What if judges already behave like algorithms? As artificial intelligence and algorithms are deployed in many settings, including the judicial system, many have debated whether judges should be allowed to rely on them. Instead, we ask whether judges follow predictable, algorithmic-like rules already. If judges already follow consistent, formula-like rules based on discrete and static factors such as criminal history, age, and charge type, then judicial behavior may be improved. However, if judges rely on individualized information that cannot be identified through court data, then standards-based decision-making may be more challenging to understand or improve. This work explores these questions by studying judicial decision-making in misdemeanor bail hearings in Harris County, Texas. Using available court data, we investigate whether magistrate judges follow what resembles an algorithm; whether they consider the same variables in their decision-making; and whether they are consistent with themselves and with each other. To do this, we train machine learning models for each judge, measure variable importance metrics to determine important variables for each judge's decision-making, and analyze outcomes of similar cases for judges. Our results reveal that these judges generally behave algorithmically: their decisions can be captured by small, interpretable formulas. However, in some cases, judges differ substantially, leading to surprising inconsistency and unequal treatment across similar defendants. Identifying cases where algorithms do not explain judicial decision-making can improve the justice system by focusing attention on decisions where individualized standards, rather than rules, better explains outcomes.
Machine learning systems increasingly make life-changing decisions about individuals, such as loan approvals, hiring, and cheating detection, raising a pressing question: how can individuals respond to negative decisions made by these opaque systems? While explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) has largely focused on algorithmic recourse -- helping individuals change their features to obtain a desired outcome -- the parallel problem of algorithmic contestability -- helping individuals review and correct erroneous algorithmic decisions -- has received far less attention, despite its central ethical and legal importance. We trace this neglect to the absence of clear formal definitions and a systematic operationalization of contestability as an algorithmic problem. To address it, we propose an operational definition of contestability as a natural complement to recourse: contestability starts from the presumption that a decision may be incorrect and focuses on identifying evidence to challenge and potentially overturn it, whereas recourse assumes the decision is valid and instead provides pathways for changing it. We show that standard XAI explanations, such as counterfactuals, LIME, or Anchors, even when combined with human intuitions about decision continuity or monotonicity, reveal only errors in the neighborhood of the individual, but provide insufficient grounds for overturning the decision at hand. Going thus beyond traditional XAI, we identify three types of evidence warranting reversal according to the decision maker's own ethical standards: predictive multiplicity, incorrect feature values, and neglected overruling evidence. We argue that these render decisions normatively indefensible and thus successfully contestable. Finally, we analyze how existing EU legislation connects to our framework and argue that individuals already hold some legal rights to these forms of evidence.
Despite significant advances in large language models, personalizing them for individual decision-makers remains an open problem. Here, we introduce a synthetic-organic supervision pipeline that transforms raw judicial decisions into instruction-tuning data, enabling parameter-efficient fine-tuning of personalized models for individual judges in low-resource settings. We compare our approach to state-of-the-art personalization techniques across three different tasks and settings. The results show that Causal Language Modeling followed by synthetically generated instruction-tuning significantly outperforms all other baselines, providing significant improvements across lexical, stylistic, and semantic similarity. Notably, our model-generated outputs are indistinguishable from the reasoning of human judges, highlighting the viability of efficient personalization, even in low-resource settings.
Existing benchmarks for legal AI focus primarily on tasks where LLMs must produce legal arguments or documents, yet the capacity to \emph{judge} such arguments -- weighing competing claims, applying doctrine to facts, and rendering reasoned decisions -- is arguably as fundamental to a well-functioning legal system as advocacy itself. We introduce Magis-Bench, a benchmark for evaluating LLMs on magistrate-level writing tasks derived from recent Brazilian competitive examinations for judicial positions. Magis-Bench comprises 74 questions from eight examinations conducted between 2023 and 2025, including discursive legal analysis questions with multi-turn structure and practical exercises requiring the composition of complete civil and criminal judicial sentences. We evaluate 23 state-of-the-art LLMs using an LLM-as-a-judge methodology with four independent frontier models as evaluators. Our results show strong inter-judge agreement (Kendall's W=0.984; pairwise Kendall's τ≥0.897), with Google's Gemini-3-Pro-Preview achieving the highest average score (6.97/10), followed by Gemini-3-Flash-Preview (6.67) and Claude-4.5-Opus (6.46). Even the best-performing models score below 70% of the maximum, indicating that judicial-level legal reasoning and writing remain challenging for current LLMs. We release the complete benchmark, model outputs, and evaluation code to support further research on legal AI capabilities.
Ramon Pires, Thales Sales Almeida, Celio Larcher Junior +6