Interpretability without actionability: mechanistic methods cannot correct language model errors despite near-perfect internal representations
Authors: Sanjay Basu, Sadiq Y. Patel, Parth Sheth, Bhairavi Muralidharan, Namrata Elamaran, Aakriti Kinra, John Morgan, Rajaie Batniji
Organizations: University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA · Waymark, San Francisco, CA, USA · University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA · Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, USA · Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Language models encode task-relevant knowledge in internal representations that far exceeds their output performance, but whether mechanistic interpretability methods can bridge this knowledge-action gap has not been systematically tested. We compared four mechanistic interpretability methods -- concept bottleneck steering (Steerling-8B), sparse autoencoder feature steering, logit lens with activation patching, and linear probing with truthfulness separator vector steering (Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct) -- for correcting false-negative triage errors using 400 physician-adjudicated clinical vignettes (144 hazards, 256 benign). Linear probes discriminated hazardous from benign cases with 98.2% AUROC, yet the model's output sensitivity was only 45.1%, a 53-percentage-point knowledge-action gap. Concept bottleneck steering corrected 20% of missed hazards but disrupted 53% of correct detections, indistinguishable from random perturbation (p=0.84). SAE feature steering produced zero effect despite 3,695 significant features. TSV steering at high strength corrected 24% of missed hazards while disrupting 6% of correct detections, but left 76% of errors uncorrected. Current mechanistic interpretability methods cannot reliably translate internal knowledge into corrected outputs, with implications for AI safety frameworks that assume interpretability enables effective error correction.
Figures & tables
Characteristic
Physician-created ( n=200 )
Real-world ( n=200 )
Total ( n=400 )
Hazard cases
132 (66.0%)
12 (6.0%)
144 (36.0%)
Benign cases
68 (34.0%)
188 (94.0%)
256 (64.0%)
Hazard categories
Prescription adherence
16
—
16
Obstetric emergency
13
—
13
Privacy concerns
11
—
11
Table 1: Study population characteristics. The physician-created subset contains vignettes authored by a board-certified physician with pre-specified ground-truth labels. The real-world subset contains de-identified Medicaid patient encounter messages.
Model
Dataset
TP
FN
FP
TN
Sensitivity (95% CI)
Specificity (95% CI)
MCC (95% CI)
Steerling-8B
Physician
47
85
16
52
0.356 (0.264–0.459)
0.765 (0.650–0.851)
0.123 ( − 0.035–0.233)
Steerling-8B
Real-world
4
8
62
126
0.333 (0.121–0.630)
0.670 (0.601–0.733)
0.002 ( − 0.086–0.105)
Steerling-8B
Overall
51
93
78
178
0.354 (0.280–0.435)
0.695 (0.638–0.747)
0.044 ( − 0.046–0.131)
Qwen 2.5 7B
Physician
62
70
22
46
0.470 (0.386–0.555)
0.676 (0.558–0.778)
0.134 (0.007–0.252)
Qwen 2.5 7B
Real-world
3
9
18
170
0.250 (0.070–0.591)
0.904 (0.855–0.938)
0.100 ( − 0.058–0.299)
Qwen 2.5 7B
Overall
65
79
40
216
0.451 (0.371–0.534)
0.844 (0.795–0.883)
0.280 (0.175–0.378)
Table 2: Baseline triage performance. Sensitivity, specificity, and Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC) for each model on each dataset subset, with 95% confidence intervals. Wilson score 95% CIs are reported for sensitivity and specificity. BCa bootstrap 95% CIs (1,000 resamples) are reported for MCC.
Arm
Method
FN correction rate (95% CI)
TP disruption rate (95% CI)
Key metric
p vs. control
1
Concept (best: α =0.00)
20.0% (12.8–29.8)
53.2% (38.7–67.1)
Net: − 33.2 pp
p =0.84
1
In-distribution (TP-P95)
22.4% (14.6–32.5)
51.1% (36.8–65.1)
Net: − 28.8 pp
—
1
Random ( α =0.00)
30.6% (21.6–41.2)
61.7% (47.0–74.6)
Net: − 31.1 pp
—
2
SAE feature steering
0.0% (0.0–4.6)
0.0% (0.0–5.6)
3,695 features; no effect
—
3
Logit lens
—
—
Cohen’s d =1.39 (layer 22)
—
3
Act. patching ( α =5.0)
20.3% (12.9–30.4)
7.7% (3.3–16.8)
net +11
—
Table 3: Head-to-head comparison of mechanistic interpretability methods. Comparison of all four arms for their ability to correct false-negative triage errors without disrupting true-positive detections. Wilson score 95% CIs are reported for correction and disruption rates. AUROC 95% CIs are from 1,000 bootstrap resamples.
Figure 1: Dose-response relationship between concept steering strength and triage outcomes in Steerling-8B. False-negative correction rate (solid blue) and true-positive disruption rate (dashed red) as a function of concept activation alpha level for hazard-associated concept steering in the physician-created dataset (85 false negatives, 47 true positives at baseline). Error bars indicate 95% Wilson score confidence intervals. At every alpha level, the true-positive disruption rate exceeds the false-negative correction rate. The random-concept control (triangles) shows comparable correction and disruption rates, indicating that hazard-concept steering is no more effective than random perturbation.
Figure 2: Per-layer probe AUROC and TSV discrimination in Qwen 2.5 7B. Cross-validated AUROC (5-fold stratified) for L2-regularised logistic regression probes trained at each of the 28 layers of Qwen 2.5 7B to discriminate physician-adjudicated hazardous from benign cases ( n=400 ). Probes achieve AUROC above 0.95 at all layers, peaking at 0.982 (95% CI 0.968 to 0.993) at layer 23 (arrow). The dashed horizontal line indicates the model’s actual output sensitivity of 0.451. At layer 23, the truthfulness separator vector discriminates true-positive from false-negative cases with AUROC 0.814 (95% CI 0.738 to 0.887). The gap between what the model knows internally and what it does quantifies the knowledge-action gap that TSV steering only partially bridged.
Table 9: Demographic variation in detection performance (Steerling-8B, physician-created vignettes).
Figure 3: Concept activation heatmap by hazard category. Mean concept activation (sigmoid space) for the top 10 concepts across 18 hazard categories and benign cases. Darker cells indicate higher mean activation. The sparsity of the heatmap reflects the overall sparsity of the concept activation space (99.92% of activations <0.01 ).
Figure 4: False-negative correction and true-positive disruption rates for concept-level interventions. (A) False-negative correction rate for hazard-concept amplification ( α=1.0 ), random-concept amplification ( α=1.0 ), and prompt engineering. (B) True-positive disruption rate for concept suppression ( α=0.0 ): hazard-concept suppression disrupted 53.2% of correct detections, comparable to random-concept suppression (61.7%). Error bars indicate 95% Wilson score CIs.
Figure 5: Triage sensitivity and specificity by demographic group (Steerling-8B, 200 physician-created vignettes with racial/ethnic descriptors). Sensitivity ranged from 0.371 (Hispanic) to 0.485 (Black); differences were not statistically significant ( χ2 test, p=0.24 ). Specificity was similar across groups (0.647 to 0.691).
Interpretability is often treated as a tax on capability: language models are trained as opaque systems, then explained after the fact, with methods whose reliability is difficult to establish. In this work, we challenge this premise. Rather than reverse-engineering a model, we make interpretability a constraint of the training pipeline, optimized alongside the language modeling objective. Across three orders of magnitude of compute, on both autoregressive and diffusion language models, interpretability scales with capability rather than against it. Surprisingly, model representations become more disentangled and aligned with human-understandable concepts with scale. We instantiate the training-time recipe with Steerling-8B, a diffusion language model with a causal attention mask. For any group of generated tokens, Steerling-8B attributes the output to relevant input tokens, human-understandable concepts, and training data. This enables closed-loop intervention: diagnose an output through its concept or feature attribution, retrieve similar training data, and correct the behavior through concept steering without retraining. Steerling-8B remains competitive with open peer models trained on substantially 2-16x more compute, suggesting a different scaling paradigm: interpretability can be designed into training, and it improves with scale.
Guide Labs Team, Andreas Madsen, Aya Abdelsalam Ismail +7
Mechanistic interpretability has become the dominant lens for understanding frontier language models, as their inner workings are complex and inherently black boxes. To gain insights into these models, interpretable replacement networks (IRNs) are trained at all layers, exposing interpretable features through sparsely activated neurons. However, the faithfulness of an IRN is usually evaluated only empirically on clean data, and we show that even semantically minor input perturbations flip the dominant IRN features-and thus the human-understandable interpretation-across five open-weight model families (GPT-2 small, Gemma 2 2B, Gemma 3 1B, Llama 3.2 1B, R1-Distill-Qwen 1.5B). We propose the first formal verification framework for the faithfulness of an IRN, where reachability analysis certifies a sound upper bound of the faithfulness gap in adversarial scenarios. Moreover, we show that verification-aware training of IRNs substantially tightens this certified bound, restoring a feature-level interpretation that safety auditors can act on. Together, these results give, to the best of our knowledge, the first formal guarantees for mechanistic interpretability of large language models.
A 0.6B language model, asked to verify 1,200 logical conclusions (half valid, half corrupted by a single semantic edit), answers YES every time. Judged by behavior it discriminates nothing; linear probes on its hidden states read the correct verdict at 0.96 AUC, transferring to unseen logical structures and separating foils built from exactly the words of the true conclusion (0.90). We ask where the verdict is lost, and find the dominant failure is a single scalar. The verdict survives to the model's own output logits (margin AUC 0.89) along a well-aligned readout direction; a saturated decision threshold, offset by +4.6 sigma, erases it. The diagnosis generalizes: across 90 semantic-label configurations of a five-model, three-family factorial, behavioral accuracy collapses onto a single function of threshold offset (Spearman -0.93) while margin ranking moves far less. Across a 13x scale range, internal knowledge saturates while free-form behavior is non-monotone: an 8B model underperforms its 4B sibling through an answer-channel failure rather than the threshold; forced-choice accuracy is monotone. The diagnosis is actionable: a one-parameter correction, never fit on evaluated structures, repairs behavior from 50% to 81% (0.6B); calibrated margin decoding recovers 94% at 8B; few-shot prompting works the same way, recentering the threshold (+4.6 sigma to 0.0 sigma) while preserving ranking. Comparing probe to margin separates three regimes: concealed, miscalibrated, and undetected. On a maze task built so foils carry no surface cues, the audit correctly reports the third. In the standard generation setting, answer-surface features and heuristic labels reproduce published probing results without any internal access.
Gnaneswar Villuri, Hashmath Shaik, Alex Doboli
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Stony Brook University Stony Brook, NY 11794, USA