The integration of multimodal models into Presentation Attack Detection (PAD) for ID Documents represents a significant advancement in biometric security. Traditional PAD systems rely solely on visual features, which often fail to detect sophisticated spoofing attacks. This study explores the combination of visual and textual modalities by utilizing pre-trained multimodal models, such as Paligemma, Llava, and Qwen, to enhance the detection of presentation attacks on ID Documents. This approach merges deep visual embeddings with contextual metadata (e.g., document type, issuer, and date). However, experimental results indicate that these models struggle to accurately detect PAD on ID Documents.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1 : Multi-turn strategy.
Fig. 2 : Scoring process based on model output logits applied to each model. Example for prompts with answer “Yes” or “No”.
Fig. 3 : Attack examples for ID Cards and Passports.
Fig. 4 : Results of Exp. 1. Comparison of the use of technical terminology among models.
Fig. 5 : Visual keypoints of a spoof PVC ID Card.
Model
OCR
Security features
Material
Print quality
Total
PaliGemma
3
0
0
0
3 /12
LLaVA
3
2
1
H
6 /12
Qwen
3
H
H
0
3 /12
TABLE I : Results of Exp. 2. Visual Scores for PVC attack. Scores: 0 (Blindness), 1 (Mention), 2 (Guided detection), 3 (Spontaneous detection), H (Hallucination).
Prompt
Paligemma2 (%)
Llava1.6 (%)
QWEN2.5 (%)
APCER
BPCER
APCER
BPCER
APCER
BPCER
Single_turn_1
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
98.0
0.0
Single_turn_2
100.0
0.0
4.0
73.0
94.0
4.0
Single_turn_3
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
58.0
10.0
Multi-turn 1
N/A
N/A
2.0
98.0
0.0
100.0
Multi-turn 2
N/A
N/A
0.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
TABLE II : Results of Exp. 3. N/A: Represents a null value because PaliGemma2 is not a multi-turn Chatbot. The results represents de [email protected] and [email protected].
Prompt
Paligemma2 (%)
Llava1.6 (%)
QWEN2.5 (%)
EER
B10
B20
EER
B10
B20
EER
B10
B20
Single_turn_1
66.0
95.0
98.0
46.5
79.0
80.0
42.0
73.0
82.0
Single_turn_2
44.0
90.0
98.0
31.0
53.0
65.0
40.5
75.0
86.0
Single_turn_3
53.0
93.0
97.0
35.5
62.0
74.0
35.0
85.0
96.0
Multi turn_1
N/A
N/A
N/A
64.0
93.0
97.0
49.5
87.0
90.0
Multi turn_2
N/A
N/A
N/A
59.0
99.0
100.0
43.0
82.0
87.0
TABLE III : Results of Exp. 3 evaluated at fixed BPCER operating points (BPCER 10 and BPCER 20 ). N/A: Represents a null value because PaliGemma2 is not a multi-turn Chatbot. B10 and B20 represent the BPCER 10 and BPCER 20 respectively.
Fig. 6 : DET performance achieved for the best prompts on the multimodal models (Left to Right): Single_turn_3 , Simple_8 , and With_background_3 .
Cross-domain shifts challenge Presentation Attack Detection (PAD) on ID Cards, given the restricted data available due to privacy concerns. This work proposes a compact multimodal model, based on new generative and discriminative blocks, which combines visual and textual data for PAD on genuine and synthetic ID images. While multimodal models exhibit strong generalisation after supervised fine-tuning, they fail in zero-shot settings. Our findings underscore that model capacity and real-world data are essential for reliable PAD, while existing synthetic datasets may not reflect real-world challenges. We argue for a re-evaluation of synthetic data as a benchmark and emphasise the need for more realistic, diverse datasets to advance PAD research.
Qingwen Zeng, Juan E. Tapia, Sneha Das +1
Technical University of Denmark (DTU), Denmark · da/sec-Biometrics and Security Research Group, Hochschule Darmstadt, Germany
Presentation-Attack Detection (PAD) for national ID cards is limited by the lack of publicly available genuine samples, making it difficult for systems to generalize across countries. This paper introduces two main innovations: (1) a Prototypical Network head using an EfficientNet-V2-b0 backbone that requires only four genuine samples per class to create reliable prototypes; and (2) an episodic training regime that keeps PAD classes fixed while varying the card domain, allowing the network to learn universal attack cues. Evaluated on a large multi-country dataset and the public DLC-2021 benchmark, this method achieves an average Equal Error Rate of around 9%, outperforming conventional softmax and CLIP zero-shot baselines even with data from a single source country. This approach provides accurate, privacy-preserving PAD while minimizing data collection, facilitating scalable cross-jurisdictional remote onboarding.
Mario Nieto-Hidalgo, Juan M. Espin, Juan E. Tapia
Facephi, R&D Department, Spain. · da/sec-Biometrics and Internet Security Research Group. Hochschule Darmstadt, Germany.
Face recognition systems are increasingly deployed in security-critical applications, yet they remain vulnerable to presentation and morph attacks. Presentation attack detection (PAD) and morphing attack detection (MAD) are therefore essential components of trustworthy face biometrics. Despite advancements in PAD and MAD methods, existing detectors suffer from limited generalization and degrade in cross-dataset evaluation. In this paper, we systematically investigate whether general-purpose foundation models (FMs) and multimodal large language models (MLLMs) encode PAD-relevant and MAD-relevant information, and how such models can best be deployed for both tasks. We study five approaches with increasing access to the internal information of the model: (i) zero-shot prompting of off-the-shelf MLLMs; (ii) training a shallow model on the next-token logit probabilities at the output of the MLLM; (iii) parameter-efficient fine-tuning on task-specific question-answer data, yielding two specialized MLLMs, called PADLLM and MADLLM, which additionally provide textual reasoning for their decisions; (iv) linear probing of frozen vision encoders; and (v) fine-tuning of vision encoders of FMs and MLLMs. We benchmark 16 open-weight MLLMs and 30 vision encoder backbones on four PAD datasets (MSU-MFSD, CASIA-FASD, Replay-Attack, and OULU-NPU) and four MAD datasets (FFHQ, FRGC, FRLL, and FERET). Our experiments show that FMs and MLLMs can achieve significant performance for PAD and MAD. In addition, the fine-tuned models achieve state-of-the-art detection performance in cross-dataset evaluation, indicating that general-purpose pretrained representations carry substantial attack-relevant information. Source code of all our experiments will be publicly released.
Hatef Otroshi Shahreza, Asif Hussain Khan, Peter Lorenz +2
Idiap Research Institute, Switzerland · Université de Lausanne, Switzerland