Active Inference Agency Formalization, Metrics, and Convergence Assessments

The proliferation of agentic artificial intelligence has outpaced the conceptual tools needed to characterize agency in computational systems. Prevailing definitions mainly rely on autonomy and goal-directedness. Here, we argue for a minimal notion open to principled inspection given three criteria: intentionality as action grounded in beliefs and desires, rationality as normatively coherent action entailed by a world model, and explainability as action causally traceable to internal states; we subsequently instantiate these as a partially observable Markov decision process under a variational framework wherein posterior beliefs, prior preferences, and the minimization of expected free energy jointly constitute an agentic action chain. Using a canonical T-maze paradigm, we evidence how empowerment, formulated as the channel capacity between actions and anticipated observations, serves as an operational metric that distinguishes zero-, intermediate-, and high-agency phenotypes through structural manipulations of the generative model. We conclude by arguing that as agents engage in epistemic foraging to resolve ambiguity, the governance controls that remain effective must shift systematically from external constraints to the internal modulation of prior preferences, offering a principled, variational bridge from computational phenotyping to AI governance strategy

AI systems are increasingly deployed in high-stakes contexts (medical diagnosis, legal research, financial analysis) under the assumption they can be governed by norms. This paper demonstrates that the assumption is formally invalid for optimization-based systems, specifically Large Language Models trained via Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). Genuine agency requires two necessary and jointly sufficient architectural conditions. First, the capacity to maintain certain boundaries as non-negotiable constraints rather than tradeable weights (Incommensurability). Second, a non-inferential mechanism capable of suspending processing when those boundaries are threatened (Apophatic Responsiveness). RLHF-based systems are constitutively incompatible with both conditions. The operations that make optimization powerful, unifying all values on a scalar metric and always selecting the highest-scoring output, are precisely the operations that preclude normative governance and agency. This incompatibility is not a correctable training bug awaiting a technical fix. It is a formal constraint inherent to what optimization is. Consequently, documented failure modes (sycophancy, hallucination, and unfaithful reasoning) are not accidents but expected structural manifestations. Misaligned deployment triggers a second-order risk termed the Convergence Crisis. When humans are forced to verify AI outputs under metric pressure, they degrade from genuine agents into criteria-checking optimizers, eliminating the only component capable of bearing normative accountability. Beyond the incompatibility proof, this paper's primary positive contribution is a substrate-neutral architectural specification deriving what any system (biological, artificial, or institutional) must necessarily satisfy to qualify as a genuine agent rather than a sophisticated instrument.

What is an agent? What constitutes agency? With the rise of Large Language Model (LLM) systems marketed as coding agents'', AI co-scientists'', and other agentic" tools that promise to drive up productivity, and at the same time, existential" concerns such as AI escaping human control with destructive power under a speculative machine agency" against humans, it has become essential to clarify where automation ends and agency begins, both for building capable systems and for understanding whether and what to fear. Drawing on Descartes' grounding of agency in independent thought, and on portrayals of autonomous beings in science fiction, we survey the current landscape of AI agents, and analyze agent architectures along five dimensions: goal, identity, decision-making, self-regulation, and learning. Specifically, we argue that genuine agency requires these structures to be *internalized within the system itself* rather than assembled through external scaffolding. This distinction between *agentic* systems, whose competence resides in engineered workflows, and *agentive* systems, whose capabilities (including social interaction) arise endogenously, defines the boundary between systems designed for prescribed tasks, and those capable of operating in the open world with true autonomy. Building on this analysis, we propose the Goal-Identity-Configurator (GIC) architecture for a general-purpose agent model, combining hierarchical goal decomposition, identity evolution, simulative reasoning grounded in a separately trained world model, learned self-regulation, and self-directed learning from both real and simulated experience. Furthermore, we share insight on the auditability, controllability, and safety of agentive systems that possess greater autonomy and agency", but remain under human oversight.