Emergent Inference-Time Semantic Contamination via In-Context Priming

Safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to interventions during inference that redirect generation toward harmful outputs. Recent work attributes this to shallow safety, where alignment concentrates in the first few output tokens. We show that shallow safety is a special case of a broader inference-time vulnerability, in which short token injections at any generation step can substantially alter subsequent safety behavior. We also find that a model's alignment with refusal directions in its hidden states does not predict its robustness to such injection, revealing that internal state alone does not determine generation behavior under perturbation. To address this, we align models directly on generation trajectories constructed by simulating mid-sequence perturbation, and show that this improves robustness to mid-sequence injection and generalizes to attacks that exploit early-token generation. Our work argues that robust safety alignment requires training on the generation process itself, not only its outputs.

Large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreaks that elicit harmful responses, yet the mechanism behind harmful response generation is poorly understood. Here, we investigate how this capability is organized within model parameters. We identify and prune parameters that specifically support harmful compliance, providing a direct mechanistic analysis at the parameter level. We find that this capability depends on a sparse set of critical parameters: pruning these parameters substantially reduces harmful compliance while causing only limited degradation in benign capabilities, suggesting that key components of harmful generation are separable from those of general utility. Parameters identified from one harm category also reduce harmful responses in others, indicating components shared across harm types. This separability appears primarily in aligned models, suggesting that alignment training internally reshapes the harmful response mechanism even when behavioral safeguards remain brittle. We further show that harmful response generation is dissociable from the ability to recognize and reason about harmfulness. Finally, we extend our analysis to emergent misalignment and identify a sparse set of parameters contributing to it, with substantial sharing across fine-tuning domains. Together, these results reveal a consistent parameter-level organization underlying unsafe behaviors and point toward more principled interventions for improving model safety.

Fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) on benign narrow data can sometimes induce broad harmful behaviors, a vulnerability termed emergent misalignment (EM). While prior work links these failures to specific directions in the activation space, their relationship to the model's broader persona remains unexplored. We map the latent personality space of LLMs through established psychometric profiles like the Big Five, Dark Triad, and LLM-specific behaviors (e.g. evil, sycophancy), and show that the semantic geometry is highly stable across aligned models and their corrupted fine-tunes. Through causal interventions, we find that directions isolating social valence, such as the 'Evil' persona vector, and a Semantic Valence Vector (SVV) that we introduce, function as intrinsic guardrails: ablating them drives the misalignment rates above $40$%, while amplifying them suppresses the failure mode to less than $3$%. Leveraging the structural stability of the personality space, we show that vectors extracted $\textit{a priori}$ from an instruct-tuned model transfer zero-shot to successfully regulate EM in corrupted fine-tunes. Overall, our findings suggest that harmful fine-tuning does not overwrite a model's internal representation of personality, allowing conserved representations to serve as robust, cross-distribution guardrails.