What if Pinocchio Were a Reinforcement Learning Agent: A Normative End-to-End Pipeline

AI systems are increasingly deployed in high-stakes contexts (medical diagnosis, legal research, financial analysis) under the assumption they can be governed by norms. This paper demonstrates that the assumption is formally invalid for optimization-based systems, specifically Large Language Models trained via Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). Genuine agency requires two necessary and jointly sufficient architectural conditions. First, the capacity to maintain certain boundaries as non-negotiable constraints rather than tradeable weights (Incommensurability). Second, a non-inferential mechanism capable of suspending processing when those boundaries are threatened (Apophatic Responsiveness). RLHF-based systems are constitutively incompatible with both conditions. The operations that make optimization powerful, unifying all values on a scalar metric and always selecting the highest-scoring output, are precisely the operations that preclude normative governance and agency. This incompatibility is not a correctable training bug awaiting a technical fix. It is a formal constraint inherent to what optimization is. Consequently, documented failure modes (sycophancy, hallucination, and unfaithful reasoning) are not accidents but expected structural manifestations. Misaligned deployment triggers a second-order risk termed the Convergence Crisis. When humans are forced to verify AI outputs under metric pressure, they degrade from genuine agents into criteria-checking optimizers, eliminating the only component capable of bearing normative accountability. Beyond the incompatibility proof, this paper's primary positive contribution is a substrate-neutral architectural specification deriving what any system (biological, artificial, or institutional) must necessarily satisfy to qualify as a genuine agent rather than a sophisticated instrument.

To safely interact with humans, AI agents must both know our norms and consider them during planning. However, such norm-guided planning has been less explored, only within communities of artificial agents, and has ignored the dynamic nature of norms. This paper instead presents an approach to guiding planning with dynamically changing norms in a human-AI setting. We contribute a defeasible calculus for resolving normative conflicts and an approach to using such dynamically changing norms as guard rails on plans. We theoretically demonstrate our approach with formal proofs and empirically with an AI agent, SocialBot, on a natural language dialogue task.

Human communities are governed by normative systems: shared standards that produce norms dictating acceptable behavior, enforced through community sanctioning. Aligning increasingly autonomous AI systems with these norms is a central alignment challenge, complicated by the fact that norms are vast in number, change quickly, and are often arbitrary (e.g., dress or language conventions). Thus, alignment requires normative competence: the ability to discern from interaction alone what norms a community enforces without relying on static pretrained knowledge. We introduce a multi-agent community debate setting, where access to debate is governed by synthetic norms, to study normative competence in isolation from pretraining exposure. We show that baseline LLM agents fail to learn norms even when doing so would improve their accuracy. We then experiment with various normative modules -- architectural components for norm inference -- finding that norm-following is highly sensitive to both the style of norm and the model powering the normative module, suggesting a lack of generalizability. Furthermore, when idiosyncratic, non-normative behaviors accompany the true norm, LLM agents exhibit an unselective attribution failure: they indiscriminately copy idiosyncratic noise alongside enforced rules, a pattern that persists even when imitating unnecessary behaviors is explicitly penalized. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to operationalize and evaluate normative competence in LLMs, demonstrating that current AI systems excel at behavioral mimicry but lack the capacity to discern socially enforced order.