Can LLMs Fool Graph Learning? Exploring Universal Adversarial Attacks on Text-Attributed Graphs

Text-Attributed Graphs (TAGs), where each node is associated with text descriptions, are ubiquitous in real-world scenarios. They typically exhibit distinctive structure and domain-specific knowledge, motivating the development of a Graph Foundation Model (GFM) that generalizes across diverse graphs and tasks. Despite large efforts to integrate Large Language Models (LLMs) and Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) for TAGs, existing approaches suffer from decoupled architectures with two-stage alignment, limiting their synergistic potential. Even worse, existing methods assign out-of-vocabulary (OOV) tokens to graph nodes, leading to graph-specific semantics, token explosion, and incompatibility with task-oriented prompt templates, which hinders cross-graph and cross-task transferability. To address these challenges, we propose PromptGFM, a versatile GFM for TAGs grounded in graph vocabulary learning. PromptGFM comprises two key components: (1) Graph Understanding Module, which explicitly prompts LLMs to replicate the finest GNN workflow within the text space, facilitating seamless GNN-LLM integration and elegant graph-text alignment; (2) Graph Inference Module, which establishes a language-based graph vocabulary ensuring expressiveness, transferability, and scalability, enabling readable instructions for LLM fine-tuning. Extensive experiments demonstrate our superiority and transferability across diverse graphs and tasks. The code is available at this: https://github.com/agiresearch/PromptGFM.

Modern graph learning systems often combine links with text, as in citation networks with abstracts or social graphs with user posts. In such systems, text is usually easier to edit than graph structure, which creates a practical security risk: an attacker may hide a small malicious cue in training text and later use it to trigger incorrect predictions. This paper studies that risk in a realistic setting where the attacker edits only node text and leaves the graph unchanged. We propose TAGBD, a graph-aware backdoor attack that first selects training nodes that are easier to manipulate, then generates stealthy poison text with a shadow graph model, and finally injects the text by replacing the original content or appending a short phrase. Experiments on three benchmark datasets show that TAGBD achieves very high attack success rates, transfers across different graph models, and remains effective under common defenses. These results show that inconspicuous poison text alone can serve as a reliable attack channel in text-attributed graphs, highlighting the need for defenses that inspect both node content and graph structure.

Graph Foundation Models (GFMs) on text-attributed graphs (TAGs) align graph representations with language semantics to support transferable graph learning. Despite these advantages, the backdoor vulnerability of GFMs on TAGs remains insufficiently understood, especially under graph-language alignment, where graph and text representations are trained to constrain each other in a shared semantic space. Existing backdoor attacks mainly target either the graph side or the text side, treating the two modalities independently. This makes direct adaptation ineffective: graph-only triggers can be constrained by clean text semantics, while text-only triggers alter the language view but do not directly shift the graph representation being aligned and scored. TAGs also impose a stealth challenge because triggers are exposed as both node text and local graph structure, making incoherent trigger attributes or anomalous subgraphs easy to inspect or filter. In this paper, we propose STAG, a stealthy trojan attack framework designed for the graph-language alignment interface of GFMs on TAGs. STAG coordinates a graph-trigger generator with a text-side soft prompt so that trigger-attached graph representations and triggered text representations move toward the same target-class text region. To address TAG-specific stealthiness, STAG realizes trigger nodes as readable text through candidate retrieval and regularizes the trigger-attached subgraph so that its local structure remains close to the original subgraph. Extensive experiments on multiple TAG datasets and representative GFMs demonstrate the effectiveness and stealthiness of STAG. Our code is available at https://github.com/ventr1c/STAG.