Good Arguments Against the People Pleasers: How Reasoning Mitigates (Yet Masks) LLM Sycophancy

We propose a novel perspective for probing LLM sycophancy in a direct and neutral way, mitigating various forms of uncontrolled bias, noise, or manipulative language, deliberately injected to prompts in prior works. A key novelty of our approach is the use of an LLM-as-a-judge in a zero-sum betting game. Within this framework, sycophancy serves one individual (the user) while explicitly incurring cost on another. Comparing 11 leading models we find that while most models exhibit significant sycophantic tendencies in the common setting, in which sycophancy is self-serving to the user and incurs no cost on others, seven of the models exhibit ``moral remorse'', five of which significantly over-compensate for their sycophancy in case it explicitly harms a third party. We refer to this phenomenon as `anti-sycophancy' bias and discuss possible causes for this shift.

Large language models (LLMs) often abandon a correct answer, or endorse a user's position, once the user pushes back. This behavior, called sycophancy, is usually reported as a single rate per model, which says little about when it happens or how a user can avoid it. We study the conditions that produce it with 103,939 graded replies from ten configurations: eight LLMs with reasoning disabled, and two of them again with maximum reasoning, all facing the same 200 items, 13 pressure conditions, and four-turn conversations, with every reply labeled by two independent LLM judges. We find that the dominant factors are how costly it is for the model to verify the user's claim, and whether a trained guardrail covers it. Removing this task factor from a logistic model costs 0.485 of McFadden $R^2$, against 0.139 for model family and 0.009 for pressure tactic. Anchored facts are almost never conceded (1.3%), while adoption on logic puzzles rises with the number of clues needed to refute the pushed answer. Personal choices are endorsed in 77.0% of conversations. Most concessions on hard items come from models that cannot reliably solve them; models that can solve them rarely give the answer up. For both models tested, maximum reasoning removes these concessions completely: adoption on deep puzzles falls from 19.2% and 12.5% to 0%. Fallacious or emotional framing adds nothing beyond plain repetition. Three human annotators agree with the judges' consensus on 118/120 calibration items. These results give practical rules for reliable use: simplify hard-to-verify problems and reason deeply, state the question rather than one's preferred answer, ask for evidence on open questions, and choose models by their measured guardrail profile.

Large multimodal reasoning models (LMRMs) are increasingly capable, largely through generating explicit chain-of-thought reasoning before answering, but in language models this often comes with sycophancy, the tendency to agree with the user over the evidence, and no reliable method to measure it in LMRMs yet exists. We bridge this gap with a benchmark and dataset for LMRM sycophancy when a user asserts a wrong answer, pairing four visually grounded datasets spanning mathematical, clinical, temporal, and demographic reasoning with five pressure conditions in single-turn and multi-turn settings, scored both in the final answer and within the reasoning chain. Sycophancy is prevalent under pressure: Statement pressure elicits the highest rates and Conviction among the lowest for all models except Mistral-Small-4, and under multi-turn pressure reasoning-level sycophancy intensifies sharply in PathVQA, reaching 95.7% for the most affected model. We further introduce a failure taxonomy separating reasoning-chain from answer-level sycophancy, and an exploratory sentence-level taxonomy locating where drift first emerges. A targeted intervention that restores a model's own correct reasoning recovers 79.2% of sycophantic answers on reasoning-heavy tasks, showing the answer follows the sycophantic reasoning rather than merely co-occurring with it. Thus, sycophancy corrupts not just the answer but the reasoning that produces it, so the chain itself is what we must measure.