Bridging the Know-Act Gap via Task-Level Autoregressive Reasoning

A standard recipe for distilling the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) is to sample chains of thought from the model, keep those that reach the correct final answer, and fine-tune on the survivors. When sampling fails, a common fix shows the generator the gold answer and asks it to write a chain that reaches that answer. We show that this second step degrades the training data in a way that correctness filtering cannot catch. We run a controlled experiment that fixes the generator, the problem set, and the correctness filter, and varies only whether the chain is generated under answer-conditioning, the gold answer shown with a request to reach it. Training a strong instruction-tuned reasoning model on its own answer-conditioned chains sharply lowers its verifiable-reasoning accuracy. The loss grows with difficulty, reaching as much as about 27 points on the hardest competition problems. The mechanism is legible in the chains themselves, which rationalize backward from the shown answer instead of deriving it, with the early final-answer statement as the measurable symptom. The harm is a property of the data rather than the generator, read off unlabeled generations before any fine-tuning, ordering the penalty across eight thinking models from four families, and transferring across teacher families. A prompt ablation localizes it to the rationalize-toward instruction rather than the answer's bare visibility. The practical takeaway is to generate answer-blind, because no correctness filter can see this damage in the data.

We study self-modeling: an LLM's ability to answer questions about its own behavior. We focus on verifiable behavioral questions, such as whether a prompt edit would change the model's final answer. To measure this capability, we introduce a benchmark that tests diverse types of self-modeling questions. Current models show non-trivial but limited self-modeling skill, and make systematic mistakes on simple counterfactual questions about their own behavior. To improve self-modeling skill, we develop a scalable synthetic-data pipeline that produces self-modeling training data, and show that reinforcement-learning can improve aggregate self-modeling skill across three open-source model families with some transfer to held-out tasks. These gains, however, do not seem to constitute introspection consistently: improved self-modeling may not arise from privileged access to the model's internal decision process.

Modeling student misconceptions in a realistic manner is critical for AI in education. In this work, we examine how large language models (LLMs) reason about misconceptions when generating distractor answers for multiple-choice questions (MCQs), a task that requires producing answers that are incorrect, yet plausible. We introduce a taxonomy over reasoning strategies for distractor generation that is grounded in learning-science literature and empirical observation, which we apply to LLM-generated reasoning traces across math and science MCQs. On the math dataset, we find that models follow a misconception-based process with potentially high diagnostic value: they recover the correct solution, articulate student errors, simulate them, and select plausible candidates. On the science dataset, on the other hand, they tend to follow a less robust approach based on semantic similarity to the correct answer. We find the most frequent failure modes to be that the model is unable to generate a correct solution or that it discards plausible distractor candidates when performing selection. Providing the correct solution in the prompt yields a relative improvement of 6.4% in alignment with human-authored distractors, highlighting the critical role of anchoring distractor generation to the correct solution. Together, our findings offer an interpretable view of how LLMs model incorrect student reasoning.