Does Unification Come at a Cost? Uni-SafeBench: A Safety Benchmark for Unified Multimodal Large Models

Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs) offer powerful cross-modality capabilities but introduce new safety risks not observed in single-task models. Despite their emergence, existing safety benchmarks remain fragmented across tasks and modalities, limiting the comprehensive evaluation of complex system-level vulnerabilities. To address this gap, we introduce UniSAFE, the first comprehensive benchmark for system-level safety evaluation of UMMs across 7 I/O modality combinations, spanning conventional tasks and novel multimodal-context image generation settings. UniSAFE is built with a shared-target design that projects common risk scenarios across task-specific I/O configurations, enabling controlled cross-task comparisons of safety failures. Comprising 6,802 curated instances, we use UniSAFE to evaluate 15 state-of-the-art UMMs, both proprietary and open-source. Our results reveal critical vulnerabilities across current UMMs, including elevated safety violations in multi-image composition and multi-turn settings, with image-output tasks consistently more vulnerable than text-output tasks. These findings highlight the need for stronger system-level safety alignment for UMMs. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/segyulee/UniSAFE

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) and Text-to-Image (T2I) models have led to the emergence of Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs), where multimodal understanding and image generation are tightly integrated within a shared architecture. Prior studies suggest that such reciprocity enhances cross-functionality performance through shared representations and joint optimization. However, the safety implications of this tight coupling remain largely unexplored, as existing safety research predominantly analyzes understanding and generation functionalities in isolation. In this work, we investigate whether cross-functionality reciprocity itself constitutes a structural source of vulnerability in UMMs. We propose RICE: Reciprocal Interaction-based Cross-functionality Exploitation, a novel attack paradigm that explicitly exploits bidirectional interactions between understanding and generation. Using this framework, we systematically evaluate Generation-to-Understanding (G-U) and Understanding-to-Generation (U-G) attack pathways, demonstrating that unsafe intermediate signals can propagate across modalities and amplify safety risks. Extensive experiments show high Attack Success Rates (ASR) in both directions, revealing previously overlooked safety weaknesses inherent to UMMs.

Existing multimodal safety benchmarks focus solely on visual inputs and cannot assess Omni Large Language Models (LLMs) that process vision, audio, and text. We introduce MCBench, a benchmark with 1196 scenarios spanning four safety categories that require integrating multiple modalities for accurate safety assessment. Each unsafe scenario is paired with a minimally different safe counterpart to assess model sensitivity. Our evaluations of state-of-the-art models reveal significant challenges. Omni LLMs struggle with subtle or non-physical risks but perform better when salient visual or acoustic cues are present. Analysis of reasoning traces shows that, although models can extract modality-specific information, they often fail to integrate these cues effectively for safety judgments. Our findings reveal that current Omni LLMs lack robust cross-modal reasoning in safety-critical settings, underscoring the need for improved architectures and training strategies for multimodal safety.