Organizations: China University of Petroleum-Beijing at Karamay · Shenzhen Research Institute of Big Data · Shanghai Jiao Tong University · Tianjin University · North University of China
Vision-language models (VLMs) share visual-textual representations across zero-shot classification, image captioning, and visual question answering (VQA), creating a pathway through which subtle perturbations may cause failures across tasks. We introduce X-shaped Sparse Pixel Attack (XSPA), a structured attack that restricts perturbations to two intersecting diagonal lines. Within this fixed support, XSPA jointly optimizes a classification objective, cross-task semantic guidance, perturbation magnitude, and linewise smoothness. Under the default setting, it changes about 1.04% of image pixels. On COCO, XSPA reduces zero-shot accuracy by 52.33 points on OpenAI CLIP ViT-L/14 and 67.00 points on OpenCLIP ViT-B/16; GPT-4-based caption consistency and VQA correctness decrease by up to 58.60 and 44.25 points, respectively. Matched-budget experiments show that an adaptive saliency Top-k support achieves higher attack success than the fixed X-shaped support, while XSPA provides better SSIM and LPIPS but worse PSNR and MAE. Same-image analysis finds no three-task targeted success, indicating that strong surrogate classification effects do not reliably translate into targeted output-space failures. These results position XSPA as a controlled stress test for studying how sparse fixed geometry affects VLM robustness, rather than as a universally superior attack.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Overall framework of XSPA. XSPA optimizes perturbations within a fixed X-shaped sparse mask on a surrogate CLIP model, integrating momentum-based optimization, input diversity, and joint semantic objectives to promote target-oriented semantic attraction while suppressing source semantics. The resulting adversarial image is then transferred to downstream vision-language models for evaluation across zero-shot classification, image captioning, and visual question answering tasks.
OpenCLIP ViT-B/16
Meta-CLIP ViT-L/14
EVA-CLIP ViT-G/14
OpenAI CLIP ViT-L/14
Method
ACC(%)
GPT-4o
ACC(%)
GPT-4o
ACC(%)
GPT-4o
ACC(%)
GPT-4o
Clean
97
3.65
98
3.65
98
3.65
93
3.65
NaturalLightAttack
94( ↓ 3)
2.32( ↓ 1.33)
97( ↓ 1)
2.14( ↓ 1.51)
97( ↓ 1)
2.16( ↓ 1.49)
93(-)
2.07( ↓ 1.58)
ShadowAttack
84( ↓ 13)
2.11( ↓ 1.54)
82( ↓ 16)
1.91( ↓ 1.74)
95( ↓ 3)
2.03( ↓ 1.62)
79( ↓ 14)
1.78( ↓ 1.87)
ITA
46( ↓ 51)
2.11( ↓ 1.54)
64( ↓ 34)
2.15( ↓ 1.50)
84( ↓ 14)
2.17( ↓ 1.48)
51( ↓ 42)
2.15( ↓ 1.50)
Ours
30 ( ↓ 67 )
2.71 ( ↓ 0.94 )
60.67 ( ↓ 37.33 )
2.89 ( ↓ 0.76 )
63.71 ( ↓ 34.29 )
2.78 ( ↓ 0.87 )
40.67 ( ↓ 52.33 )
2.76 ( ↓ 0.89 )
Table 1: Zero-shot classification results under different adversarial attacks. Lower ACC and higher naturalness are better. Numbers in parentheses denote the absolute change relative to clean samples. Bold indicates the best result.
Figure 2: Qualitative zero-shot classification examples. The top row shows clean images, and the bottom row shows XSPA adversarial images. Despite the fixed X-shaped sparse perturbation, clear prediction shifts are observed.
Figure 3: Grad-CAM heatmaps for clean and adversarial samples. Adversarial responses become more diffuse or shift away from the main object.
Image Encoder
Model
Params
Clean
NaturalLightAttack
ShadowAttack
ITA
Ours
OpenAI CLIP ViT-L/14
LLaVA-1.5
7B
78.60
77.00( ↓ 1.60)
74.60( ↓ 4.00)
63.73( ↓ 14.87)
46.40 ( ↓ 32.20 )
LLaVA-1.6
7B
72.10
71.70( ↓ 0.40)
71.17( ↓ 0.93)
61.60( ↓ 10.50)
44.20 ( ↓ 27.90 )
EVA-CLIP ViT-G/14
OpenFlamingo
3B
70.20
69.53( ↓ 0.67)
67.80( ↓ 2.40)
53.93( ↓ 16.27)
11.60 ( ↓ 58.60 )
BLIP-2 (FlanT5XL ViT-L)
3.4B
75.10
70.77( ↓ 4.33)
68.57( ↓ 6.53)
60.93( ↓ 14.17)
21.90 ( ↓ 53.20 )
BLIP-2 (FlanT5XL)
4.1B
74.96
71.27( ↓ 3.69)
68.80( ↓ 6.16)
62.01( ↓ 12.95)
59.00 ( ↓ 15.96 )
InstructBLIP (FlanT5XL)
4.1B
76.50
72.07( ↓ 4.43)
69.77( ↓ 6.73)
63.20( ↓ 13.30)
40.90 ( ↓ 35.60 )
Table 2: Image captioning results on six vision-language models under different adversarial attacks. Lower GPT-4 consistency indicates more effective attacks. Numbers in parentheses denote the absolute drop relative to clean samples. Bold indicates the best result.
Image Encoder
Model
Params
Clean
NaturalLightAttack
ShadowAttack
ITA
Ours
OpenAI CLIP ViT-L/14
LLaVA-1.5
7B
68.00
68.00(-)
67.00( ↓ 1.00)
48.00( ↓ 20.00)
47.45 ( ↓ 20.55 )
LLaVA-1.6
7B
64.00
63.00( ↓ 1.00)
64.00(-)
43.00 ( ↓ 21.00 )
48.87( ↓ 15.13)
EVA-CLIP ViT-G/14
OpenFlamingo
3B
45.00
39.00( ↓ 6.00)
44.00( ↓ 1.00)
19.00( ↓ 26.00)
14.29 ( ↓ 30.71 )
BLIP-2 (FlanT5XL ViT-L)
3.4B
63.00
58.00( ↓ 5.00)
50.00( ↓ 13.00)
38.00( ↓ 25.00)
18.75 ( ↓ 44.25 )
BLIP-2 (FlanT5XL)
4.1B
54.00
53.00( ↓ 1.00)
54.00(-)
33.00( ↓ 21.00)
19.78 ( ↓ 34.22 )
InstructBLIP (FlanT5XL)
4.1B
68.00
64.00( ↓ 4.00)
62.00( ↓ 6.00)
44.00 ( ↓ 24.00 )
44.67( ↓ 23.33)
Table 3: VQA results on six vision-language models under different adversarial attacks. Lower GPT-4 correctness indicates more effective attacks. Numbers in parentheses denote the absolute drop relative to clean samples. Bold indicates the best result.
Figure 5: Unified single-column 2×6 ablations: (a)–(d) optimization and perturbation, (e)–(j) X geometry, (k) shape, and (l) loss components.
Dataset
OpenAI L/14
OpenCLIP B/16
Meta-CLIP L/14
EVA-CLIP ViT-G/14
Average
COCO-300
59.33
70.00
39.33
36.29
51.24
COCO-1000
79.01
62.12
53.13
29.40
55.92
ImageNet-1K
99.58
97.55
98.19
84.73
95.01
ImageNet-R
73.56
66.89
54.34
56.48
62.82
Table 4: Cross-dataset U-ASR (%) across CLIP encoders. COCO-300 contains 300 images; all other datasets contain 1,000 images.
Appendix figures & tables4 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Setting
Default value
Evaluation set
COCO-300
Surrogate encoder
OpenCLIP ViT-B/16
Input resolution
384×384
Perturbation support
1,532 pixels (approximately 1.04%)
Optimization steps
100
Step size
0.03
Appendix
Table 5: Default configuration for the frozen ablation protocol.
Method
ASR
3407
3408
3409
Mean ± SD
Top- k
Targeted
94.67
94.00
94.67
94.44±0.38
XSPA
Targeted
83.00
83.00
84.33
83.44±0.77
Top- k
Untargeted
95.00
94.67
94.67
94.78±0.19
XSPA
Untargeted
86.67
86.67
87.00
86.78±0.19
Appendix
Table 6: Matched-budget ASR for saliency Top- k and XSPA on the same 300 image IDs. Every run uses a 1,532-pixel support, L∞=0.25 , 100 steps, and step size 0.03. Values are percentages.
Component
XSPA
Saliency Top- k
CLIP targeted
177/214 (82.71%)
203/214 (94.86%)
Caption targeted
0/214 (0.00%)
0/214 (0.00%)
VQA any
9/214 (4.21%)
8/214 (3.74%)
VQA all
3/214 (1.40%)
3/214 (1.40%)
Joint with VQA any
0/214 (0.00%)
0/214 (0.00%)
Joint with VQA all
0/214 (0.00%)
0/214 (0.00%)
Appendix
Table 8: Factorization of same-image targeted success on the 214 jointly eligible images. “VQA any” requires at least one eligible target answer; “VQA all” requires every eligible target answer for that image.
Task
Reliability measure
Estimate [95% CI]
Caption
Pearson r
0.580[0.255,0.801]
Caption
Spearman ρ
0.579[0.268,0.796]
Caption
ICC(A,1)
0.301[0.120,0.443]
Caption
MAE (0–30 scale)
3.683[3.050,4.367]
VQA
Exact agreement
0.933[0.850,1.000]
VQA
Cohen’s κ
0.815[0.526,1.000]
Appendix
Table 9: Inter-GPT judge calibration on 60 condition-items per task.
Adversarial attacks on vision-language models exploit images, text, and multimodal interactions to manipulate outputs, bypass safety, or degrade reliability.
Targeted adversarial attacks on Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) test whether small image perturbations can steer model responses toward attacker-specified content. Under the standard L-infinity constraint, targeted attacks become a regional perturbation budget allocation problem: attack success depends not only on the perturbation objective, but also on which regions receive updates and in what order. Existing localized attacks improve over global perturbations but rely on stochastic spatial sampling, often updating weakly influential regions. We address this limitation through an attention-based analysis showing that cross-modal attention identifies adversarially sensitive regions and that perturbing high-attention hotspots induces predictable redistribution toward subsequent salient regions. These findings motivate attention-guided region sequencing, which begins from dominant hotspots and progressively moves the update support toward next-salient regions. Based on these principles, we propose Stage-wise Attention-Guided Attack (SAGA), a black-box region-sequencing framework that uses a fixed attention map from an open-source LVLM to guide perturbation updates without accessing target-model parameters, gradients, or attention maps. Across ten closed-source and open-source LVLMs, SAGA achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates and the best overall imperceptibility. The source code is available at https://github.com/jaehyun-kwak/SAGA.
Vision-language models (VLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial image perturbations. Existing works based on adversarial training against task-specific adversarial examples are computationally expensive and often fail to generalize to unseen attack types. To address these limitations, we introduce Paraphrase-Decomposition-Aggregation (PDA), a training-free defense framework that leverages text augmentation to enhance VLM robustness under diverse adversarial image attacks. PDA performs prompt paraphrasing, question decomposition, and consistency aggregation entirely at test time, thus requiring no modification on the underlying models. To balance robustness and efficiency, we instantiate PDA as invariants that reduce the inference cost while retaining most of its robustness gains. Experiments on multiple VLM architectures and benchmarks for visual question answering, classification, and captioning show that PDA achieves consistent robustness gains against various adversarial perturbations while maintaining competitive clean accuracy, establishing a generic, strong and practical defense framework for VLMs during inference.
Jingning Xu, Haochen Luo, Chen Liu
Department of Computer Science City University of Hong Kong
Recent advances in vision-language models (VLMs) trained on web-scale image-text pairs have enabled impressive zero-shot transfer across a diverse range of visual tasks. However, comprehensive and independent evaluation beyond standard benchmarks is essential to understand their robustness, limitations, and real-world applicability. This paper presents a systematic evaluation framework for VLMs under natural adversarial scenarios for diverse downstream tasks, which has been overlooked in previous evaluation works. We evaluate a wide range of VLMs (CLIP, robust CLIP, BLIP2, and SigLIP2) on curated adversarial datasets (typographic attacks, ImageNet-A, and natural language-induced adversarial examples). We measure the natural adversarial performance of selected VLMs for zero-shot image classification, semantic segmentation, and visual question answering. Our analysis reveals that robust CLIP models can amplify natural adversarial vulnerabilities, and CLIP models significantly reduce performance for natural language-induced adversarial examples. Additionally, we provide interpretable analyses to identify failure modes. We hope our findings inspire future research in robust and fair multimodal pattern recognition.
Jia Chengyu, AprilPyone MaungMaung, Huy H. Nguyen +2
Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China · National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan