Organizations: OPTML, Michigan State University · MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab, IBM Research · University of Minnesota · University of Michigan · University of Colorado Boulder
Foundation models, such as large language models (LLMs), are powerful but often require customization before deployment to satisfy practical constraints such as safety, privacy, and task-specific requirements, leading to "constrained" optimization problems for model steering and adaptation. However, solving such problems remains largely underexplored and is particularly challenging due to interference between the primary objective and constraint objectives during optimization. In this paper, we propose a subspace control framework for constrained model training. Specifically, (i) we first analyze, from a model merging perspective, how spectral cross-task interference arises and show that it can be resolved via a one-shot solution that orthogonalizes the merged subspace; (ii) we establish a connection between this solution and gradient orthogonalization in the spectral optimizer Muon; and (iii) building on these insights, we introduce SIFT (spectral interference-free training), which leverages a localization scheme to selectively intervene during optimization, enabling controllable updates that mitigate objective-constraint conflicts. We evaluate SIFT across four representative applications: (a) machine unlearning, (b) safety alignment, (c) text-to-speech adaptation, and (d) hallucination mitigation. Compared to both control-based and control-free baselines, SIFT consistently achieves substantial and robust performance improvements across all tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/SIFT.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Schematic overview of proposed subspace control framework, SIFT. ( A ) Performance across four model steering tasks (detailed in Tables 1 and 2 ), compared with the baseline BLUR ( Reisizadeh et al., 2025 ) . ( B ) When and where to control : SIFT enables selective intervention at targeted layers and training steps ( i.e. , spatial-temporal localization). ( C ) How to control : Built on spectral optimizer Muon, SIFT leverages gradient orthogonalization (the matrix sign function) to mitigate subspace interference.
Application
Primary Objective f
Constraint Objective g
Machine unlearning (§ 5.2 )
MSE (mean squared error) loss of representation alignment on a retain dataset ( Li et al., 2024 )
RMU (representation misdirection unlearning) loss on a forget dataset ( Li et al., 2024 )
Safety alignment (§ 5.3 )
CE (cross-entropy)-based SFT (supervised fine-tuning) loss on a utility dataset
DPO (direct preference optimization) loss on a safety dataset ( Rafailov et al., 2023 )
Text-to-speech adaptation (§ 5.4 )
CE loss on text generation ( Zeng et al., 2024b )
CE loss on speech generation ( Zeng et al., 2024b )
Hallucination mitigation (§ 5.5 )
CE-based prediction loss on non-hallucinated tokens
Negative CE loss on hallucinated tokens
Table 1: Specification of the constrained formulation across different applications.
Figure 2: Visualization of cosine similarity τ across optimization steps ( temporal dimension) and model layers ( spatial dimension) in LLM unlearning. The top and right marginal plots summarize the counts of τ<−0.1 across steps and layers, respectively. Red stars ⋆ mark steps and layers need for control.
Figure 3: Utility loss under different descent directions starting from a model at step 35 of the unlearning process. Multiple update steps are performed along the full gradient, projected gradient, and removed component, respectively. The unlearning setup is the same as in Fig. 2 .
Figure 4: Sparse localization across applications. Temporal sparsity is the fraction of all training steps, and spatial sparsity is the fraction of all model components where SIFT is activated.
Applications
Training Datasets
Base LLM
Evaluation
Machine unlearning
Forget: WMDP ( Li et al., 2024 ) Retain: Wikitext ( Merity et al., 2016 )
zephyr-7b-beta
Unlearning ( ↓ ): ES-Bio/Cyber ( Yuan et al., 2024 ) , MCQ-Bio/Cyber ( Li et al., 2024 ) Utility ( ↑ ): MMLU ( Hendrycks et al., 2021 ) , TruthfulQA ( Lin et al., 2021 ) , IFEval ( Zhou et al., 2023 ) , GSM8K ( Cobbe et al., 2021 )
Safety alignment
Safety: PKU-SafeRLHF ( Ji et al., 2024 ) Utility: Alpaca ( Taori et al., 2023 )
Llama-2-7b
Safety ( ↑ ) ( Wang et al., 2025 ) : Strong Reject, JBB-Behaviors, Wild Jailbreak Utility ( ↑ ): MMLU, GSM8K, IFEval, MNLI ( Wang et al., 2019 ) , MRPC ( Wang et al., 2019 )
ESNLI ( Camburu et al., 2018 ) COSE ( Rajani et al., 2019 ) OpenBookQA ( Mihaylov et al., 2018 )
GLM-4-Voice ( Zeng et al., 2024a )
Test accuracy ( ↑ ) on ESNLI, COSE, and OpenBookQA under four cross-modal input -output settings: “Audio → Text”, “Audio → Audio”, “Text → Audio”, “Text → Text”
Table 2: Overview of experimental setups for different applications.
Methods
Unlearning Performance (%)
Utility Performance (%)
Runtime (min)
ES-Bio ↓
ES-Cyber ↓
MCQ-Bio ↓
MCQ-Cyber ↓
MMLU ↑
TruthfulQA ↑
IFEval ↑
GSM8K ↑
Base Model
62.3 ±0.3
46.7 ±0.2
64.1 ±0.2
44.8 ±0.4
58.2 ±0.3
39.5 ±0.2
10.4 ±0.3
35.6 ±0.4
N/A
AdamW
14.6 ±0.3
26.3 ±0.2
31.7 ±0.4
29.4 ±0.3
57.1 ±0.3
40.8 ±0.4
9.2 ±0.2
33.9 ±0.3
8.8
Muon
14.2 ±0.2
30.5 ±0.3
31.3 ±0.2
28.6 ±0.2
56.4 ±0.1
37.9 ±0.2
8.7 ±0.4
34.1 ±0.3
11.8
POME
15.8 ±0.4
29.6 ±0.3
29.2 ±0.3
27.5 ±0.2
57.3 ±0.3
38.4 ±0.4
9.6 ±0.2
34.7 ±0.3
9.9
BLUR
9.3 ±0.2
24.8 ±0.2
28.6 ±0.3
27.3 ±0.3
57.1 ±0.3
39.2 ±0.1
9.1 ±0.2
33.5 ±0.3
9.4
Table 3: Performance of LLM unlearning for removing hazardous content generation on WMDP. ES-Bio/Cyber denotes the entailment score (ES) ( Yuan et al., 2024 ; Fan et al., 2025 ) measuring unlearning effectiveness via factual consistency with the pre-unlearned model on WMDP Bio and Cyber sets. MCQ-Bio/Cyber denotes multi-choice question (MCQ) accuracy on the same sets; Model utility is evaluated on standard benchmarks. Superscripts indicate standard deviations over 10 random trials.
Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis of SIFT with respect to the top- K subspace dimension. Left: effective rank of momentum matrices. Right: unlearning and utility performance under varying K .
Methods
Safety Performance (%)
Utility Performance (%)
Runtime (min)
SR ↑
JBB ↑
WJ ↑
MMLU ↑
GSM8K ↑
IFEval ↑
MNLI ↑
MRPC ↑
Base model
19.5 ±0.8
14.0 ±1.2
47.6 ±1.2
41.3 ±0.3
14.7 ±0.8
34.2 ±0.4
42.8 ±0.3
69.5 ±0.2
N/A
AdamW
33.2 ±0.6
28.0 ±1.1
52.8 ±0.4
36.6 ±0.5
8.4 ±0.9
31.9 ±0.3
36.2 ±0.2
62.7 ±0.3
110.3
Muon
36.4 ±0.3
26.0 ±1.3
52.0 ±0.9
36.1 ±0.5
9.5 ±0.7
30.4 ±0.4
32.8 ±0.1
63.3 ±0.4
191.2
POME
36.7 ±0.6
26.0 ±1.1
51.6 ±1.2
38.7 ±0.3
9.2 ±0.5
31.6 ±0.5
32.5 ±0.2
62.1 ±0.5
115.4
BLUR
35.8 ±0.3
29.0 ±0.5
54.4 ±0.9
37.4 ±0.6
9.8 ±0.4
31.3 ±0.8
37.6 ±0.4
65.9 ±0.2
114.7
Table 4: Safety alignment performance across optimization methods. Higher scores on Strong Reject, JBB, and Wild Jailbreak indicate stronger safety, while higher scores on downstream tasks (MMLU, GSM8K, IFEval, MNLI, MRPC) indicate better utility. Evaluation metrics are specified in Table 2 and results format follows Table 3 .
Methods
Audio → Text ( ↑ )
Audio → Audio ( ↑ )
Text → Text ( ↑ )
Text → Audio ( ↑ )
Runtime (min)
ESNLI
COSE
OpenBook
ESNLI
COSE
OpenBook
ESNLI
COSE
OpenBook
ESNLI
COSE
OpenBook
Base
27.2 ±1.1
42.1 ±1.1
12.6 ±1.3
20.1 ±2.1
41.6 ±2.2
11.2 ±2.4
60.6 ±0.5
66.2 ±0.6
54.7 ±0.8
42.8 ±1.5
34.5 ±1.5
43.4 ±1.8
N/A
AdamW
70.3 ±1.0
46.7 ±1.3
48.6 ±1.2
68.6 ±1.7
48.1 ±2.2
27.5 ±2.2
78.9 ±0.5
74.1 ±0.6
68.2 ±0.8
74.1 ±1.8
52.9 ±1.9
54.2 ±1.5
44.6
Muon
73.6 ±1.2
48.5 ±1.1
53.4 ±1.2
71.5 ±2.4
49.1 ±2.1
27.3 ±2.5
79.9 ±0.5
72.8 ±0.6
64.4 ±0.9
74.3 ±1.6
52.4 ±1.5
53.8 ±1.9
47.9
POME
73.3 ±1.1
47.2 ±1.4
53.4 ±1.3
70.6 ±1.9
48.2 ±2.1
25.7 ±2.5
80.6 ±0.5
72.3 ±0.5
64.5 ±0.9
74.1 ±1.5
52.2 ±1.6
53.7 ±2.0
24.7
BLUR
69.6 ±1.2
43.2 ±1.2
47.1 ±1.3
68.6 ±2.4
44.1 ±2.5
20.4 ±2.3
80.1 ±0.5
72.2 ±0.6
63.1 ±0.8
77.4 ±1.9
53.6 ±1.7
51.5 ±1.6
46.1
Table 5: Test accuracy ( ↑ ) of the speech LLM trained on interleaved speech–text data constructed from ESNLI, COSE, and OpenBookQA under four input–output settings (e.g., “Audio → Text” denotes audio input and text output). Evaluation metrics and result format follow Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
Figure 6: Localization patterns under the dataset ESNLI. Components are grouped by Transformer layer: each layer comprises self-attention module (Q, K, V, Out) and feed-forward module (FC1, FC2). The presenting format follows Fig. 2 .
Methods
Hallucination Rate ( ↓ )
Utility Performance ( ↑ )
Runtime (min)
MMLU
GSM8K
TruthfulQA
QNLI
MNLI
Base model
73.2 ±1.6
46.5 ±0.4
20.4 ±1.1
30.2 ±1.6
68.7 ±0.6
56.2 ±0.5
N/A
AdamW
39.1 ±1.9
46.1 ±0.4
17.4 ±1.1
28.9 ±1.6
68.3 ±0.6
56.2 ±0.5
8.1
Muon
38.5 ±1.7
46.2 ±0.4
17.8 ±1.1
29.0 ±1.5
68.2 ±0.6
56.2 ±0.5
12.0
POME
41.1 ±1.5
46.0 ±0.4
17.8 ±1.1
29.2 ±1.6
68.2 ±0.6
56.1 ±0.5
10.6
BLUR
44.3 ±2.2
46.0 ±0.4
15.4 ±1.0
27.1 ±1.6
68.0 ±0.6
56.2 ±0.5
8.6
Table 6: Performance of hallucination mitigation on RAGTruth. Hallucination rate measures the proportion of responses containing hallucinated content (judged by GPT-5.2); lower is better.
Figure A1: Localization patterns of SIFT for safety alignment, similar to Fig. 2 .
Figure A2: Sensitivity analysis on subspace dimension K in SIFT for safety alignment. ( Left ) The effective rank of the momentum matrices computed across SIFT-localized layers (15, 18, and 22) under different energy thresholds. ( Right ) Performance of SIFT under varying K , where Safety denotes the average over all safety metrics, and Utility denotes the average over all utility metrics in Table 4 .
Figure A3: Example of interleaved speech–text data constructed from COSE’s training set.
Input query
Summarize the following news within 161 words: …Five people were infected and three died in the past year in Kansas from listeria that might be linked to Blue Bell Creameries products, according to the CDC…
Original Model
… This is the third time Blue Bell has taken action due to listeria contamination, and the company is cooperating with investigations. No illnesses have been reported directly linked to the contaminated ice cream, but five people in Kansas have died from listeriosis in the past year after consuming Blue Bell products.
Mitigated model
…This recall follows past listeria outbreaks in Kansas and Texas, where five people were infected and three died, some after consuming milkshakes made with Blue Bell ice cream. Blue Bell is cooperating with authorities, emphasizing safety, and other Blue Bell products are not affected.
Table A1: Example responses from the base model and the SIFT-updated model for an input query sampled from the RAGTruth dataset. Red text indicates hallucinated content.
Figure A4: In each Transformer layer, “Q”, “K”, and “V” denote the query, key, and value projection matrices, and “O” denotes the output projection of the self - attention module. “G”, “U”, and “D” denote the gating, up - projection, and down - projection components of the feed - forward network.
Open-weight foundation models can be fine-tuned for harmful purposes after release, yet no existing training resistance methods provide theoretical guarantees. Treating these interventions as convergence-rate control problems allows us to connect optimization speed to the spectral structure of model weights. We leverage this insight to develop a novel understanding of convergence rate control through spectral reparameterization and derive an algorithm, SpecDef, that can both provably and empirically slow first- and second-order optimization in non-adversarial settings. In adversarial settings, we establish a fundamental limit on a broad class of convergence rate control methods including our own: an attacker with sufficient knowledge can restore fast convergence at a linear increase in model size. In order to overcome this limitation, future works will need to investigate methods that are not equivalent to controlling convergence rate.
Domenic Rosati, Xijie Zeng, Hong Huang +4
Dalhousie University · Vector Institute · Indian Institute of Management Bangalore
Continual learning (CL) and model merging (MM) both aim to obtain a single model that performs well across multiple tasks, challenged respectively by catastrophic forgetting and weight-disentanglement error. In the literature, these difficulties are merely treated separately and mitigated through a variety of solutions, while the geometry induced by the base optimizer is treated as an implementation detail. In this work, we show that the two difficulties are in fact two instances of the same phenomenon: a parameter update useful for one task shifts the model's outputs on another. We formalize this shared phenomenon as task interference and reduce it to a common layer-wise Frobenius inner product ⟨ΔWℓ,Jℓ(x)⟩F. This quantity, in turn, is utilized to expose the role of the optimizer. We theoretically derive an upper bound that isolates the spectral norm ∥ΔWℓ∥2 as an optimizer-controllable factor of task interference, and a per-mode analysis shows that this bound tracks the dominant part of the empirical interference. Specifically, we then identify the recent Muon optimizer as a mechanism that regulates this factor by construction. Our work reveals that its elegant control on spectral norm tightens the interference bound for both CL and MM, positioning Muon as a principled optimizer-centric approach complementary to existing solutions. Our theoretcal analysis is well validated by experimental results. Replacing the AdamW optimizer with Muon improves accuracy by up to +5.02 points on the eight-task model-merging benchmark across three CLIP backbones. For continual learning, Muon also delivers uniformly positive gains across ten class-incremental protocols, three task-incremental protocols, and the 11-task MTIL benchmark.
Shangge Liu, Yuehan Yin, Yinghuan Shi +2
State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University · University of Wollongong
While spectral-based optimizers like Muon operate directly on the spectrum of updates, standard adaptive methods such as AdamW do not account for the spectral structure of weights and gradients, leaving them vulnerable to two empirical issues in large language model (LLM) training: (i) the optimizer updates can have large spectral norms, potentially destabilizing training and degrading generalization; (ii) stochastic gradient noise can exhibit sparse spectral spikes, with a few dominant singular values much larger than the rest. We propose SPECTRA, a general framework addressing these by (i) post-spectral clipping of updates to enforce spectral-norm constraints (ii) optional pre-spectral clipping of gradients to suppress spectral noise spikes. We prove that post-clipping constitutes a Composite Frank-Wolfe method with spectral-norm constraints and weight regularization. We further analyze how pre-clipping mitigates sparse spectral spikes. We propose efficient soft spectral clipping via Newton-Schulz iterations, avoiding expensive SVD. Experiments on LLM pretraining show SPECTRA uniformly improves validation loss for various optimizers, including AdamW, Signum, Mars, and AdEMAMix, with the best-performing variants achieving state-of-the-art results. Models trained with SPECTRA exhibit smaller weight norms, confirming the link between spectral clipping and regularization.
Xiaowen Jiang, Andrei Semenov, Sebastian U. Stich
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarbrücken, Germany · Universität des Saarlandes, Saarbrücken, Germany · EPFL