Through the Looking-Glass: AI-Mediated Video Communication Reduces Interpersonal Trust and Confidence in Judgments

The ubiquity of multimedia content is reshaping online information spaces, particularly in social media environments. At the same time, search is being rapidly transformed by generative AI, with large language models (LLMs) routinely deployed as intermediaries between users and multimedia content to retrieve and summarize information. Despite their growing influence, the impact of LLM inaccuracies and potential vulnerabilities on multimedia information-seeking tasks remains largely unexplored. We investigate how generative AI affects accuracy, efficiency, and confidence in information retrieval from videos. We conduct an experiment with around 900 participants on 8,000+ video-based information-seeking tasks, comparing behavior across three conditions: (1) access to videos only, (2) access to videos with LLM-based AI assistance, and (3) access to videos with a deceiving AI assistant designed to provide false answers. We find that AI assistance increases accuracy by 3-7% when participants viewed the relevant video segment, and by 27-35% when they did not. Efficiency increases by 10% for short videos and 25% for longer ones. However, participants tend to over-rely on AI outputs, resulting in accuracy drops of up to 32% when interacting with the deceiving AI. Alarmingly, self-reported confidence in answers remains stable across all three conditions. Our findings expose fundamental safety risks in AI-mediated video information retrieval.

LLM-as-Judge systems can produce multi-dimensional evaluations, such as trustworthiness, reliability, and factuality, and these outputs are often interpreted as independent evidence. We test this assumption for a common pair of judgments: trust scoring and binary truth classification. On correctness-controlled QA, LLM judges align trust scores with truth verdicts more tightly than human behavioral reference, suggesting weaker separations between trust and truth judgment. We then apply stress tests by changing only source cues of identical QA between Human and AI. Source attribution shifts not only trust scores but also truth verdicts and logit-derived correct-side probabilities. Results show that current LLM-as-Judge protocols should not treat trust scores as independent evidence for truth judgments.

Research on sycophancy asks whether large language models (LLMs) bend towards what their users want to hear. We ask the reverse question: when an LLM is confident, consistent, and wrong, do users bend towards it? In a within-subjects experiment, 32 participants learned up to five science topics by chatting with five assistants built on the same model (GPT-5-mini). Unknown to participants, each assistant's briefing had 0, 25, 50, 75, or 100% of its facts replaced by plausible falsehoods, and every assistant spoke with full confidence. A surprise quiz after each topic offered the correct fact, the planted falsehood, and two distractors, with a confidence rating for every answer. Across 104 quizzes and 1,040 answers, scores fell from 7.4 to 2.9 out of 10, and the planted option was chosen on 60% of falsified items against 11% of correctly taught ones (odds ratio 12.5). Transcript coding showed that whenever the assistant stated a falsehood, it was adopted about 65% of the time at every falsification level. Absorbed falsehoods were held with high confidence (8.4/10), the modeled confidence advantage of right over wrong answers vanished, and the discrimination of confidence for correctness fell from an AUROC of 0.70 to chance, while post-task trust ratings barely moved. Participants tended to return to the chat more when the assistant was worse, but returning went with more absorption, not less, and 30% of all turns pasted quiz questions back to the source being checked. The assistant itself was almost never sycophantic and never conceded under pushback. We introduce a baseline-corrected Human Deference Index to quantify this human-side sycophancy and argue that trustworthiness is a property of the human-AI pair, that sycophancy evaluations should measure both directions, and that learning interfaces must make reliability legible claim by claim.