institute, Technical University of Munich · Microsoft Research Cambridge, UK
Model quantization reduces the numerical precision of neural network weights and activations to lower storage and computational costs. Model inversion attacks recover or reconstruct sensitive training data or inference inputs from model outputs or intermediate features, so quantization may also alter their effectiveness. However, two questions remain unresolved: How does model quantization affect model inversion? How do data characteristics influence this relationship? To address the first, we bound quantization-induced changes in mutual information between inputs and a categorical variable defined by prediction probabilities, distinguishing informational effects from attack optimization obstacles. To address the second, we identify data-dependent changes in feature distributions and inversion outcomes, with pronounced quantization sensitivity differences at 4 bits. These insights guide a privacy-aware post-training quantization method that improves inversion resistance while recovering utility. It uses a Fisher-type task-sensitivity proxy for budget-aware bit allocation, calibrates activation ranges, and jointly optimizes weight and activation scales and weight-rounding decisions with task-recovery and geometry-retention objectives and scale and rounding regularization. Experiments cover multiple metrics, neural network architectures, and face, palmprint, and iris recognition tasks. On ResNet-50, Palm at 4 bits reduces RL-MIA's strict success from 54% to 26%, while accuracy decreases from 99.01% to 96.55% relative to FP32. Our method also supports output-level defenses: adding Stealthy Shield Defense (SSD, epsilon = 0.1) to Iris at 4.5 bits reduces BREP-MI's strict success from 63.33% to 37.33%, while accuracy decreases from 92.8% to 87.6% relative to quantization alone.
Rongke Liu, Youwen Zhu
School of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China