Trivial Vocabulary Bans Improve LLM Reasoning More Than Deep Linguistic Constraints

A standard recipe for distilling the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) is to sample chains of thought from the model, keep those that reach the correct final answer, and fine-tune on the survivors. When sampling fails, a common fix shows the generator the gold answer and asks it to write a chain that reaches that answer. We show that this second step degrades the training data in a way that correctness filtering cannot catch. We run a controlled experiment that fixes the generator, the problem set, and the correctness filter, and varies only whether the chain is generated under answer-conditioning, the gold answer shown with a request to reach it. Training a strong instruction-tuned reasoning model on its own answer-conditioned chains sharply lowers its verifiable-reasoning accuracy. The loss grows with difficulty, reaching as much as about 27 points on the hardest competition problems. The mechanism is legible in the chains themselves, which rationalize backward from the shown answer instead of deriving it, with the early final-answer statement as the measurable symptom. The harm is a property of the data rather than the generator, read off unlabeled generations before any fine-tuning, ordering the penalty across eight thinking models from four families, and transferring across teacher families. A prompt ablation localizes it to the rationalize-toward instruction rather than the answer's bare visibility. The practical takeaway is to generate answer-blind, because no correctness filter can see this damage in the data.

Asked whether to walk or drive to a car wash 50 m away, most language models say walk, forgetting that the car has to be there. Such failures are usually measured by accuracy on questions where the hidden constraint applies. We show that this is misleading: a model can answer these questions correctly without reasoning about the constraint at all, simply by favoring the cautious option. We instead ask whether a model's decision changes when the constraint is removed. We test this at three levels of control: log-probability sweeps on open-weight models, a 500-prompt stress test, and CORE, a new human-validated benchmark of minimal constraint-present/constraint-absent pairs. The picture is consistent. The constraint nudges decisions rather than governing them. Models still miss presence constraints like the car wash, yet elsewhere they apply constraints that are not there. As a result, standard accuracy flatters all ten models we evaluate and reorders their ranking, and prompting fixes that look effective largely vanish under paired scoring. Claims about hidden-constraint reasoning need paired evidence.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in complex reasoning tasks, they have learned to heavily prioritize explicit conditions provided in the input. However, in everyday commonsense reasoning, this mechanism exposes a critical vulnerability which we term Salience Bias: models become easily hijacked by useless explicit distractors (e.g., numerical values), leading them to ignore the implicit physical or commonsense prerequisites of a task. A critical open question is whether this failure reflects a genuine gap in commonsense knowledge or merely its suppression under misleading task framing. To investigate this, we construct the SaliTrap Benchmark, a high-quality dataset across four trap dimensions. Evaluating 12 state-of-the-art LLMs, we find that all mainstream models suffer significantly from salience bias, with severity scaling with distractor density and detecting the trap often decoupled from actually avoiding it. Crucially, by re-eliciting the same models with the task framing stripped away, we show that this is overwhelmingly a failure of knowledge suppression rather than knowledge absence: a context-free knowledge probe alone recovers over 90% of sycophantic-compliance failures, revealing that the requisite commonsense is intrinsically present but actively crowded out by salient distractors that lure the model into over-compliant, unnecessary computation. Building on this diagnosis, we further show that lightweight, inference-time prompting alone substantially closes the gap without any retraining. Our findings relocate the bottleneck of commonsense reasoning failures from model competence to elicitation, and we release SaliTrap as a testbed for this blind spot. The codes are available at https://github.com/Wuzheng02/SaliTrap.