Catching rationalization in the act: detecting motivated reasoning before and after CoT via activation probing

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting often improves the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs), but the internal signal that triggers this behavior remains poorly understood. Leveraging the sparse features captured by Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), we propose a systematic framework to analyze and intervene on the internal representations of LLMs, identifying a small set of latent features that are linked to reasoning behavior and can be causally tested through targeted intervention. Across multiple model families and reasoning benchmarks, we show that steering one or a small number of reasoning-related latent features can substantially induce reasoning behavior without explicit CoT prompting, achieving accuracy comparable to CoT. We further show that the identified features are not tied to particular wording patterns or verbosity, and confirm their causal role in reasoning through suppression experiments that impair performance even under CoT prompting. These results suggest that CoT prompting activates specific latent features to trigger reasoning, and that targeted intervention on these features offers an alternative pathway to elicit efficient reasoning behavior without explicit CoT prompting. Code is available at https://github.com/Zhenghao-He/LatentCoT.

Large language models often answer complex reasoning questions without revealing intermediate steps, raising whether they reason latently or complete patterns. We propose the Hidden CoT Detection Score (HCDS), a comparative behavioral and mechanistic signal measuring whether neutral-prompt behavior aligns more closely with explicit CoT or explicit no- CoT. Here, hidden CoT operationally denotes this neutral-prompt CoT-like alignment; HCDS does not directly observe or prove an unexposed reasoning trace. On GSM8K, HCDS is significantly positive for both Qwen3-4B variants (Thinking $+1.87$, $p = 1.2 \times 10^{-7}$; Instruct $+1.41$, $p = 1.9 \times 10^{-4}$), replicates across a different inference stack and quantization within $0.08$ ($+1.80$ and $+1.45$), and is not significantly positive in seven of eight length-adjusted calibration-control cells. The unadjusted score produces large positive scores on single-step arithmetic and numeric factual lookup. The variants also respond differently to no-CoT instructions: Instruct complies from the prompt alone, whereas Thinking continues reasoning and requires intervention. These findings show stronger, less prompt-conditional CoT-like behavior in the reasoning-tuned model, consistent with but not proof of latent reasoning. HCDS thus investigates latent reasoning without relying on models' self-reported traces.

As chain of thought (CoT) has become central to scaling reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), it has also emerged as a promising tool for interpretability, suggesting the opportunity to understand model decisions through verbalized reasoning. However, the utility of CoT toward interpretability depends upon its faithfulness---whether the model's stated reasoning reflects the underlying decision process. We provide mechanistic evidence that instruction-tuned models often determine their answer before generating CoT. Training linear probes on residual stream activations at the last token before CoT, we can predict the model's final answer with >0.9 AUC on most tasks. We find that these directions are not only predictive, but also causal: steering activations along the probe direction often flips model answers, with flip rates substantially exceeding norm-matched orthogonal baselines across most model-dataset pairs. When steering induces incorrect answers, we observe two distinct failure modes: confabulation (fabricating false premises) and non-entailment (stating correct premises but drawing unsupported conclusions). While post-hoc reasoning may be instrumentally useful when the model has a correct pre-CoT belief, these failure modes suggest it can result in undesirable behaviors when reasoning from a false belief.