cs.LGMar 19, 2026

Online Learning and Equilibrium Computation with Ranking Feedback

Authors: Mingyang Liu, Yongshan Chen, Zhiyuan Fan, Gabriele Farina, Asuman Ozdaglar, Kaiqing Zhang

Organizations: Massachusetts Institute of Technology · University of Maryland, College Park · Northeastern University

Abstract

Online learning in arbitrary, and possibly adversarial, environments has been extensively studied in sequential decision-making, and it is closely connected to equilibrium computation in game theory. Most existing online learning algorithms rely on numeric utility feedback from the environment, which may be unavailable in human-in-the-loop applications and/or may be restricted by privacy concerns. In this paper, we study an online learning model in which the learner only observes a ranking over a set of proposed actions at each timestep. We consider two ranking mechanisms: rankings induced by the instantaneous utility at the current timestep, and rankings induced by the time-average utility up to the current timestep, under both full-information and bandit feedback settings. Using the standard external-regret metric, we show that sublinear regret is impossible with instantaneous-utility ranking feedback in general. Moreover, when the ranking model is relatively deterministic, i.e., under the Plackett-Luce model with a temperature that is sufficiently small, sublinear regret is also impossible with time-average utility ranking feedback. We then develop new algorithms that achieve sublinear regret under the additional assumption that the utility sequence has sublinear total variation. Notably, for full-information time-average utility ranking feedback, this additional assumption can be removed. As a consequence, when all players in a normal-form game follow our algorithms, repeated play yields an approximate coarse correlated equilibrium. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms in an online large-language-model routing task.

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