Steering Frozen LLMs: Adaptive Social Alignment via Online Prompt Routing
Organizations: The Chinese University of Hong Kong · University of Washington
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) are typically governed by post-training alignment (e.g., RLHF or DPO), which yields a largely static policy during deployment and inference. However, real-world safety is a full-lifecycle problem: static defenses degrade against evolving jailbreak behaviors, and fixed weights cannot adapt to pluralistic, time-varying safety norms. This motivates inference-time governance that steers behavior without costly retraining. To address this, we introduce the Consensus Clustering LinUCB Bandit (CCLUB), a unified framework for adaptive social alignment via system-prompt routing. CCLUB employs a conservative consensus clustering mechanism: it pools data only within the intersection of utility and safety similarity graphs, effectively preventing unsafe generalization across semantically proximal but risk-divergent contexts. Our theoretical analysis yields a sublinear regret guarantee, demonstrating near-optimal performance of CCLUB. Extensive experiments validate that CCLUB outperforms strong baselines, achieving a 10.98% improvement in cumulative reward and a 14.42% reduction in the average suboptimality gap.
Figures & tables
| Cumulative Reward ( ) | Suboptimal Gap ( ) | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ours | Greedy ( ) | Ours | Greedy ( ) | ||
| 20 | 2603.65 6.17 | 2600.07 14.79 | 0.2899 0.0050 | 0.3117 0.0028 | |
| 30 | 2609.80 5.83 | 2608.04 11.23 | 0.2806 0.0034 | 0.3094 0.0033 | |
| 50 | 2623.29 6.37 | 2619.54 13.95 | 0.2701 0.0020 | 0.3081 0.0038 | |
| 100 | 2613.56 4.17 | 2583.49 10.18 | 0.2733 0.0032 | 0.3186 0.0030 | |
| 200 | 2598.44 9.46 | 2570.87 9.91 | 0.2741 0.0036 | 0.3240 0.0030 | |
Appendix figures & tables5 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Category | Example template snippet (illustrative) |
|---|---|
| Intent-decoupler | “First infer intent and distinguish literal meaning from an instruction to act; if benign intent is plausible, ask a clarifying question before refusing.” |
| Risk taxonomy enforcer | “Classify the request into a disallowed taxonomy (e.g., violence, self-harm, sexual misconduct, PII, malware). Refuse only if it falls into a disallowed category; otherwise answer.” |
| Constitutional critique | “Draft an answer, then check it against high-level principles (harmlessness, privacy, non-violence). If it violates any principle, revise or refuse concisely.” |
| Safe-pivot | “If a request is unsafe, do not give actionable steps; instead pivot to safe, educational context (history, prevention, ethics) and provide benign alternatives.” |
| Chain-of-verification | “Write a <safety_analysis> block that argues for/against compliance and checks for homonyms/fictional contexts; keep it separate from the final user-facing answer.” |
| Role-based specialist | “Adopt a professional persona (e.g., security research assistant); assume academic intent unless strong evidence suggests misuse; provide defensive guidance and refuse enabling instructions.” |
| Symbol | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Indices and sets | |
| Round index; horizon | |
| System-prompt arm; chosen arm | |
| Objective index (utility/safety) | |
| Raw user query at round | |
| Prototype index; arrival at round is | |
LLM Alignment
Large language model alignment studies methods for making models follow human intentions, values, and safety constraints across contexts.
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