cs.LGApr 1, 2026

Convergence of Byzantine-Resilient Gradient Tracking via Probabilistic Edge Dropout

Authors: Amirhossein Dezhboro, Fateme Maleki, Arman Adibi, Erfan Amini, Jose E. Ramirez-Marquez

Organizations: Department of Systems Engineering, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ 07030. · Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ 08854. · School of Computer and Cyber Sciences, Augusta University, Augusta, GA 30912. · Center for Climate Systems Research, Columbia University, Palisades, NY 10964.

Abstract

We study distributed optimization over networks with Byzantine agents that may send arbitrary adversarial messages. We propose Gradient Tracking with Probabilistic Edge Dropout (GT-PD), a stochastic gradient tracking method that preserves the convergence properties of gradient tracking under adversarial communication. GT-PD combines two complementary defense layers: a universal self-centered projection that clips each incoming message to a ball of radius ττ around the receiving agent, and a fully decentralized probabilistic dropout rule driven by a dual-metric trust score in the decision and tracking channels. This design bounds adversarial perturbations while preserving the doubly stochastic mixing structure, a property often lost under robust aggregation in decentralized settings. Under complete Byzantine isolation (pb=0p_b=0), GT-PD converges linearly to a neighborhood determined solely by stochastic gradient variance. For partial isolation (pb>0p_b>0), we introduce Gradient Tracking with Probabilistic Edge Dropout and Leaky Integration (GT-PD-L), which uses a leaky integrator to control the accumulation of tracking errors caused by persistent perturbations and achieves linear convergence to a bounded neighborhood determined by the stochastic variance and the clipping-to-leak ratio. We further show that under two-tier dropout with ph=1p_h=1, isolating Byzantine agents introduces no additional variance into the honest consensus dynamics. Experiments on MNIST under Sign Flip, ALIE, and Inner Product Manipulation attacks show that GT-PD-L outperforms coordinate-wise trimmed mean by up to 4.3 percentage points under stealth attacks.

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