Access Controlled Website Interaction for Agentic AI with Delegated Critical Tasks

Large Language Model (LLM) agents combine the chat interaction capabilities of LLMs with the power to interact with external tools and APIs. This enables them to perform complex tasks and act autonomously to achieve user goals. However, current agent systems operate on an all-or-nothing basis: an agent either has full access to an API's capabilities and a web page's content, or it has no access at all. This coarse-grained approach forces users to trust agents with more capabilities than they actually need for a given task. In this paper, we introduce AC4A, an access control framework for agents. As agents become more capable and autonomous, users need a way to limit what APIs or portions of web pages these agents can access, eliminating the need to trust them with everything an API or web page allows. Our goal with AC4A is to provide a framework for defining permissions that lets agents access only the resources they are authorized to access. AC4A works across both API-based and browser-based agents. It does not prescribe what permissions should be, but offers a flexible way to define and enforce them, making it practical for real-world systems. AC4A works by creating permissions granting access to resources, drawing inspiration from established access control frameworks like the one for the Unix file system. Applications define their resources as hierarchies and provide a way to compute the necessary permissions at runtime needed for successful resource access. We demonstrate the usefulness of AC4A in enforcing permissions over real-world APIs and web pages through case studies. The source code of AC4A is available at https://github.com/reSHARMA/AC4A

Web agents automate browser tasks, ranging from simple form completion to complex workflows like ordering groceries. While current benchmarks evaluate general-purpose performance~(e.g., WebArena) or safety against malicious actions~(e.g., SafeArena), no existing framework assesses an agent's ability to successfully execute user-facing website security and privacy tasks, such as managing cookie preferences, configuring privacy-sensitive account settings, or revoking inactive sessions. To address this gap, we introduce WebSP-Eval, an evaluation framework for measuring web agent performance on website security and privacy tasks. WebSP-Eval comprises 1) a manually crafted task dataset of 200 task instances across 28 websites; 2) a robust agentic system supporting account and initial state management across runs using a custom Google Chrome extension; and 3) an automated evaluator. We evaluate a total of 8 web agent instantiations using state-of-the-art multimodal large language models, conducting a fine-grained analysis across websites, task categories, and UI elements. Our evaluation reveals that current models suffer from limited autonomous exploration capabilities to reliably solve website security and privacy tasks, and struggle with specific task categories and websites. Crucially, we identify stateful UI elements are a primary reason for agent failure, with toggles causing more than 45% task failure across many models.

Large language model (LLM) agents are becoming direct users of the open web. As they take on increasingly complex and information-intensive tasks, effective web access is becoming a core capability for agentic problem solving. Existing approaches have advanced agentic web access through different access models, including search-augmented agents, browser-based agents, and, more recently, filesystem-based agents. Nevertheless, as users expect agents to complete long-horizon, end-to-end tasks, they increasingly need to conduct broad information gathering, perform browser actions, and revisit acquired evidence within a single trajectory. Yet our preliminary analyses reveal that existing access models struggle to meet these demands. They primarily support either information gathering or browser interaction, while combining their capabilities can involve substantial costs or performance trade-offs. To this end, we present Web$hell, an interface that unifies web access under a single access model. Using a common schema defined by WebContract, WebCompiler compiles live webpages into addressable information and action objects. These objects are maintained in WebCache and handled through a shared set of operations, providing agents with consistent, operable, and persistent web access. Through extensive experiments across web search, web navigation, and deep research benchmarks, we show that Web$hell achieves strong task performance at lower cost. Our results further indicate the importance of interface design for effective web access, with Web$hell opening new possibilities for more capable and efficient LLM agents on the web.