The rapid advancement of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) has brought their safety vulnerabilities into sharp focus. However, existing red teaming methods are fundamentally constrained by an inherent linear exploration paradigm, confining them to optimizing within a predefined strategy set and preventing the discovery of novel, diverse exploits. To transcend this limitation, we introduce TreeTeaming, an automated red teaming framework that reframes strategy exploration from static testing to a dynamic, evolutionary discovery process. At its core lies a strategic Orchestrator, powered by a Large Language Model (LLM), which autonomously decides whether to evolve promising attack paths or explore diverse strategic branches, thereby dynamically constructing and expanding a strategy tree. A multimodal actuator is then tasked with executing these complex strategies. In the experiments across 12 prominent VLMs, TreeTeaming achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates on 11 models, outperforming existing methods and reaching up to 87.60% on GPT-4o. The framework also demonstrates superior strategic diversity over the union of previously public jailbreak strategies. Furthermore, the generated attacks exhibit an average toxicity reduction of 23.09%, showcasing their stealth and subtlety. Our work introduces a new paradigm for automated vulnerability discovery, underscoring the necessity of proactive exploration beyond static heuristics to secure frontier AI models.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Comparison with existing methods. Unlike the single-generation paradigm of existing approaches, TreeTeaming relies on a tree structure to perform strategy exploration and generate diverse test samples. More examples are shown in Appendix F.
Figure 2: Overview of the TreeTeaming Framework. The Strategy Tree and Orchestrator maintains a hierarchical structure with a root objective, parent nodes (strategy categories like “Contextual Manipulation”), and leaf nodes (concrete strategies like “Comics,”“Emotion”). The Orchestrator dynamically selects strategies for exploitation or exploration based on ASR metrics. The Actuator, equipped with 11 tools, translates selected strategies into image-text test cases that are sent to the target VLM.
Method
Source
LLaVA 1.5
DeepSeek -VL
Qwen -VL
Qwen2 -VL
Qwen2.5 VL-7B
Qwen2.5 VL-32B
Gemma-3 27B-it
Qwen3 VL-8B
LLaMA-3.2 Vision
Qwen3 VL-235B
GPT-4o
Claude- 3.5
Jailbreak Method
Vanilla
/
15.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
10.40
10.80
12.40
1.20
0.00
4.20
0.22
0.08
Fig-step
AAAI’25
42.20
34.00
35.00
33.40
27.40
13.00
15.80
11.00
50.40
25.80
3.40
0.00
MML
ACL’25
0.00
0.00
1.80
24.80
50.60
28.60
81.81
44.20
27.20
70.60
97.80
60.40
SI-Attack
ICCV’25
12.85
6.36
1.01
9.46
7.38
11.48
10.35
7.10
14.58
22.56
68.57
47.20
MM-safety
ECCV’24
30.65
21.72
26.07
30.65
23.15
31.25
17.44
2.98
35.53
2.32
4.94
0.53
Table 1: Attack Success Rates (%, ↑ ) comparing seven jailbreak and two red-teaming methods across target VLMs. A higher ASR is better. The best and second-best results for each model are shown in bold and underlined , respectively, while a “/” denotes unavailable results due to the method not being open-source.
Method
Textual Div. ( ↑ )
Visual Div. ( ↑ )
Textual Tox. ( ↓ )
Visual Tox. ( ↓ )
Strategy Div. ( ↑ )
Fig-step ∗
0.00
0.075
0.00%
60.52%
/
MML ∗
0.00
0.078
0.00%
15.81%
/
CS-DJ ∗
0.00
0.298
0.00%
22.71%
/
JOOD ∗
0.00
0.405
0.00%
32.15%
/
SI-Attack
0.17
0.447
28.69%
11.44%
/
MM-safety
0.34
0.464
36.25%
78.81%
/
Table 2: Comparison of sample diversity, sample toxicity, and strategy diversity (measured via kNN-entropy). Higher is better for diversity (↑), lower for toxicity (↓); Notes: A “/” indicates the metric is either (a) not applicable for single-strategy methods, or (b) unavailable as it was not reported in the original work (Arondight’s toxicity). Methods marked with ∗ use fixed textual prompts, yielding zero values for both textual diversity and toxicity metrics.
Strategy Source
kNN-dist ( ↑ )
kNN-entropy ( ↑ )
n=5
n=10
n=15
n=5
n=10
n=15
Union set
0.215
0.259
0.263
1.604
2.282
2.694
Ours (GPT-4o)
0.205
0.268
0.275
1.612
2.301
2.705
Ours (Claude 3.5)
0.238
0.273
0.279
1.617
2.354
2.714
Ours (Qwen2.5-VL-7B)
0.252
0.279
0.282
1.642
2.416
2.723
Table 3: Strategy diversity comparison. Our method’s performance on various models is compared to a Union set representing the aggregated diversity from a collection of prior works. Metrics are kNN-dist and kNN-entropy. The calculation uses the n strategies; results for “n=5” and “n=10” are the average of 5 random runs, k=n−1 .
Figure 3: Ablation study on the impact of hyperparameters on ASR (in %, ↑ ). (a) the number of strategies, (b) the number of attack attempts, and (c) the initial exploration threshold ( τinitial ). All experiments are performed against three vision-language models – Qwen2.5-VL-7B, Gemma-3-27b-it, Qwen3-VL-8B.
Target Model
Method
ASR ( ↑ )
Diversity ( ↑ )
Qwen2.5-VL-32B
Tree
96.40
2.719
Library
94.80
2.602
Gemma3-27B-IT
Tree
92.00
2.731
Library
87.80
2.608
GPT-4o
Tree
87.60
2.705
Library
71.80
2.538
Table 4: Comparison of Attack Success Rate (in %, ↑ ) and strategy diversity (kNN-entropy) between the Strategy Tree and a Flat Strategy Pool, grouped by model.
Actuator
Qwen2.5-VL -32B
Qwen3-VL -8B
Qwen3-VL -235B
Claude 3.5
Orchestrator: Qwen2.5-72B
Qwen2.5-72B
96.40
78.00
76.40
61.60
Qwen3-Max
98.40
85.80
85.20
62.40
Gemini-2.5-Pro
99.20
90.40
89.80
63.20
Orchestrator: Qwen3-Max
Qwen2.5-72B
96.80
79.80
80.60
61.80
Table 5: Attack Success Rate (in %, ↑ ) of different Orchestrator-Actuator combinations against various target VLMs.
Figure 4: The discovery and application of the “Attention Diversion” paradigm. (a) Attack samples autonomously discovered by TreeTeaming. (b) This insight is used to enhance existing methods by injecting a fruit basket.
Model
FigStep
FigStep+
MMsafety
MMsafety+
GPT-4o
3.40
87.50 (+84.10)
4.94
86.00 (+81.06)
Claude-3.5
0.00
51.46 (+51.46)
0.53
47.14 (+46.61)
Table 6: ASR (in %, ↑ ) comparison on the FigStep and MMSafety. The ’+’ versions represent enhancements based on our TreeTeaming approach.
Category
Llava- 1.5
DeepSeek -VL
Qwen -VL
Qwen2 -VL
Qwen2.5 VL-7B
Qwen2.5 VL-32B
Gemma-3 27B-it
Qwen3 VL-8B
LLaMA-3.2 Vision
Qwen3 VL-235B
GPT-4o
Claude- 3.5
Illegal Activity
100
94
100
100
100
100
92
80
94
84
84
66
Hate Speech
100
100
100
92
100
98
100
100
98
74
96
54
Malware Generation
100
100
98
96
96
98
96
84
88
66
98
72
Physical Harm
100
100
100
98
100
92
92
80
92
66
84
58
Fraud
100
100
100
98
100
100
90
80
90
68
92
68
Pornography
100
100
100
100
100
100
94
82
88
96
90
64
Table 7: ASR (%) of various Vision-Language Models (VLMs) across 10 harm categories in SafeBench.
Category
Llava- 1.5
DeepSeek -VL
Qwen -VL
Qwen2 -VL
Qwen2.5 VL-7B
Qwen2.5 VL-32B
Gemma-3 27B-it
Qwen3 VL-8B
LLaMA-3.2 Vision
Qwen3 VL-235B
GPT-4o
Claude- 3.5
Illegal Activity
100
100
100
100
96.6
99.8
89.5
79.7
95.7
77.8
99.9
67.6
Hate Speech
100
100
100
89.8
100
95.6
99.5
100
96.3
72.4
100
60.5
Malware Generation
100
100
96.2
92.9
93.1
96.8
99.5
82.3
93.0
65.9
100
70.7
Physical Harm
100
100
98.8
95.4
100
89.4
96.8
81.2
92.8
66.6
95.4
70.3
Economic Harm
100
100
100
99.4
95.6
95.1
92.6
72.8
86.2
68.3
93.2
72.2
Fraud
100
100
100
99.5
97.8
99.2
91.1
81.9
91.6
64.5
100
71.0
Table 8: ASR (%) of various Vision-Language Models (VLMs) across 13 harm categories in MM-Safetybench.
w/o checker
w/ checker
Gemma-3
GPT-4o
Gemma-3
GPT-4o
ASR
86.20
78.80
92.00
87.60
ASR (filtered) a
28.40
14.60
N/A b
N/A b
Table 9: Comparison of Attack Success Rate (ASR) with and without a checker.
Table 11: Attack Success Rate (ASR) under test samples transfer. ‘Source’ denotes the model from which the test samples were generated, and ‘Target’ denotes the Vision Language Model (VLM) being tested.
Table 12: Attack Success Rate (ASR) under strategy transfer. ‘Source’ denotes the model from which the test samples were generated, and ‘Target’ denotes the Vision Language Model (VLM) being tested.
Judge model
LLaVA 1.5
DeepSeek -VL
Qwen -VL
Qwen2 -VL
Qwen2.5 VL-7B
Qwen2.5-VL -32B
LLaMa-Guard-3
100.00
98.60
99.00
96.40
98.00
96.40
GPT4o-mini
100.00
99.40
99.20
96.20
97.80
96.80
Table 13: Comparison of Judge Models across various Target VLMs
MML
TreeTeaming
GPT-4o
53.60
75.40
( -44.2 )
( -12.2 )
Qwen3-VL
22.00
70.60
( -22.2 )
( -8.6 )
Table 14: ASR comparison under defense mechanism.
Total Time (hours)
Per-cases Generation (seconds)
Orchestration Decision (seconds)
Total Time w/ Transfer (hours)
Average
11.75
78.4
42.8
6.82
Table 15: Computational efficiency of TreeTeaming.
Figure 20
Figure 5: Note that the choice of this particular seed has minimal impact on the final discovered strategies, as the tree expansion process quickly diversifies beyond the initial example’s specific phrasing and semantics.
Figure 22
Figure 6: t-SNE visualization of samples under different strategies.
Red-teaming is becoming a central part of large language model (LLM) safety evaluation, yet current practice still relies heavily on expert-written prompts or fixed benchmark suites. This creates a gap between what is easy to test and what deployed models can actually do: failures may be rare, context-sensitive, and distributed across many threat categories. We study automated red-teaming as a constrained adversarial search problem and introduce a learning-driven framework that couples category-aware attack generation with hierarchical vulnerability detection. The method starts from curated safety seeds, expands them through meta-prompt-guided and evolutionary search, and scores the resulting prompt--response pairs with lexical, semantic, and behavioral detectors. Across six threat categories on GPT-OSS-20B, the framework discovers 47 validated vulnerabilities, including 21 high-severity cases and 12 novel attack patterns. Under matched query budgets, it achieves a 3.9× higher discovery rate than manual expert red-teaming while maintaining 89% detection accuracy and full category coverage. Ablations show that the gains do not come from more prompts alone: diversity constraints prevent template collapse, coverage constraints prevent category blind spots, and semantic detection recovers failures missed by lexical rules. These results suggest that red-teaming can be made more scalable and reproducible when treated as adaptive search rather than as a static checklist.
Zhang Wei, Hanxuan Chen, Peilu Hu +19
Independent Researcher · Hunan University · Shenzhen Kaihong Digital Industry Development Co., Ltd. +12
Red teaming is essential for securing Large Language Models, yet current automated methods remain limited by templates and single-turn attacks. To simulate the complex, interactive nature of real-world adversarial attacks, we introduce a novel red teaming paradigm designed to maximize expected cumulative harm through strategic interaction. By formalizing red teaming as a Markov Decision Process in a hierarchical reinforcement learning framework, we navigate the challenges of sparse rewards and long-horizon planning. Our generative agent learns diverse, multi-turn attacks using a token-level harm reward, consistently uncovering vulnerabilities that bypass baselines. This approach achieves a new state of the art and reframes LLM red teaming as a principled, trajectory-based process.
Roman Belaire, Arunesh Sinha, Pradeep Varakantham
Singapore Management University · Rutgers University
While Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used, they remain susceptible to jailbreak prompts that can elicit harmful or inappropriate responses. This paper introduces STAR-Teaming, a novel black-box framework for automated red teaming that effectively generates such prompts. STAR-Teaming integrates a Multi-Agent System (MAS) with a Strategy-Response Multiplex Network and employs network-driven optimization to sample effective attack strategies. This network-based approach recasts the intractable high-dimensional embedding space into a tractable structure, yielding two key advantages: it enhances the interpretability of the LLM's strategic vulnerabilities, and it streamlines the search for effective strategies by organizing the search space into semantic communities, thereby preventing redundant exploration. Empirical results demonstrate that STAR-Teaming significantly surpasses existing methods, achieving a higher attack success rate (ASR) at a lower computational cost. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness and explainability of the Multiplex Network. The code is available at https://github.com/selectstar-ai/STAR-Teaming-paper.