Plausibility as Commonsense Reasoning: Humans Succeed, Large Language Models Do not

Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.

Presupposition projection in conditionals is central to theories of meaning and pragmatics, yet it remains largely unevaluated in large language models. We address this gap through a parallel behavioral study comparing human judgments and LLM predictions on a normed dataset of conditional sentences that controls the relation between the antecedent and the projected presupposition. We collect likelihood ratings from 120 participants and four LLMs under matched contextual conditions. Results show that humans integrate probabilistic and pragmatic cues in their judgment, whereas LLMs show variable alignment with human patterns. Using a linguistically motivated checklist within an LLM-as-a-Judge framework, we further evaluate model reasoning. We observe models that best match human ratings often lack coherent pragmatic reasoning, while models with stronger reasoning produce less human-like judgments. These findings suggest that LLMs' performance on such tasks may result from surface pattern matching rather than pragmatic competence. Our findings highlight the importance of benchmarks grounded in linguistic theory for comparing humans and models.

Grammaticality and likelihood are distinct notions in human language. Pretrained language models (LMs), which are probabilistic models of language fitted to maximize corpus likelihood, generate grammatically well-formed text and discriminate well between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences in tightly controlled minimal pairs. However, their string probabilities do not sharply discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences overall. But do LMs implicitly acquire a grammaticality distinction distinct from string probability? We explore this question through studying internal representations of LMs, by training a linear probe on a dataset of grammatical and (synthetic) ungrammatical sentences obtained by applying perturbations to a naturalistic text corpus. We find that this simple grammaticality probe generalizes to human-curated grammaticality judgment benchmarks and outperforms LM probability-based grammaticality judgments. When applied to semantic plausibility benchmarks, in which both members of a minimal pair are grammatical and differ in only plausibility, the probe however performs worse than string probability. The English-trained probe also exhibits nontrivial cross-lingual generalization, outperforming string probabilities on grammaticality benchmarks in numerous other languages. Additionally, probe scores correlate only weakly with string probabilities. These results collectively suggest that LMs acquire to some extent an implicit grammaticality distinction within their hidden layers.