Man and machine: artificial intelligence and judicial decision making

What if judges already behave like algorithms? As artificial intelligence and algorithms are deployed in many settings, including the judicial system, many have debated whether judges should be allowed to rely on them. Instead, we ask whether judges follow predictable, algorithmic-like rules already. If judges already follow consistent, formula-like rules based on discrete and static factors such as criminal history, age, and charge type, then judicial behavior may be improved. However, if judges rely on individualized information that cannot be identified through court data, then standards-based decision-making may be more challenging to understand or improve. This work explores these questions by studying judicial decision-making in misdemeanor bail hearings in Harris County, Texas. Using available court data, we investigate whether magistrate judges follow what resembles an algorithm; whether they consider the same variables in their decision-making; and whether they are consistent with themselves and with each other. To do this, we train machine learning models for each judge, measure variable importance metrics to determine important variables for each judge's decision-making, and analyze outcomes of similar cases for judges. Our results reveal that these judges generally behave algorithmically: their decisions can be captured by small, interpretable formulas. However, in some cases, judges differ substantially, leading to surprising inconsistency and unequal treatment across similar defendants. Identifying cases where algorithms do not explain judicial decision-making can improve the justice system by focusing attention on decisions where individualized standards, rather than rules, better explains outcomes.

Legal Judgment Prediction (LJP) has become a core benchmark for evaluating AI in the criminal legal domain, but it only sees criminal cases that have already passed prosecutorial review and been formally indicted. As a result, LJP leaves a substantial blind spot in assessing criminal liability, overlooking cases involving insufficient evidence, no criminal liability, or guilt exempted from punishment. To fill this gap, we propose \textbf{Prosecution Decision Prediction (PDP)}, the first Legal AI task built around prosecutorial review, which classifies each case into prosecution or one of three non-prosecution decisions and reflects legal AI's capabilities in evidence evaluation, legal subsumption, and value-based discretion. We further construct \textbf{PDP-Bench}, a benchmark of 4{,}630 real Chinese prosecutorial decisions spanning 190 charges. Extensive experiments show that state-of-the-art LLMs perform substantially worse on PDP than on LJP and that mainstream enhancement routes fail to close the gap. Moreover, controlled RLVR interventions show that simple outcome rewards fail to produce generalizable PDP discrimination.

A well-known limitation of AI systems is presumptuousness: the tendency of AI systems to provide confident answers when information may be lacking. This challenge is particularly acute in legal applications, where a core task for attorneys, judges, and administrators is to determine whether evidence is sufficient to reach a conclusion. We study this problem in the important setting of unemployment insurance adjudication, which has seen rapid integration of AI systems and where the question of additional fact-finding poses the most significant bottleneck for a system that affects millions of applicants annually. First, through a collaboration with the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment, we secure rare access to official training materials and guidance to design a novel benchmark that systematically varies in information completeness. Second, we evaluate four leading AI platforms and show that standard RAG-based approaches achieve an average of only 15% accuracy when information is insufficient. Third, advanced prompting methods improve accuracy on inconclusive cases but over-correct, withholding decisions even on clear cases. Fourth, we introduce a structured framework requiring explicit identification of missing information before any determination (SPEC, Structured Prompting for Evidence Checklists). SPEC achieves 89% overall accuracy, while appropriately deferring when evidence is insufficient -- demonstrating that presumptuousness in legal AI is systematic but addressable, and that doing so is a necessary step towards systems that reliably support, rather than supplant, human judgment wherever decisions must await sufficient evidence.