Adaptive Contracts for Cost-Effective AI Delegation

AI coding agents increasingly accept assigned software tasks, modify repositories under bounded authority, and return work packages for review. Prior work proposed the software delegation contract, covering the task, authority, returned work package, and acceptance context, as the unit of analysis for delegated coding work, but did not measure its effects. This paper reports a controlled pilot study of explicit delegation contracts for coding agents. We built a dependency-free TypeScript API task environment with seeded defects and documentation gaps, authored ten tasks across five families, and ran 64 agent executions across two model tiers under three conditions: a realistic issue-style prompt, an explicit delegation contract, and a contract with a required evidence bundle. Each run was scored with hidden acceptance tests, mutation checks, and scope analysis, then reviewed by three independent condition-blinded model-based reviewers using a fixed rubric, for 192 reviews. Explicit contracts did not improve objective task outcomes: all 64 runs passed hidden acceptance checks, with zero scope violations. They did improve reviewability. Evidence sufficiency improved in 22 of 30 paired comparisons and worsened in none (+0.83 on a 5-point scale, p < 0.0001, Cliff's delta = 0.66); reviewer ambiguity decreased (p = 0.035); changed-file lists, known-limitations sections, residual-risk sections, and reviewer checklists appeared mostly or only when demanded by the contract. Contracts cost +13% agent tokens and +38% wall-clock time, with larger effects for the weaker model tier. On these small tasks, delegation contracts bought reviewability rather than correctness.

This position paper argues that agentic AI systems should be designed and evaluated as \emph{marginal token allocation economies} rather than as text generators priced by the unit. We follow a single request -- a developer asking a coding agent to fix a failing test -- through four economic layers that today are designed in isolation: a router that decides which model answers, an agent that decides whether to plan, act, verify, or defer, a serving stack that decides how to produce each token, and a training pipeline that decides whether the trace is worth learning from. We show that all four layers are solving the \emph{same} first-order condition -- marginal benefit equals marginal cost plus latency cost plus risk cost -- with different index sets and different prices. The framing is deliberately minimal: we do not propose a complete theory of AI economics. But adopting marginal token allocation as the shared accounting object explains why systems that locally minimize tokens globally misallocate them, predicts a small set of recurring failure modes (over-routing, over-delegation, under-verification, serving congestion, stale rollouts, cache misuse), and points to a concrete research agenda in token-aware evaluation, autonomy pricing, congestion-priced serving, and risk-adjusted RL budgeting.

As search increasingly shifts toward LLM-driven answer engines, advertising is becoming embedded within the generated response itself and should therefore be evaluated for both user utility and commercial value. The key challenge is click-through intent: behavioural logs are unavailable, human annotation resists calibration, and frontier LLM judges conflate intent with linguistic fluency. These gaps compound, as principled pricing presupposes a continuous intent signal, while generating such a signal presupposes supervision that is currently unavailable. We construct the missing supervision through a psychologically grounded agent simulation framework, and distil it into a parameter-efficient evaluator that predicts click-through intent, together with the three companion dimensions of ad quality, as smooth, differentiable estimates. Validated through sign-certain behavioural perturbations, the evaluator surpasses frontier zero-shot judges on relevance sensitivity (79% versus 60-67%), tracks graded content degradation, generalises without error to 103 fictional products, and agrees with human preference in 86% of pairwise judgements across five annotators, with agreement rising in the evaluator's confidence. Upon its estimates we build the pricing layer directly, deriving the unique payment rule under which truthful bidding is optimal, demonstrating it on a best-of-k allocation, and extending the mechanism to non-monotone allocations. The same differentiable signal stands ready as a training objective for ad generation.